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Abstract
In this dissertation I exploit observational and experimental data to study individual
decision making when agents face social interactions or are described by non-standard
neoclassical preferences.
In the first chapter I study how social interactions, could explain occupational
choice in an incomplete information setting. In a discrete choice framework I allow for
group unobservables affecting decisions. I show that asymmetries in the peer influence
enables to separately identify the effects from group members’ expected behaviour and
the effects from their characteristics. I provide an empirical application to nineteenth
century London. The results show that social networks were important in determining
occupations but are somewhat lower than estimates which do not impose consistent
beliefs nor allow for unobservables.
Secondly, I implement an artefactual field experiment with small entrepreneurs.
Subjects were given an initial amount of money to be invested across alternatives.
Some of the subjects were informed about the possibility of getting either a high or
a low income level. The income level was either predetermined or allocated after a
fair lottery. Agents who started with a low income after the lottery were more risk
loving. A model of reference–dependent preferences with multiple reference points,
formed through recently held expectations on foregone and actual outcomes, fits most
of the experimental results.
In the last chapter I study game interactions in interdependent value auctions fol-
lowing Kim (2003). Agents are asymmetrically informed in terms of how precisely
they know the different aspects of the object’s value. Due to the mismatch of bidding
strategies between these bidders, the second-price auction is inefficient. The English
auction has an equilibrium in which bidders can infer information and attain efficiency.
The increase in perfectly informed bidders increases the seller’s revenue. A laboratory
experiment confirms key predictions about efficiency and revenues and reveals naive
bidding.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this dissertation I exploit observational and experimental data, together with microe-
conomic models, to study individual decision making when agents are subject to social
interactions or are better described by non-standard neoclassical preferences. Social
interactions are important for labour market or goods acquisition decisions when indi-
viduals are asymmetrically informed or have interdependent valuations. Non-standard
preferences, in the shape of reference points against which one can compare outcomes
from actions, could better describe investment decisions when individuals hold expec-
tations about potential outcomes.
In chapter 2 I study how non–market institutions, mediated through local interac-
tions among members of the same social group, could explain occupational choice in an
incomplete information setting. This chapter presents a multinomial choice model with
social interactions and heterogeneous beliefs. Individuals form heterogeneous expected
behaviours of peers by taking into account their characteristics and the strength of their
ties. Given the asymmetries on peer influences, even when unobservables hit the group
as a whole, the effect from group members’ expected behaviour (endogenous effect)
and from peers’ characteristics (contextual effect) are separately identified. I provide
an empirical application to nineteenth century London and explore the importance of
social networks in determining occupational choice. As ecclesiastical parishes were at
the heart of social identity, groups are delimited by their boundaries. Using a novel
dataset that pins residential locations down to the street level, I measure the strength
of ties between members of a group based on geographical proximity. The unique
two-tier administration which attributed the public good provision responsibility to a
grouping of parishes allows me to mitigate the self-selection bias. My results show that
social networks were important in determining occupational choice. Failing to allow
for correlated effects leads to the overestimation of the true endogenous effect. Once
13
1. Introduction
multiple equilibria and group unobservables are accounted for we still find significant
and positive effects for individuals unemployed and in industrial occupations, while a
significant and negative effect for commercial occupations. Social interactions do not
seem to matter for domestic and professional occupations.
Then, I investigate how reference–dependent preferences affect the individual de-
cision making process and thus can help to understand economic phenomena. Such
reference–dependence is characterized by preferences that have embedded points against
which individuals weight the outcomes from their choices. Falling behind them is felt
as a loss that looms larger than a commensurable gain when surpassing them.
My research aim in this area is to understand the nature of reference points, in
particular whether expectations could determine them. In chapter 3 I implement an
artefactual field experiment on a sample of Colombian informal small entrepreneurs.
Subjects were given an initial amount of money to be allocated across different invest-
ment alternatives. A high or low initial amount of money was given to the subjects
(Income Variation). Further, some of the subjects were informed about the possibility
of getting either income level which was then to be determined by a coin toss, while
the rest was assigned a predetermined income level (Reference Point Variation). The
experimental results suggest that agents who started with a low income were more
prone to invest if they faced the lottery on possible initial incomes compared to all
other treatments. A model of reference–dependent preferences with multiple reference
points is provided which fits most of the experimental results. In such model, recently
held expectations on foregone and actual outcomes play a role in the decision making.
Those with a predetermined initial income decide as if that income constitutes their
reference point, while those who faced the initial lottery behave as if weighting their
decisions against the foregone and actual one.
In the last chapter 4 I continue studying game theoretical interactions with asym-
metric information, but now in an interdependent value auction setting. I follow Kim
(2003)’s model were agents are asymmetrically informed in terms of how precisely they
know about different aspects of the object’s value and study two standard auction for-
mats – the second-price (sealed-bid) auction and the English auction. Some bidders
are perfectly informed about their value (insiders), while the rest only know the pri-
vate component of their value (outsiders). Due to the mismatch of bidding strategies
between informed and imperfectly–informed bidders, the second-price auction is ineffi-
cient. The English auction has an equilibrium in which imperfectly–informed bidders
can infer, from the history of prices at which other bidders drop out, relevant informa-
tion to attain efficiency. The increase in insider information by switching an outsider
to an insider has a positive impact on the seller’s revenue reminiscent of the linkage
14
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principle of Milgrom & Weber (1982a). A laboratory experiment confirms key theoret-
ical predictions about efficiency and revenues. Nevertheless, there is evidence on naive
bidding which declines in the number of insiders in the English auction.
The present thesis contributes to the literature on several fronts. First, chapter 2
adds to the scarce literature on multinomial choice models with social interaction by
allowing for group–level unobservables and a network structure.
Secondly, due to the lack of information on actual contact, researchers usually proxy
the relevant group using some arbitrary metric of distance based on social and/or ge-
ographical proximity (Gaviria & Raphael 2001, Hanushek, Kain, Markman & Rivkin
2003, Hoxby 2000, Sacerdote 2001, Solon, Page & Duncan 2000) In the modern world,
there is a legitimate concern that physical distance may have become less and less
important in shaping social networks. Therefore, focusing on this historical time pe-
riod provides the advantage that I have a more credible proxy for social networks as
interactions were mostly geographic in nature. Moreover, the religious property of my
measure offers an additional dimension to social networks.
Third, thanks to the unique administration layout of the period studied, I provide
plausible reasons why adding a fixed effects at the administrative level might better
control for self-selection into a group.
The second chapter adds a piece of evidence on the role expectations play in shap-
ing reference points. In particular, the experimental results suggest that recently held
expectations on both: possible income levels (i.e. counterfactuals) and actual experi-
enced income level affect individual decision making. Therefore, foregone opportunities
as well as actual experiences serve as benchmarks against which individuals may com-
pare prospective outcomes from current actions. This is evidence that not only forward
looking expectations (Ko¨szegi & Rabin 2006) may affect reference point formation.
Most of the previous papers on investment decisions with reference–dependent pref-
erences (Berkelaar, Kouwenberg & Post 2004, Gomes 2005, Siegmann 2002, Yogo 2008)
do not allow for beliefs to play a role in determining the reference point, and therefore
they are usually deterministic with an adjustment based on starting conditions and
recent outcomes. Our approach fills this gap.
On the other hand, chapter 4 brings new insights to the literature concerning the al-
locative efficiency, of two standard auction formats, in the interdependent value auction
setting when bidders are asymmetrically informed (Krishna 2003). The experimental
findings contribute to the experimental literature of auctions. Most work in this field
have focused on either private value auctions or pure common value auctions (Kagel &
Levin 2011, 1995).
In what follows I present the chapter on social interactions, heterogeneous beliefs
15
1. Introduction
and occupational choice (chapter 2). Then I study reference points formation and
investment decisions (chapter 3) and then move to the analysis of auctions in an inter-
dependent value setting with asymmetrically informed bidders (chapter 4). The final
chapter 5 provides some concluding remarks and directions of future work
16
Chapter 2
Occupational choice and social
interactions: A Study of
Victorian London
“Society is tending more and more to spread into classes, – and not merely classes but localised
classes, class–colonies. It is not in London merely, nor as a matter of business, and in consequence of
the division of labour that this happens. It is not simply that lawyers dwell with lawyers in the
Temple, publishers with publishers in the Row, bankers with bankers in Lombard street, merchants
with merchants in Mark lane, carriage-makers with carriage-makers in Long Acre, and weavers with
weavers in Spitalfields. But there is a much deeper social principle involved in the present increasing
tendency to class-colonies.”
— The Economist, June 20, 1857
2.1 Introduction
Despite the wide literature on social interactions and their importance in shaping in-
dividual behaviours, in particular labour market decisions (Topa 2011), credibly iden-
tifying social interactions remains challenging. First, the researcher must determine
the appropriate reference group. Second, unobserved attributes that are correlated
between peers, due to self-selection into the group or common information shocks, may
generate a problem of confounding variables (correlated effects). Third, the reflection
0We thank the Archaeology Department of the Museum of London for sharing their geographical
referencing of London’s historical map. Daniel Felipe Martinez Enriquez assisted us in the extension of
this map. The authors acknowledge the use of the UCL Legion High Performance Computing Facility
(Legion@UCL), and associated support services, in the completion of this work. We are grateful to all
discussants of IFS, UCL and Cambridge-INET Institute and HCEO Chicago Summer School in Social
Economics, University of Cambridge for their comments.
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2.1. Introduction 2. Occupational choice and social interactions
problem or the simultaneity in peer behaviour may hinder identification of contextual
effects (the influence of peer attributes) from endogenous effects (the influence of peer
outcomes) (Manski 1993). Discrete choice frameworks face further challenges. In par-
ticular, the beliefs equilibrium condition cannot be made implicit in the reduced form
due to non–linearities. For the same reason, multiplicity of the equilibrium must be
taken into account in order to get consistent and efficient estimates.1
Our aim in this chapter is twofold: first we provide a discrete choice model ad-
dressing these identification issues, and second we offer an empirical application. We
present a model of multinomial choice to assess how interaction among members of a
group affects their occupational decision. At the core of our specification there is an
interplay between an endogenous local network effect and an exogenous effect through
public good provision and peer’s characteristics. The local network effect represents
the externality members of a same group exert on each other. An individual’s occupa-
tional decision is affected by his rational expectation of his peers’ occupational choices
while taking into account their characteristics and the strength of their ties. We al-
low for asymmetric influence while accounting for the network structure introduced
by a weighting matrix which captures closeness between each pair. The provision of
public goods at a higher level affects the cost of occupation by the characteristics of
the area and its residents. We allow for correlated effects at the group level which
may reflect information shocks or demand shifts that hit the group as a whole. The
nonlinearity introduced by the discrete choice breaks down the linear dependence at
the root of the reflection problem, while the asymmetries in the behavioural influence,
introduced by proximity weights, allow us to separately identify endogenous and con-
textual effects from group unobservables. We establish the conditions under which a
unique equilibrium can be found. A recursive Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation
with equilibrium Fixed Point subroutine (Aguirregabiria & Mira 2007) is used in the
estimation to solve the problem of indeterminacy due to multiplicity of equilibria in
the consistent beliefs condition.2 In light of our simulations, we conclude that the in-
cidental parameters issue3 can be dealt with given the nature of our data set, where
groups are sufficiently large and there is variation in number of members across them.
We apply our empirical approach to occupational choice in nineteenth century Lon-
don. For this purpose, we have constructed a new dataset which allows us to geograph-
ically locate individuals down to the street level. Matched with the 1881 full census,
1See Blume, Brock, Durlauf & Ioannides (2010) for a complete survey of the literature and its
challenges
2However, we also report the results from the Relaxation Method (Kasahara & Shimotsu 2012) that
converges to the true parameters whenever the fixed point constraint does not have local contraction
properties in a neighbourhood of the true parameters.
3Reminiscent of the non–linear panel data with fixed effects literature (Arellano & Bonhomme 2011).
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we are able to determine the occupation of each individual and their characteristics.
Victorian London provides a compelling case study. Given that parishes play an im-
portant social role in the community and parish membership were based on residency,
ecclesiastical parish boundaries dating back to the 17th century provide a convincing
proxy for social networks. We rely on the unique two-tier administrative system cre-
ated by the Metropolis Management Act of 1855 to deal with potential self-selection
concerns. Prior to the act, parishes were not only an ecclesiastical and social subdi-
vision, but they were also the districts of local civic government responsible for the
administration of taxes in return for many public good services. This Act separated
the civil (i.e. dealing with the public good provision) from the social (i.e. fostering
social ties) duties of parishes. Smaller parishes were grouped together to form local
Board of Works (BW) while larger parishes were elevated to the status of Vestry. BW
and Vestries were now in charge of public good provision. In practice, this meant
that residents from the same BW living in adjacent ecclesiastical parishes shared the
same local institutions but belonged to different social groups. We claim that location
decisions were based on BW rather than ecclesiastical parishes. In other words, the
Act made group membership orthogonal to other unobservables that affect individual
labour market decisions.
From our empirical investigations, we document spatial clustering of occupation
in 1881 London. Our results highlight the importance of social networks on occupa-
tional choice. Moreover, we uncover how networks have distinct impacts on labour
outcomes depending on the type of occupation. Networks have a positive impact for
the unemployed and those in industrial occupations while they have a negative impact
for those in commercial occupations. There are no social network effects for domestic
and professional occupations. Many contextual variables are significant in influencing
occupational choice.
It is important to underscore some limitations of our approach. Ecclesiastical parish
boundaries might not capture the entirety of a residents social network. Measurement
errors and/or misspecification are a concern. Relationships are difficult to observe
and quantify. As robustness check, we use pseudo boundaries to test the validity of
our social group definition. Given the limitations of our data, we remain agnostics
about potential mechanisms driving this spatial patterns. Our results are consistent
with models in which agents’ employment is affected by information exchanged locally
within individuals’ social group (Bayer, Ross & Topa 2008, Calvo´-Armengol & Jackson
2007). However, other potential channels include social norms or stigma effects (Akerlof
1980), imitation, learning, and complementarities in production.
This chapter contributes to the literature on several fronts. First, we add to the
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scarce literature on multinomial choice models with social interaction as the only refer-
ences dealing with a similar framework as far as we know are Brock & Durlauf (2002,
2006) and Bayer & Timmins (2007). Brock & Durlauf (2001) show how contextual and
endogenous effects can be identified in a binary choice model with group interactions
and no group unobservables. The non–linearity imposed by the logit structure on er-
rors allows them to break the reflection problem documented in the linear–in–means
case. Given the information structure of their game, decision makers form rational
expectations on other’s decision, such belief’s structure introduce multiple equilibria.
Brock & Durlauf (2006) extend the previous binary decision into the multinomial logit
case. They do not allow for group–level unobservables and provide sufficient conditions
for identification of the endogenous and contextual effects. Our work is also related to
Brock & Durlauf (2007) study on partial identification of binary choice outcomes with
group interactions, which relaxes random assignment, known distribution of errors and
allows for the presence of group unobservables.
Most studies, including Brock & Durlauf (2002, 2006), follow Manski (1993) to
impose rational expectation condition on the subjective choice probabilities of the in-
dividual in a large group interaction setting. An individual is equally affected by all
the other members in the same group, and he forms rational expectations regarding the
choice probabilities of all the other group members. Lee, Li & Lin (2014) incorporates
network interactions, as opposed to group interactions, and asymmetric influence in a
binary choice model. They allow individual characteristics to enter the information set,
so instead of forming rational expectation on the expected behaviour of the group as
a whole (i.e. every individual within a group has the same rational expectation) they
allow each individual to control for the observed characteristics of other in the group
and therefore the rational expectation is a vector of individual choice probabilities of
all members in a group. By allowing a network structure and rational expectations
in a multinomial choice model we provide a direct extension to Lee et al. (2014) bi-
nary choice with asymmetric influence model and Brock & Durlauf (2006) multinomial
choice with symmetric influence model.
We also explore the social network structure which few have explored. A notable
exception is Lin (2010) who explores various specifications of the spatial weights matrix.
To account for the heterogeneity among peers, she allows elements of the weighting
matrix to depend on friend nomination order, on the amount of activities associated
together, etc. In our setup, we use various measures of geographical distance between
the residence of members of the same group. These spatial weights matrix capture the
strength and/or availability of contacts.
Second, due to the lack of information on actual contact, researchers usually proxy
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the relevant group using some arbitrary metric of distance based on social and/or ge-
ographical proximity such as school (Gaviria & Raphael 2001, Hoxby 2000), grade
(Hanushek et al. 2003), rooms and dorms (Sacerdote 2001), neighbouring families
(Bayer et al. 2008, Helmers & Patnam 2014, Solon et al. 2000) and gender or race
(Patacchini & Zenou 2012) In the modern world of easy mobility and access to commu-
nication technologies, there is a legitimate concern that physical distance nowadays may
have become less and less important in shaping social networks. As Manski (2000) has
emphasised, presuming we know the true social network is a very strong assumption and
may not be plausible in many cases. The absence of a coincidence between measured
social groups and true social groups will induce complicated patterns of interdepen-
dences in errors across individuals as well as make it difficult to assess counterfactuals
such as the effects of changes in the compositions of measured groups. Therefore, focus-
ing on this historical time period provides the advantage that we have a more credible
proxy for social networks as interactions were mostly geographic in nature. Moreover,
the religious feature of our measure offers an additional relevant dimension to social
networks in a period were religion played a central role (Booth 1897).
Third, in the absence of random peer groups (Hoxby 2000, Sacerdote 2001) most
studies incorporate group-specific fixed effect and/or group random effects to account
for correlated effects. These studies justify this strategy by arguing that, in most con-
texts, individuals choices cannot narrow their preferences down to the smaller preferred
unit. For instance, in the case of class–schools choice, families can somewhat decide
which school to send their children but cannot decide which class they should belong to.
Thanks to the unique administration layout of the period studied, we provide plausible
reasons why adding a fixed effects at the administrative level might better control for
self-selection into a group.
Finally, our chapter also contributes to a wider strand of literature interested in
evaluating the empirical relevance of the social networks on labour market outcomes.
Prior empirical work on the effects of contacts on job finding, and unemployment
duration generally confirms that contacts are individually beneficial to workers (Akerlof
& Kranton 2000, Blau & Robins 1990, Kramarz & Skans 2007). As Topa & Zenou
(2014), we also document spatial clustering of occupations within a city and attempt
to distinguish neighbourhood from network effects.
In particular, our chapter hints at an already well-documented observation about
the transmission of job opportunities by peers. For instance, Topa (2011) reports that
studies commencing in 1970 and using a variety of data sources, find that at least half
of all jobs are typically found through informal contacts rather than through formal
search methods. Patel & Vella (2013) find that new immigrants are more likely to
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choose the same occupation previous immigrants from the same country have chosen.
Given that social contacts enhance the spread of information, our chapter is also related
to the literature on social capital (Knack & Keefer 1997).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 present the multinomial
model with social interaction and asymmetric influence. Section 2.3.1 paints the histor-
ical background of London in the nineteenth century as the setting of our application
while section 2.3.2 presents the the dataset. Section ?? presents our results and 2.4
investigates how robust they are. We finally summarise our findings and conclude in
the last section.
2.2 Empirical Model
In this section, we present a model of occupational choice under incomplete information
and network interactions. Then we proof that, given our assumptions on locational
decisions and information shocks, the structural parameters are identified and finally
describe the estimation approach we use. We borrow heavily from Brock & Durlauf
(2006) and follow his notation.
2.2.1 Specification of the structural model
We consider a situation where there is a set P of social groups. There is also a set
B of administrative areas. For each b ∈ B there is a collection of social groups Pb
belonging to the same area, i.e. Pb = {p ∈ P | b(p) = b}. Individual i ∈ {1, · · · , N},
characterised by vector xi (dim(xi) = K), belongs to a social group p with np members
and belonging to administrative area b.4 Each individual, taking group membership as
given, chooses an occupation y ∈ Ω = {0, 2, · · · , L− 1} earning a market wage ωy.
In order to capture the potential interaction and/or the strength of ties between
individuals, we allow for social interactions to be mediated by the social or spatial
distance between each duple i, j ∈ p. For a given reference social group p, we allow
for a weighting matrix Wp, with entry wp,ij ,∀i, j ∈ p measuring the extend to which
an individual j influences i’s occupational choice, where wp,ii = 0. Denote wp,i as
the 1 × np row-normalised vector of weights for individual i. Denote individual i’s
neighbours as neip,i = {j ∈ p | wp,ij 6= 0}. Agents therefore may only interact with a
subset of individuals identified as his or her peers.
At the core of our specification there is an interplay between an endogenous network
effect and an exogenous effect through public goods provision and peer’s characteristics.
4With a bit abuse of notation we use p both as the social group label and the set of all individuals
belonging to that group, i.e. | p |= np.
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The local effects can be interpreted as a pure network externalities depending on the
occupation chosen which is captured by φy(ωy,xi, s
e
py | Wp). sepy is the expectation
an individual in group p form on the action taken by any other individual in their
group. Therefore, sepy =
(
sepy,1, · · · , sepy,np
)′
is a vector where entry sepy,j is the belief
any individual in group p has on j taking action y.
φ(·) may capture the expected future higher/lower benefits of having more peer’s
on the same occupation due to job information flows or local competition (Anderberg
& Andersson 2007, Granovetter 1973) or the availability of handling more efficiently
occupation–specific problems when there are more workers of the same type around due
to local complementarities or local public goods (Benabou 1993, Kim & Loury 2013).
The cost of following occupation y is given by Cb,y(zp,i) where zp,i is the exoge-
nous characteristics at the group level, dim(zp,i) = S.
5 And refers to the public goods
provided by the administrative area or any effects explained mainly by peer’s charac-
teristics.
Individual i’s decision problem is to choose an occupation y such that
max
y
φy
(
ωy,xi, s
e
py |Wp
)− Cb,y (zpi) + νp,y,i, (2.1)
where νp,y,i = y,i+up,y incorporates preference shocks that depends on individual’s
decisions y,i and a group effect, unobservable to the econometrician, denoted by up,y.
We parametrise φy(ωy, s
e
py | Wp) = ky + xicy + wp,isepyJy. Notice we do not include
wages ωy directly in this approximation. Contrary to common practice, we are not fo-
cusing on the effect of foregone earnings influencing occupational choice (Boskin 1974,
Heckman & Honore 1990). However, ky is a constant for each occupation and there-
fore captures occupation-specific characteristics including wages. The main variable of
interest, wp,is
e
py, is the endogenous social interactions, or the pure network externality.
Jy would capture how individual’s occupational choice is affected by the belief’s on
peer’s decisions weighted by the strength of ties.
The term −Cb,y (zp,i) = zp,idy + τb,y represents the opportunity cost of following a
certain occupation within an administrative area. It includes the characteristics of the
group and administrative area. The former includes characteristics such as the aver-
age age, sex, number of children and wealth of residents of the social group. One can
think of demand-driven goods or services specific to certain groups which translate in
5Among its variables we include wp,iXp where Xp is the np ×K matrix with j-row element xj .
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differences in occupational opportunity cost. One example may be the clustering of
the presence of certain firms at specific neighbourhoods. The latter set of variables
accounts for public amenities offered at the administrative level which can lead to dif-
ferences for occupations. Education is an obvious example.
In sum, an individual i who belongs to group p gets utility from choosing y that
can be approximated by
V (y; xi, s
e
py, zp,i, τb,y, up,y, y,i,Wp) = ky + xicy + zp,idy + wp,is
e
pyJy + τb,y + up,y + y,i
In Manski (1993)’s terms, Jy is the endogenous effect, dy is the contextual effect and up,y
is the correlated effect. The endogenous effect describes how the expected behaviour of
peers affect an individual’s occupational choice. The contextual effect reflects how the
characteristics of fellow group members affects individual i’s choice of occupation y.
The correlated effect arises through endogenous group formation, common institutional
or environmental factors which cause group members to behave similarly even in the
absence of social effects.
We assume that
Assumption 2.2.1. i,y are independent and identically distributed across and within
groups p with known distribution function F,
We further assume an individual i does not observe other agents’ preference shocks.
We therefore have a global interaction model with incomplete information where agents’
decisions only depend on their beliefs about other members of the group sepy.
In Brock & Durlauf (2006) agents within a group possess symmetric influence due
to group interactions. This is due to every individual being linked to everybody
else, attaching equal weight to their influence (i.e. wp,ij = w 6= 0∀j ∈ p \ {i}) and hav-
ing the same information set (FXp ∈ Ii for all i ∈ p) therefore agreeing on the beliefs
about the action of everybody else. However, in the present setup agents only interact
with a subset of individuals identified as his or her peers, network interactions, and
we allow for asymmetric influence mediated by Wp following Lee et al. (2014).
The intuition of incorporating asymmetric influence is to allow individuals forming
beliefs on their peer choices while taking into account their specific characteristics
(therefore xj , zp enters Ii and not only their empirical distribution, as is the case in
Brock & Durlauf (2001)), but also to recognise that some individuals may exert a larger
influence on others due to proximity (and therefore, Wp is also included in Ii).
24
2.2. Empirical Model 2. Occupational choice and social interactions
As standard in the literature (Anderson, De Palma & Thisse 1992, Blume et al.
2010) we assume a Gumbel distribution F(y,i < ) = exp(− exp()).6 It follows that
agent i, belonging to social group p, chooses occupation y with probability given by
P(y ∈ arg max
y′∈Ω
V (y′; p, ·) | Ii) ≡ spy,i = exp(ky+xicy+zp,idy+wp,is
e
pyJy+τb,y+up,y)∑
y′∈Ω
exp
(
ky+xicy′+zp,idy′+wp,isepy′Jy′+τb,y′+up,y′
) . (2.2)
Under the rational beliefs condition, subjective beliefs on j’s occupational choice,
sepy,j , should
a) be agreed upon every individual belonging to the same group
b) such beliefs should match objective beliefs sepy,j = spy,j .
Both conditions imply that the vector spy is the fixed point solution to the following
expression
spy ≡

spy,1
...
spy,np
 =

exp(ky+x1cy+zp,idy+wp,1spyJy+τb,y+up,y)∑
y′∈Ω
exp(ky′+x1cy′+zp,idy′+wp,1spy′Jy′+τb,y′+up,y′)
...
exp(ky+xnpcy+zp,idy+wp,npspyJy+τb,y+up,y)∑
y′∈Ω
exp(ky′+xnpcy′+zp,idy′+wp,npspy′Jy′+τb,y′+up,y′)
 (2.3)
If we collect the np × L matrix Sp = (sp0, · · · , spL−1) and denote the RHS as Ψ(·)
we get
Sp = Ψ(Sp,Xp,Zp,Wp;θ) (2.4)
where θ =
(
ky, cy, dy, Jy, (τb,y)b∈B , (up,y)p∈P
)
y∈Ω
This expression could present multiple solutions. The following proposition provides a
sufficient condition on J for the existence of a unique equilibrium in the multinomial
case with asymmetric influence.
Proposition 2.2.2. Multiplicity. In the multinomial choice model with asymmetric
influence and network interactions given by 2.1 and 2.4 with Jy = J for all y ∈ Ω and
abstracting from the effect of the FX on choice probabilities, if |J | < 4
(
1− 1L
)
then
there is a unique equilibrium.
6Imposing a normalisation on the dispersion in the random utility term equal to 1 and with zero
location parameter. This assumption amounts to homoskedasticity. However, due to the spatial nature
of our sample we would like to modify this in the future to account for spatial correlation. This would
come with an additional requirement: we would have to assume that individuals somehow know the
spatial structure of the error term as to form beliefs that are rational.
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Proof. Let us leave group p and choice–group unobservables conditioning implicit. Let
us assume Z = WX. We know that sy,i =
exp(ky+xicy+wiXdy+wisyJ)∑
y′
exp(ky′+xicy′+wiXdy′+wisy′J)
. Therefore
my,i ≡ sy,i − s0,i = [exp (gy,i + wimyJ)− 1]
1 +
∑
y′ 6=0
exp
(
gy′,i + wimy′J
) ≡ ψy,i(M, θ,G),
where gy,i ≡ ky − k0 + xi(cy − c0) + wiX(dy − d0), my = (my,1, · · · ,my,n)′ and
denote ψy = (ψy,1, · · · , ψy,n)′
We know that the n× (L− 1) matrix M ≡ (m1, · · · ,mL−1) = (ψ1, · · · ,ψL−1) ≡ Ψ.
If we assume gy = 0∀y ∈ Ω (i.e. we ignore the effect of X on choices) we get that
my = 0∀y is an equilibrium. To see this, notice that ψy,i (0, J, 0) = exp(wi0J)−11+ ∑
y′ 6=0
exp(wi0J)
= 0
for every i, y.
Given this, consider the case for Mˆ = (m1,0, · · · ,0) then m1 = ψ1(Mˆ, J, 0) =
exp(Wm1J)−1
L−1+exp(Wm1J) ≡ ψw(m1). As we want to find a sufficient condition for uniqueness,
our aim is to find parameters for which the vector ψw(m1) is a contraction mapping.
Define the metric space (ψw(m1), ||·||∞) where ||A||∞ is the maximum absolute row
sum norm of a matrix A given by max
i
∑
j |aij |. By the contraction mapping theorem
we know that if there is a k ∈ R such that 0 ≤ k < 1 and ||ψw(m1) − ψw(q1)||∞ ≤
k||m1 − q1||∞ then mapping ψw(m1) has a unique fixed point. By the Mean Value
Theorem we also now that for every m1,q1 ∈ [−1, 1]n there is a vector m′1 that, on
an element by element basis, lie in between the former two vectors and such that
ψw(m1)−ψw(q1) = ∇ψw(m′1)(m1−q1). Applying ||·||∞ on both sides of the previous
equality, we get
||ψw(m1)−ψw(q1)||∞ ≤ ||∇ψw(m′1)||∞||(m1 − q1)||∞.
Then, we need to find conditions on J such that 0 ≤ ||∇ψw(m′1)||∞ < 1. Notice
that
∂ψw(m′1)
∂m1,i
= 0 given wii = 0 and
∂ψw,i(m1)
∂m1,j
=
exp(wim1J)wijLJ
L−1+exp(wim1J) for every j 6= i.
Therefore, ||∇ψw(m′1)||∞ = max
i
|J |L exp(wim1J)
[L−1+exp(wim1J)]2
∑
j 6=i|wij | ≤ |J | L4(L−1) Which pro-
vides the result.
The previous result suggest that the more alternatives individuals face, the less
likely multiple equilibrium are. It extends Lee et al. (2014) binary outcome framework
into a multiple choice one. With more alternatives the non–linearities in the fixed point
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condition become less pronounced and multiplicity less pervasive.
We conjecture that allowing for X’s affecting choices will enlarge the set of values
of J for which an unique equilibrium exists. If choices are affected by observable
characteristics, such variables serve as a coordination device thus making multiple
equilibria less pervasive. Brock & Durlauf (2007) show this is the case for the binary
choice with group–interactions case.
As we detail in section ?? our estimation strategy will need to impose the equilib-
rium constraint on beliefs in order to get consistent estimates of the structural param-
eters (see Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007)).
2.2.2 Identification
There are two main threats to identification of the structural parameters θ of the model
2.1–2.3. First, there is the standard problem of non–random sorting of individuals into
the group. Individuals choose which group they would like to belong to (i.e. p ∈ P )
and with whom they would like to interact with (i.e. wp,i). The resulting correlation
in unobservables among peers can lead to serious bias in the estimation of social inter-
action among peers in the absence of a research design capable of distinguishing social
interactions from these alternative explanations. Second, the presence of correlated
effects is a concern created by common unobserved information shocks that hit the
group as a whole (Manski 1993). For instance, a group p might face an increase in
the demand for certain occupation or have access to better information. If this is not
appropriately addressed, one cannot separately identify the exogenous effect from the
endogenous effect in the presence of unobserved component under symmetric influence
framework (Blume et al. 2010, Brock & Durlauf 2001).7
The self–selection problem can be dealt with by operating under random assignment
based on observables (Brock & Durlauf 2007, Sacerdote 2001). In our setup, we as-
sume that once we control for the administrative area b’s characteristics, individuals
are at worst equally inclined to choose any group p ∈ Pb and, once we control for
characteristics at the group p level, Wp is exogenous.
Assumption 2.2.3. Random assignment based on τb.
A.2.1 dFX|Wp,zp,τb,up = dFX|τb
7The identification is further complicated by the simultaneity problem, also named the reflection
problem by (Manski 1993, Moffitt 2001), when studying a linear–in–means. However, the non–linear
functional form given by the discrete choice model breaks up the simultaneity problem (Brock & Durlauf
2001) For instance, in the symmetric influence multinomial case without group unobservables, (Blume
et al. 2010, Theorem 13) provide sufficient conditions for identification of θ up to a normalization on
one of the alternatives.
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A.2.2 Wp ⊥  | zp, up, τb
We now show that even in the presence of correlated effects, if there is enough
variation in the weighting matrix across rows, it is possible to separately identify the
endogenous effect from the contextual effect within a asymmetric influence framework.
This provides an extension to Brock & Durlauf (2006)’s symmetric influence case.
Assume from now on that zp,i = wp,iXp.
Proposition 2.2.4. Under assumptions A.2.2.1, A.2.2.3, L > 2 and the following
additional assumptions (AA.)
AA.1 Joint support of (xi,wp,iXp) is not contained in any linear proper subspace of
R2K
AA.2 The support of wp,iXp is not contained in any linear proper subspace of R
K
AA.3 For each y, there is a group p such that conditional on WpXp, xi is not contained
in any proper linear subspace of RK ,
AA.4 None of the elements of xi contains bounded support,
AA.5 For each y, across different p groups, sp,y and up,y are not constant,
AA.6 There is a group p for which Wp presents sufficiently variation across rows.
then, for model described by 2.1-2.3, the true set of parameters θ\(Jy)y∈Ω are identified
up to a normalisation while all (Jy)y∈Ω are identified.
Proof. Given A.2.2.1, A.2.2.3 and normalising common parameters for y = 0 to be 0
(i.e. k0 = up,0 = 0, c0 = d0 = 0 for every p), we know that, for a given b,
log
(
spy,i
sp0,i
)
= ky + xicy + wp,iXpdy + wp,i(spyJy − sp0J0) + up,y.
Assume there is another set of observationally equivalent structural parameters θ¯,
then it must be the case that
xi(cy− c¯y)+wp,iXp(dy−d¯y)+wp,ispy(Jy− J¯y)+wp,isp0(J¯0−J0) = k¯y−ky+ u¯p,y−up,y.
Notice that for a given p we have, for every given y, that the right hand side remains
constant while there is variation, due to AA.1 and AA.6, on the left hand side. Notice
that to avoid perfect collinearity we should impose an exclusion on one social group,
call it p(1). Then, for the equality to hold, it must be the case that ky +up,y = k¯y + u¯p,y
where we can apply the second part of AA.5 and get ky = k¯y and up,y = u¯p,y. Then
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xi(cy − c¯y) + wp,iXp(dy − d¯y) + wp,ispy(Jy − J¯y) = wp,isp0(J0 − J¯0).
Given p, i by AA.5, and considering L > 2, for the equality to hold for every y it
must be the case that J0 = J¯0. Which leaves us with
xi(cy − c¯y) = wp,i
(
Xp(d¯y − dy) + spy(J¯y − Jy)
)
.
Notice that for AA.2 and AA.3, if we fix a parish p for every y, the previous equality
can hold if and only if cy = c¯y. Then it must be the case that
wp,iXp(dy − d¯y) = wp,ispy(J¯y − Jy).
We know that AA.4 imply that the LHS is unbounded, but given (2.3) we know
that each element spy,i ∈ [0, 1], so it must be the case that dy = d¯y. As we know by
AA.5 that for each y, spy varies across groups it must also be true that J¯y = Jy.
The previous results suggests that when collinearity between regressors is ruled
out,8 and one imposes sufficient within variation in at least one parish on choices and
characteristics, sufficient between variation across parishes on beliefs and, sufficient
within variation in at least one parish on weighting matrix then the structural param-
eters are identified up to some normalization. In the linear–in–means case, Bramoulle´,
Djebbari & Fortin (2009) also exploit the weighting (i.e. adjacency) matrix structure,
in the shape of intransitive triads between members, for identification. Lee (2007) ex-
ploit group size variations to show that separate identification is possible. In such cases,
a simultaneity problem must also be dealt with. However, the non–linear functional
form of our model breaks up this simultaneity (see Brock & Durlauf 2006) and thus,
the requirement on the structure of the network is weaker.
Given that the structural parameters are identified, the next task is to define a
consistent estimator for our endogenous effect (Gabrielsen 1978). In the next section
we provide the details of such estimator.
2.2.3 Estimation
DenotingX as all exogenous observables specified above andW as the observed spatial
weights, the pseudo log-likelihood function, taking S, as the collection of spy for all p
8To avoid perfect collinearity due to the presence of fixed effects at both administrative and social
group levels one would have to impose an exclusion restriction in the administrative fixed effects with
respect to one administrative level, call it b(1); but also, for every b ∈ B \ {b1} one should add an
exclusion restriction with respect to one of its social groups. Otherwise, one could include all social
group fixed effects up,y but one.
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and all y, as observed and u as a fixed effect at the group p level, is
LN (Y | X,W ,S;θ) = 1
N
∑
p∈P
∑
i∈p
log

∑
y∈Ω
(
exp (ky + xicy + wp,iXpdy + wp,ispyJy + τb,y + up,y)1[yi=y]
)
∑
y′∈Ω
exp (ky + xicy + wp,iXpdy + wp,ispyJy + τb,y + up,y)
 .
(2.5)
The Full Maximum Likelihood Estimator of our discrete choice problem with social
interactions and incomplete information is given by
θˆMLE = arg max
θ∈Θ
{
sup
S
LN (Y | X,W ,S;θ) s.t. S = Ψ(S,X,W ; θ)
}
For computational reasons, we follow a recursive Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Es-
timation procedure with a Fixed Point subroutine (PML/FP) (Aguirregabiria & Mira
2007).9 For this method to solve the indeterminacy problem due to multiple equilibria
we need:
1. within a group, every member agrees on which of all possible equilibria is being
played;
2. only stable equilibria emerging in the data;
3. the equilibrium selection to be determined by the data; and
4. a good local contraction properties around the true values.
The first step is to find a consistent estimator for spy, denote it
(
sˆ0py
)
p∈P,y∈Ω . The second
step is to fix Sˆ0 and do the PML maximisation using a Newton–Raphson algorithm10
for any further step t ≥ 1 such that the estimator at step t is
θˆt = arg max
θ∈Θ
LN (Y | X,W, Sˆt−1;θ) (2.6)
where we replace recursively st as the one–step iteration of
Sˆt = Ψ(Sˆt−1,X,W; θˆt) (2.7)
and keep combining ML iteration with fixed–point updating until θˆt is within a
level of tolerance with respect to θˆt−1.11
9See Hotz & Miller (1993), Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008) for alternative methods, Pe-
sendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2010) for some global conditions in which this iterative procedure fails
to converge, with probability approaching 1, to the true parameters, and Kasahara & Shimotsu (2012)
for local conditions in which it is known to converge to the true parameter.
10This two–step estimator using NR algorithm is efficient (Aguirregabiria & Mira 2007).
11The literature provides a couple of alternatives, Bisin, Moro & Topa (2011) suggest implementing
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We also implement the Alternative Relaxation Method (i.e. NPL-Λ algorithm)
where the fixed point iteration is obtained instead by a log–linear combination of
Ψ(Sˆt−1,X,W; θˆt) and Sˆt−1. Specifically, we replace the right hand side of (2.7) by
Λt =
{
Ψ(Sˆt−1,X,W; θˆt)
}α
Sˆt−11−α with α ∈ {0.1, 0.8} ≈ 0. (Kasahara & Shimotsu
2012, see their Prop. 5) argue that even when (2.7) does not have a local contraction
property around the true parameters, the Λt–mapping does. We find that the results
reported here do not change significantly.12
As we have allowed for correlated effects at the group level, an additional concern
with the PML is that up,y may induce a incidental parameters problem which lead
to the inconsistency of maximum likelihood estimators (Neyman & Scott 1948). This
arises because the information about the fixed group effects stops accumulating after
a finite number of observations. When groups are very small the incidental parameter
problem may become important. In a binary choice network model with small groups
the implementation of group fixed effect strategy is not feasible as it introduces too
many fixed effect parameters to estimate in the model.13
An alternative strategy is to base the estimation on a Conditional ML function
that differences out the group fixed effects. Such procedure for the non–linear case was
first described by Chamberlain (1980) and resembles the within estimator proposed for
the linear-in-inclusive-means case by Lee (2007).14 One needs to construct a likelihood
function that conditions on a sufficient statistic for the incidental parameter.15 This
approach produces a likelihood function that does not depend on the incidental pa-
rameters and allows standard asymptotic theory to be applied at the inference stage.
The estimator converges to the true parameter as the number of groups increases even
if the number of observations per group is small (Andersen 1970). In section 2.3.3 we
investigate, by means of montecarlo simulations, how acute such problem may be given
the features of our data (i.e. large groups, many groups).
such recursive method for T = 2 iterations. Lee et al. (2014) substitute the fixed point updating step
with Sˆt being the solution to the fixed point iteration Sˆt = Ψ(Sˆt,X,W; θˆt). However, our simulation
results, see next section, suggest that the method applied here converges faster to the true parameter.
12See section 2.4.
13Lee et al. (2014) propose to account for correlated effects by including both the fixed effects at a
broader level group and random effect at a group level.
14Boucher, Bramoulle´, Djebbari & Fortin (2014) is the first empirical application of Lee’s results
and clarify some of the intuition for identification: That is, individuals with larger outcomes have,
by construction, worst peers; positive endogenous effects will therefore decrease the dispersion on
outcomes, and will do so at a decreasing rate in group size.
15See appendix 2.6.2 for further details.
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2.3 Empirical application
To illustrate our approach, we describe the effects of social groups on occupational
choice in Victorian London. We first layout the historical background of London in the
nineteenth century which justifies our use of ecclesiastical parish boundaries as proxy
for social group and our use of particular institutional characteristics for administrative
areas. The newly constructed dataset is then presented before turning to the results.
2.3.1 Historical background
An observant pedestrian in London may sometimes see, set into the walls of old build-
ings at ground level, a small stone with two sets of initials on it, standing for the
parishes on either side of the stone. These parish boundary markers were once im-
portant to residents as it defined the rights and responsibilities of parishes as a basic
administrative unit. Below we attempt to summarise the evolution of the local concept
of parish, to highlight its civil and social role and how the changes in their boundaries
justify our social group definition.
Meaning of parish boundaries
Ancient parishes find their origin in the manorial system. Until the seventeenth
century, the manor was the principal unit of local administration and justice. Parish
boundaries seem to have been determined by the bounds of the original property (Pen-
drill 1937). In their beginnings parishes remained largely an ecclesiastical unit. How-
ever, in due course, the parish boundaries came to matter a lot to residents as parishes
became public good providers. The first significant change in the role of the parish
came with the “Poor Law” in 1601. It gave parish officials the legal ability to collect
money from rate payers to spend on poor relief for the sick, elderly and infirm - the
“deserving” poor. The 1662 Poor Relief Act enabled the creation of “civil parishes”, a
form of parish which existed solely for specific civil purposes and which had no bearing
on ecclesiastical affairs. Parish duties included: to levy a compulsory property-based
rate; to put the “undeserving” able-bodied poor to work, whilst punishing those who
refused to obey; and to supply outdoor relief to the deserving or impotent poor who
were elderly, sick or infirm. During the next century, priests’ civil duties, together with
an increasing number of other civil duties, were either in the hands of the Justices of
the Peace16 or those of the emerging body of parishioners known as the Vestry.
Due to the fiscal impact of Napoleonic wars and new Corn Laws, during the early
19th century the government was forced to reassess the way it helped the most im-
16Justices of the Peace were judicial officers elected or appointed to keep the peace.
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poverished members of society. The government’s response was to pass a Poor Law
Amendment Act in 1834, also referred to the“New Poor Law”. The new system was still
funded by rate payers, but was now administered by “Unions” – groupings of parishes
– presided over by a locally elected Board of Guardians. Each Union had responsible
for poor relief by providing a central workhouse for its member parishes. It has to draw
upon the economic resources available within its boundaries which included poor rates,
parish charities and the creative use of freehold land and commons (Birtles 1999, Webb
& Webb 1929). Delimiting boundaries was therefore crucial. In effect, the New Poor
Law amalgamated the 15,000 parishes in England and Wales into approximately 600
Poor Law Unions and established a Poor Law Commission in charge of implementing
national policies (Besley, Coate & Guinnane 2004).
The Metropolis Management Act of 1855 was a landmark in the history of London’s
government. Prior to 1855 there was no administrative machinery of any kind respon-
sible for the local government of the metropolis as a whole. All that existed, outside
the narrow limits of the City, were about three hundred parochial boards operating
under as many separate Acts of Parliament (Firth 1888). The 1855 Act established
the Metropolitan Board of Works and empowered it to develop and implement schemes
of London-wide significance, perhaps the most well known being the London drainage
system and the Thames embankments. The Act also created 15 local Boards of Works
(BW) which were groupings of 55 of the smaller parishes together and forced the 23
larger parishes to form Vestries with similar duties as depicted by the figure 2.1.17 The
BW and Vestries were given statutory powers to manage and improve of local facilities
such as streets, paving, lighting, drainage and sewerage and elected the members of
the Metropolitan Board of Works. Given the redistributive nature of the 1855 Act, the
rearrangement of London’s local authorities was crucial. This responsibility fell into
the hands of Cabinet Minister “who will be able to rearrange the boundaries of London
unions at discretion”.18
Under the 1855 Act, the boundaries of the ecclesiastical parishes remained unal-
tered and so was their religious functions. The Compulsory Church Rate Abolition
Act of 1868 finally removed the power of ecclesiastical parishes to collect compulsory
church rate, from which time they became almost irrelevant as a unit of government.
Furthermore, by giving rise to a national system of state education, the Education Act
of 1870 (i.e. Forster Act) relieved part of the education role which was previously under
the control of the established church. In effect, it created a dual system - voluntary de-
nominational schools and nondenominational state schools. The London School Board,
17A detailed list of administrative areas in London can be found in the the appendix ??.
18The Economist, June 19, 1869
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covering the whole of London, was created to build and run schools where there were
insufficient voluntary school places and to compel attendance.19
(a) Ecclesiastical parishes (red) (b) Board of Works and Vestries (blue)
Figure 2.1: Ecclesiastical and BW borders
Economic and social relevance of parishes
Despite losing importance in terms of civic responsibilities, Victorian age was a
religious era and parishes remained an integral part of community life. In his quest to
understand the lives of Londoners, Charles Booth dedicated one of its seven volumes to
Religious Influences in an attempt to describe the effect of organised religion upon the
people of London. In one of his accounts, Booth (1897) stated “so there are other social
influences which form part of the very structure of life (...) Among these influences
Religion claims the chief part”. Such account is corroborated by contemporaneous
authors who claim that by the beginning of the nineteenth century “religion was both
more pervasive and more central than anything we know in today’s Western world”
(Friedman 2011).
Anderson (1988) explains how Adam Smith rationalised the economic incentives
individuals had to choose to participate in religious activities based on his theory of
the capital value of reputation. In particular, he claims that religious membership
acted as a club in providing information about individual members’ morality which
was valuable to reduce transaction costs among them. By providing such reliable
information concerning the level of risk attached to dealings with particular individuals,
he continues, religious membership improved the efficiency of the allocation of human
19The Elementary Education Act 1880 insisted on compulsory attendance from 5 − 10 years. El-
ementary education became effectively free with the passing of the 1891 Education Act. The Poor
Law remained in force until the 1920s but it gradually lost its functions to other programs and bod-
ies. The administrative division of London was further altered by the Local Government Act of 1888
which created a single London county authority replacing the Metropolitan Board of Works and the
Justices of the Peace. These Boards were in turn replaced by the 1903 Metropolitan Boroughs, with
similar boundaries to the Boards they replaced. Some workhouses continued in operation until the
introduction of the National Assistance Act of 1948. Civil parishes in London were formally abolished
in 1965 when Greater London was created, as the legislative framework for Greater London did not
make provision for any local government body below a London borough.
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resources among their members.
According to Smith (1904), church attendance was not only mandatory but also im-
portant to maintain standing within the community.20. Church and chapel attendance
did not fall between 1851 and 1881, and in absolute terms actually grew up to around
1906, though it fell relative to the population (Smith 1904). In the only reliable Reli-
gious Census collected between 1902-1903, 47% of the population in Greater London
that could attend a place of worship at least once on a Sunday actually attended.21
Membership in a parish was determined by domicile, or by membership in a par-
ticular group for which personal parish is established (ethnic parishes, college parishes,
etc.). Membership was important as it determined burial, inclusion in the intentions of
the Missa pro populo or other spiritual benefits, right to have one’s marriage solemnised,
etc. Given the fact that religion remained important for residents,“parish boundaries,
if they reflected anything, reflected a long-vanished pattern of settlement”.(Davis 1988)
We therefore base our definition of network on ecclesiastical parish boundaries provided
interactions were indeed local in nature.
Interactions restricted by geography
It is usually assumed that for most people in Victorian Britain it was both necessary
and convenient to minimise the distance between home and workplace. In the late
nineteenth century London the distances over which most people travelled to work
remained relatively short. According to Green (1991), this was required both because
many trades were casual, and there was thus a strong imperative to be part of a
community which knew when work was available (Green 1982, 1991, Hoggart & Green
1991, Johnson & Pooley 1982), and because of the inability of most working people
to afford public transport. It was not until after the First World War that the ties
between home and workplace were broken, and improved urban transport systems
linked to rising real incomes allowed longer-distance commuting for large numbers of
people (Dyos 1953, Green 1988, Lawton 1959, Warnes 1972). The mean journey to work
for those employed in London was only around five kilometres in the nineteenth century.
20“People might attend services on week days if they wished, but it was obligatory on Sundays to join
at least in matins and mass, and for at least one member of each family to join in the procession, headed
by the priests and clerks with their crosses and banners, that made the perambulation of the church
and churchyard. (...) A notorious and unreformed sinner, which would usually mean a heretic who
cared nothing for the ways of the Church, would not be allowed to escape by the easy method of staying
away. In the tiny parishes religious observance was not only everybody’s business, but everybody else’s
business, and the neighbours would bring him forcibly to the church on Ash Wednesday, where he
would be publicly expelled and compelled to come daily to the low side window and listen to mass
until Maundy Thursday, when, if repentant, he would be restored” (Smith 1904)
21In 1886 a previous census had been carried out providing a larger figure but, given the census was
performed in only one day and did not discount for double–counting, it was more imprecise and more
dependant on weather conditions of the day.
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Professional workers on higher incomes had the longest journeys to work, but in the
period 1850 to 1899 professional workers in London still only travelled on average 6.9
km from their home to their workplace. In contrast, skilled manual and craft workers
travelled just 3.1 km. Those living within the County of London had especially short
journeys to work, for instance residents of East London on average travelled only 2.2
km from their home to their workplace in the period 1850-99. London was notable for
the persistence of home working, especially the East End clothing trade. It is estimated
that there were over 100,000 home workers in London in 1900 (Schmiechen 1984).
Table 2.1: Distance to work
Mean journey to work (km)
Period Workplace in London All workplaces
1750 - 1799 2.6 1.7
1800 - 1849 5.1 1.9
1850 - 1899 4.4 2.5
1900 - 1929 10.8 4.3
1930 - 1959 21.0 7.2
1960 + 37.2 14.5
Total sample size 4,957 18,891
Notes: Data extracted from Pooley & Turnbull (1997)
This suggests that social group were probably “local” in nature and a geography–
based measure of social group is a plausible assumption let along one that captures a
defining social dimension of the time as it was Religion.
2.3.2 Data
We combine several datasets to link the social network and the occupational choice
of Londoners. We first use the 100% sample of England and Wales census of 1881
from the North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP). The unit of observation is at the
individual level. The census contains the full address of individuals (house number or
name, name of street, avenue or road, civil parish and county of residence). In addition
to geographic variables, the census also provides a wider range of sociodemographic
information: age, gender, place of birth, marital status, number of children, number of
servants and family structure as well as information on occupation defined as that in
which the individual was principally engaged on the day on which the census was taken
(beginning of April). The only economic outcome available in our data is self-reported
occupation. There are over 400 occupations such as physician, cook, stable keeper,
cabinet maker or farmer.
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Using historical maps, we geo reference as precisely as possible all the streets of Lon-
don. We start from the digitalised map of London dating back to John Rocque’s 1746
which was provided by Archaeology Section of the Museum of London. We extend their
initial work by manually adding points for each street using the 1882 First Ordnance
Survey Map of London. In addition, we locate the church location and record their
denomination. We end up with 5998 geographic references to streets or landmarks and
549 churches. Finally, we add the digitalised ecclesiastical parish and and BW/Vestry
boundaries provided by the UK Data Service.
In order to geographically locate the individuals in the census on our maps, we
use information on place of residence (address, parish and county) from the census
and the street points along with the ecclesiastical and BW/Vestry boundaries from the
historical map to match these two datasets based on string.
Our final dataset comprises 1, 137, 876 individuals for which we can precisely locate
down to the street level. This amounts to 70% of matches of the entire population
in London in 1881. There are 299 ecclesiastical parishes in Central London and 38
BW/Vestries.
Descriptive statistics
Our sample focuses on native men and women of working age that are household
heads (between the ages of 15 and 60). We therefore eliminate foreign-born individuals.
We also eliminate individuals who are likely to live in the place where they work such
as prisons, workhouses or any other public institution. We finally restrict ourselves
to individuals living in parishes for which (i) the BW is composed of at least two
ecclesiastical parishes, (ii) with at least 30 residents and (iii) with at least one neighbour
living on the same street.22 We therefore have a total of 200 ecclesiastical parishes
within 32 BW. In the appendix 2.6.1, we show the number of ecclesiastical parish
per BW, the population density within ecclesiastical parishes, the average number of
neighbours per parish and the final areas included in our analysis. Generally, we have
large variation across and within BW.
Table 2.2 reports the descriptives statistics of our sample. As expected, men con-
stitute a large fraction of household heads. The mean age is 39 years. The majority of
individuals are married with an average of 2 children. The average number of servants,
which has been used as a proxy for wealth, is 0.194 with a large variation within the
sample. Finally few individuals (13%) have stayed in their parish of birth while 47%
have stayed in their county of birth.23
22These restrictions follow what is standard in the literature and were imposed to avoid noisy esti-
mates whenever there is very few observations.
23In Appendix 2.6.1 we map these various characteristics. The south and eastern part of London
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Average Unemployed Professional Domestic Commercial Industrial Total
male 0.234 0.885 0.407 0.995 0.893 0.835
(0.424) (0.319) (0.49) (0.074) (0.309) (0.371)
age 44.518 39.015 41.680 37.598 38.922 39.243
(11.239) (10.408) (10.733) (10.335) (10.548) 10.688
married 0.907 0.890 0.879 0.960 0.944 0.937
(0.290) (0.313) (0.326) (0.196) (0.230) (0.243)
n children 1.810 1.823 1.592 2.028 2.140 2.044
(1.810) (1.968) (1.651) (1.977) (2.039) (1.992)
n servants 0.416 0.605 0.200 0.108 0.158 0.194
(1.394) (1.619) (0.921) (0.715) (0.722) (0.876)
resident p birth 0.094 0.062 0.091 0.116 0.146 0.129
(0.291) (0.242) (0.288) (0.321) (0.353) (0.335)
resident cty birth 0.389 0.337 0.403 0.459 0.494 0.466
(0.488) (0.473) (0.490) (0.498) (0.500) (0.499)
Obs. 10,340 9,559 11,508 28,243 105,464 165,114
Notes: Std. dev in parenthesis. Sample includes only native working-age individuals (between 15 and 60)
living in a parish which has a minimum of 30 residents within a BW which has at least two ecclesiastical
parishes.
Apart from those unemployed, we have aggregated the remaining occupations into
four categories: professional, domestic, commercial, agricultural, and industrial. The
employment structure of London was diverse with industrial occupation dominating
the labour market. In 1881 6% of the sample were unemployed. Based on our occu-
pational classification, 5.79% worked in a domestic occupation, 6.97% in a professional
occupation, 17.11% in a commercial occupation and finally 63% held industrial jobs.24
To motivate the choice of nineteenth century London, we map the geographic clus-
tering of occupational choice. In maps of figure 2.2 each panel represent an occupation
category. We observe a clear geographical pattern by occupation. Employment appears
to be predominant in the central areas of London while unemployment is found the pe-
riphery. Professional trades account for a large proportion of West London. Domestic
workers are few in East London but more numerous in the City of London and West
are predominantly inhabited by younger, predominantly inhabited by men. Wealthy, captured by the
number of servants, is mainly found in the west. The majority of individual living in the south have
been born elsewhere.
24In the appendix 2.6.1, we provide comparison of these descriptives between the merged and the
not merged datasets in order to assess the balance of our sample.
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London. In contrast, industrial workers are few in the City of London and West London
and more numerous in the East and South. Finally, commercial occupations appear
to be more spread out. Agricultural occupation are concentrated in outlying areas of
London. However, we see that such concentrations vary both within and across BW
(depicted in dotted gray lines) which suggests interactions within social groups may be
a driving force behind this striking occupational clustering of labour outcomes across
London areas.
2.3.3 Simulation to study the performance of the estimator
We take the empirical distribution of parish members and minimum number of neigh-
bours living on the same street from our data set (see figure 2.11 in the Appendix)
and randomly draw a duple (np,mini∈p neii). We then simulate geographic points on
[0, U[1,2]]
2. We define wp,i as all those individuals that are within the radius δp close to
i where δp is the minimum distance such that every i ∈ p has at least one neighbour.
Individuals face the utility function given by equation 2.1,where we assume K = S = 1
and have to choose among five alternatives (L = 5).25
We assume the true coefficients are given by J0 = (3.3, 2.5, 2, 3.2, 3.6)′ (the endoge-
nous effect), k0 = (−1.5,−1.3,−2.4, −1.7,−2.1)′ (alternative–specific characteristics),
c0 = (1.5, 1.4, 2.1, 0.9, 1.1)′ (individual characteristics) and d0 = (2.2, 2.4, 2.7, 2.3, 2.6)′
(the contextual effect). Regarding the correlated effect, we assume up,y ∼ σyN(0, 1)
where σ0 = (0.13, 0.08, 0.18, 0.05, 0.1).26 To simulate optimal choices while imposing
consistent asymmetric influence we solve, iteratively, for the belief fixed point of 2.3
until no individual’s beliefs change. This guarantees only stable equilibria to emerge
in the observational data.
We then assume that the Data Generation Process (DGP) is identical across differ-
ent groups that belong to world c. We generate 100 “worlds” with | P |= {5, 10, 50, 100}
groups each. Even though the DGP is exactly the same for a given world c, wcp and
Xcp are random so we have different choices across groups. In the left hand side panels
(a, c) of Figure 2.3, we depict two examples of different individuals’ locations within a
group. Red lines represent the links within them (i.e. wp) and the shape of the point
represents the alternative being chosen by each individual (i.e. yp). On the right hand
side panels (b, d) we plot the fixed point convergence of hetereogenous beliefs (i.e.
25We should make clear that for the simulation these are abstract alternatives and are not related to
the occupational choice problem we are interested in. The purpose of the simulation is therefore only
to get an idea on how close to true parameters our estimates, following the proposed strategy, could
be.
26The coefficients were chosen so as to have some alternatives being chosen by less than 10% of the
population. In the appendix we include some variations of these coefficients. The results remain valid
(see Appendix tables 2.12 and 2.13)
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London 1881 class0
under 0.029
0.029 - 0.045
0.045 - 0.054
0.054 - 0.077
over 0.077
(a) Unempoyed
London 1881 class1
under 0.024
0.024 - 0.039
0.039 - 0.064
0.064 - 0.102
over 0.102
(b) Domestic Occupation
London 1881 class2
under 0.042
0.042 - 0.059
0.059 - 0.085
0.085 - 0.15
over 0.15
(c) Professional Occupation
London 1881 class3
under 0.122
0.122 - 0.154
0.154 - 0.185
0.185 - 0.233
over 0.233
(d) Commercial Occupation
London 1881 class4
under 0.456
0.456 - 0.592
0.592 - 0.664
0.664 - 0.715
over 0.715
(e) Industrial Occupation
Figure 2.2: Occupations per ecclesiastical parish.
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sp,y) for our simulated data associated to each group. It is noticeable that differences
in the simulated X’s may imply variation in sp,y across groups which is necessary for
the identification of the endogenous effect (see proposition 2.2.4).
The simulations provide us with observational data on choices Y, characteristics X
and network W for every group p ∈ c. We perform the estimation by the PML/FP
described in equations 2.6-2.7 using a Newton–Raphson algorithm.
This exercise allows us also to investigate how important is the incidental parameter
problem and is closer in nature to our real set–up, where we have a city (i.e. London
1881) with 299 different social parishes. Among which 277 of them have np ≥ 30 and
200 for which inhabitants are fully geographically located on our map and belong to
Unions composed by at least 2 different social parishes.
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Figure 2.3: Some simulated network and beliefs fixed iteration per parishes with θ0
In Table 2.3 we show the endogenous parameter Jy estimates from the ML estima-
tion assuming beliefs sp,y are not observed. We also explore the effects of measurement
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errors in the networks. In Panel A, the true network wp is observed, while in Panel B
the network is only partially observed w∗p (we assume a truncated version of the true
network where up to 10 peers are observed).27 The last row shows the percentage of
individuals choosing each alternative.
Focusing on Panel A, we see that the larger the number of parishes is the closer the
estimates to the true parameters and the smaller the dispersion. One important result
is that estimates of the endogenous effect for a given alternative is very precise when
their is a large mass of individuals choosing that alternative. In our case, the estimate
for J4 is imprecise due mainly to very few observations choosing such alternative (i.e.
less than 8%).
The results in Panel B are not as encouraging which should come as no surprise:
as documented in the literature, whenever the true network is not observed, estimates
are biased. A truncated network (in this case observing only up to observing 10 neigh-
bours) generally lead to the underestimation of the endogenous parameters. However,
a large number of parishes alleviates the underestimation. Consequently, our recursive
PML/FP method cannot recover the true beliefs (see figure 2.14 in the appendix). This
reinforces the importance of appropriately measuring the social group.
27In the Appendix 2.6.3 we include corresponding estimates for the effect of an individual’s own
characteristics c (Table 2.11) and the contextual effect d (Table 2.10 ) effects as well as the estimates
when both sp,y and wp are observed (Table 2.9).
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In the Figure 2.4 we depict the correlation and density between the true beliefs
spatially weighted (i.e. wpsp,y denoted as expw in the figure) and the estimated beliefs
through the PML/FP (i.e. wpsˆp,y) denoted as sw in the figure). It is evident that,
after a fairly low number of iterations (T = 58), the estimated beliefs converge to the
true beliefs, which suggests that the estimation procedure leads to a good fit with the
real unobserved beliefs.
Taken together, our results suggest that the estimation is generally accurate when-
ever the true network is observed. Even though we have reasons to belief that in
the nineteenth century geographic measures of reference groups where meaningful and
religion was an important dimension of social identity, in the robustness section we
investigate how sensible our results are to different definitions of social group.
The results suggest that, given the nature of our sample (i.e. generally large refer-
ence groups with large number of neighbours), the incidental parameter problem can be
downplayed and estimates following the method described in equations 2.6-2.7 converge
to the true parameters.28
2.3.4 Group interactions and symmetric influence
We now move on to our true data set. As a benchmark we present the estimation for
the standard symmetric influence case with group interactions and no correlated effects
(Brock & Durlauf 2001, 2006). In the next section, we relax these restrictions allowing
for both asymmetric influence due to network interactions and unobservables at the
group level affecting individuals’ decisions.
The symmetric influence assumption implies that the number of agents in each parish
p is sufficiently large so that each agent dismisses his own effect on others’ decisions.
The condition for rational expectations (2.3) is now given by
sp,y =
∫
exp(ky+xicy+x¯pdy+Jysp,y+τb,y+up,y)∑
y′∈Ω
exp(ky′+xicy′+x¯pdy′+Jy′sp,y′+τb,y)
dFˆx|p, for all p ∈ P (2.3a)
where individuals know Fˆx|p, the empirical within-group distribution of (xi, x¯p). Notice
that this expression is no longer a vector value function, but still can present multiple
consistent beliefs (Blume et al. 2010).
28Even though the consistency properties of such estimator are not analysed here, the result is
reminiscent of the importance of rich number of groups and variation in their sizes for consistency of
the method proposed by Lee (2007) in the linear–in–means case, which is clarified further in Boucher
et al. (2014).
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We begin our econometric findings with the estimation of equation (2.5) for the sym-
metric influence case where Wp is a matrix with zero along the diagonal and 1/(np−1)
off–the–diagonal whenever two individuals live in the same parish. We also con-
sider s0p as being equal to the observed weighted average decision at group p (ŝ
0
y,p =
1
np−1
∑
j∈p 1[yj = y] ). We shy away from allowing any correlated effects, therefore
up,y = 0∀p ∈ P, y ∈ Ω. We call this first exercise the naive estimates for θ such that
θnaive = arg max
θ
L(Y | X, ŝ; θ) (2.8)
As previously, individuals choose among five different occupations: “out of the
labour force” (y = 0), “professional” (y = 1), “domestic” (y = 2), “commercial”
(y = 3), “industrial” (y = 4). We will use y = 0 as the benchmark. Individual char-
acteristics xi include age, sex, marital status, number of children, number of servants
and resident in parish of birth. Group level (i.e. ecclesiastical parish) characteristics
x¯p =
1
np−1
∑
j∈p xj . Blume et al. (2010) discuss under which assumptions this estimator
is consistent.
Tables 2.4 presents the endogenous effects Jy. Tables 2.14 in the appendix present
the other estimates. The first three columns illustrate the naive estimates for Jy us-
ing equation (2.8) while the last column uses the PML/FP using equation (2.3a). We
successively include sets of variables: the first column includes only individual charac-
teristics xi, the second column adds to this specification the contextual variables at the
social group level x¯p, and the third and fourth columns add the fixed effects at the BW.
This is our preferred specification due to its dealing with the self selection problem.29
It is immediately apparent from table 2.4 that the contextual effect is an important
source of upward bias in our endogenous effect. Groups may differ in average level
of schooling, cognitive functioning, occupational structure and wealth level. Moreover,
including the BW–occupation–specific dummies shows that there are local factors which
play a role on endogenous effects. Comparing the last two columns reveals that the
PML/FP procedure leads to smaller parameters which may indicate more accurate
estimates due to the fact the specification is now internally consistent with beliefs and
the included variables (i.e. weighted estimated beliefs, 1np−1
∑
j∈p s
t
y,p ) are smoother
than the non–parametric consistent estimator s0p. For this very same reason the log-
likelihood values are not necessarily compara
The coefficients for each occupation category are consistent with the presence of
local peer effects. The presence of peers in a given occupation has a significant and
positive effect on the likelihood of following that same occupation. This is true for all
29In Figure 2.15 panel a) we show the convergence of endogenous coefficients per iterations.
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occupations except for commercial ones. Individuals out of the labour force present the
largest endogenous effects. The larger the number of unemployed one interacts with,
the less likely s/he is to be employed. The present of significant endogenous effects
among professional occupations is more puzzling as one expected high–skilled networks
to be less geographically restricted. Commercial occupations on the other hand do
exhibit significant endogenous effects.
Individual characteristics have the expected sign (see table 2.14). Age affects neg-
atively the propensity of being in any given occupation compared to being out of the
labour force. Given that migration might be due to job prospects, we find that those
who have not moved away from their parish of birth are more likely to be in a produc-
tive occupation. A large number of children decreases the chances of individuals being
in an occupation, which could indicate poverty traps or child labour.
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Figure 2.4: Density and correlation between true beliefs (wpsp,y) and PML/FP esti-
mates beliefs (wpsˆp,y) after 58 iterations across 5 alternatives
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Table 2.4: Estimation of endogenous effects Jy with symmetric influence
vars Naive estimation PML/FP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployed 10.55∗∗∗ 14.613∗∗∗ 10.044∗∗∗ 5.676∗∗∗
( 0.363 ) ( 0.55 ) ( 0.791 ) ( 1.643 )
domestic 9.522∗∗∗ 10.118∗∗∗ 8.247∗∗∗ 4.059∗∗∗
( 0.279 ) ( 0.357 ) ( 0.418 ) ( 0.955 )
professional 8.151∗∗∗ 6.39∗∗∗ 5.682∗∗∗ 3.773∗∗∗
( 0.173 ) ( 0.255 ) ( 0.287 ) ( 0.511 )
commercial 4.644∗∗∗ 4.63∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ -0.447
( 0.134 ) ( 0.167 ) ( 0.282 ) ( 2.023 )
industrial 1.995∗∗∗ 1.987∗∗∗ 2.414∗∗∗ 2.725∗∗∗
( 0.071 ) ( 0.1 ) ( 0.142 ) ( 0.386 )
log-like -156320 -156070 -155760 -156820
obs 165114
xi yes yes yes yes
x¯p no yes yes yes
τb,y no no yes yes
up,y no no no no
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
unemployed sp,0; professional sp,1; domestic sp,2; commercial sp,3; industrial sp,4.
2.3.5 Network interactions and asymmetric influence
In table 2.5 we include the asymmetric influence estimation. In this case we define
Wp as matrix with zero diagonal and entry wp,ij = 1/ |neip,i| if j is a neighbour of i.
We define neighbour as any two individuals living within a 50 mts radius from each
other.30 We focus on the specifications that controls already for individual character-
istics xi and network–level covariates wp,iXp. We present the naive estimation (i.e.
without imposing equilibrium condition (2.4)) in the first two columns. We perform
the PML/FP structural estimation described in expressions (2.6) and (2.7) in the last
30As already explained above, we are able to locate individuals down to the street level, therefore
the distance between two individuals is taken from the mass point of the streets in which they live.
The results that follow hold for different definitions of neighbours, see section 2.4.
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two columns. We successively add parish fixed effect to the basic specification.
We can now gain insight into the correlated effects at the social group (i.e. ecclesi-
astical parish) level. Such correlated effects can take the form of local industries or an
inspiring priest which might encourage his parishioners to work or share information.
Failing to take the correlated effects into account can lead to serious upward bias.
Comparing column (4) of table 2.4 with column (3) of table 2.5 reveals the difference
between symmetric and asymmetric influence. We note that the symmetric influence
specification overestimates endogenous effects for out of the labour force, domestic
and commercial occupations; while it underestimates the social effect on professional
and industrial occupations. Under the asymmetric influence specification, we see that
commercial occupations are not subject to positive endogenous effects but instead,
negatives ones. Again, the magnitude of the endogenous effect appears very high
for professional occupations. In the symmetric case such estimate may be capturing
neighbourhood effects rather than social interactions.
Our preferred specification is depicted in the last column. Networks play a sig-
nificant and positive role for individuals out of the labour force and in industrial oc-
cupations. If you expect your peers to be unemployed you are less likely to receive
information about job opportunities through informal channels, therefore you are more
likely to be unemployed as well (Calvo´-Armengol 2004). Computing the marginal ef-
fect31 we find that a one standard deviation change in the weighted expected ratio of
unemployed peers leads to a 0.54% increase in the likelihood of being unemployed. No-
tice that such magnitude is somewhat lower than contemporary studies. Topa (2001)
who finds that a one standard deviation of peers’ employment leads to a increase in the
likelihood of being employed that lies between [0.6%− 1.3%], while Bayer et al. (2008)
estimates lie somewhere between [0.8%− 3.6%].
Industrial occupations are mainly demand–side driven and information about job
opening should therefore be easily transmitted. The marginal effects suggest that a one
standard deviation change in the peers industrial expected ratio leads to an increase
on 8.04% in the likelihood of being employed in a similar occupation. Commercial
occupations on the other hand might be more competitive and individuals may want
to keep private information on customers or alike for themselves. A one standard
deviation increase in peers commercial expected occupational choice reduces the chance
of following a similar occupation in 2.46%.
At both end of skill’s distribution (i.e. domestic and professionals) we find that our
network measure do not explain occupational choice once we allow for unobservables
31As pointed out by Lee et al. (2014) one should account for the effect on equilibrium conditions of
a covariate change. To compute marginal effects we use the formulas found in appendix 2.6.5
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hitting the group as a whole. The forces driving these result might be very different.
In the domestic case, the availability of such posts may be very locally restricted.
Individuals will tend to live where they work and not necessarily where their perceived
peers will interact and share information. Local interactions may not be the channel
through which one could hear about such job offers. On the other hand, professional
occupations may have two unique features: Firstly, they may be particular prone to
locate in particular parishes (probably wealthy ones) compared to other occupations.
Thus, once we allow for group unobservables at the parish level (which may account for
such self-selection at the parish level), the seemingly large endogenous effect becomes
insignificant. Secondly, the professional class is arguably the less spatially confined, and
therefore, their social networks may extend beyond a geographical/religious dimension.
The results from the naive and PML/FP estimation are substantially different so
it is worth understanding why the latter may be more reliable. We know the naive
estimation consistency depends largely on how accurate the local average of occupations
incidence is as a proxy for rational beliefs. On the other hand, even with a poor starting
estimate on the beliefs, the recursive PML approach may get, after suitable iterations,
consistent estimates for sp (Aguirregabiria & Mira 2007).
Table 2.5: Estimation of endogenous effects Jy with asymmetric influ-
ence
vars Naive estimation PML/FP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployed 4.667∗∗∗ 3.233∗∗∗ 2.164∗∗ 3.057∗∗∗
( 0.288 ) ( 0.267 ) ( 0.751 ) ( 0.760 )
professional 4.857∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗ -0.663 -0.976
( 0.169 ) ( 0.166 ) ( 0.740 ) ( 0.650 )
domestic 4.614∗∗∗ 3.991∗∗∗ 3.841∗∗∗ -0.669
( 0.131 ) ( 0.140 ) ( 0.458 ) ( 1.220 )
commercial 1.865∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ -3.992∗∗∗ -3.429∗∗
( 0.108 ) ( 0.101 ) ( 1.309 ) ( 1.143 )
industrial 2.419∗∗∗ 3.426∗∗∗ 3.342∗∗∗ 3.639∗∗∗
( 0.067 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.252 ) ( 0.265 )
log-like -152620 -152010 -156240 -154100
obs 165114
xi yes yes yes yes
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
wpXp yes yes yes yes
τb,y yes no yes no
up,y no yes no yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Beliefs unemployed sp,0; professional sp,1; domestic sp,2; commercial sp,3;
industrial sp,4.
We also investigate whether there is multiple equilibria given our parameters. Per
parish p we then want to find the roots to the large (np(L− 1))–system of non–linear
equations described by
F (sp; θˆ) ≡ vec(sp)− vec(Ψ(sp,X,W ; θˆ)) = 0
To do so we follow spectral methods32 to solve for possible multiple roots. However, for
none of the 200 parishes we could find (after using 1005 different starting values per each
parish) more than one equilibrium. Even though some of the absolute value estimated
parameters in column (4) are above the threshold 3.2 suggested by proposition 2.2.2,
we know that in the proposition we shy away from allowing (k, c, d) > 0. As pointed
out by Brock & Durlauf (2006), for the symmetric case, the presence of individual
differences across covariates may increase the threshold for which unique equilibrium
exists.
2.4 Robustness checks
We perform several additional results to study how robust our estimates are and also
provide evidence that our identifying assumption are likely to hold.
2.4.1 Change of Wp and placebo coordinates
In the first three columns of table 2.6 we modify the definition of our weights. In column
(1) we define our weighting matrix as wδp,ij = 1/|neiδi |∀j ∈ p such that || i− j ||≤ δmts,
where index i is used as a label for an individual as well as his coordinates. We use
δ = {0, 100}. Similarly we follow the same estimation procedure but truncating the
number of neighbours to 10, w
|nei|<10
p .
What we learn from such exercises is how sensitive results are to different definitions of
32See Varadhan & Gilbert (2009) for an implementation of such algorithm in R–package.
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the network. For a distance of 0 mts results are very similar to our original same–street
interactions. Once we allow for larger radius within the same parish (i.e. 100 mts) we
see that the endogenous effect becomes significant for professionals. On the other hand,
a 10–peers truncated network imply generally underestimated effects.
We also implemented a placebo test in which we randomly allocate individuals on
to different streets across all city. One concern is that the aggregation method we
are pursuing could, somehow, influence the statistical significance of the results. Such
placebo test could shed some light on how important this concern is. Then we followed
exactly the same PML/FP estimation as before. The estimates from such placebo test
are included in column (4). What we observe is that the endogenous effect is now
insignificant for all occupations. It implies that the endogenous effect is not driven by
the type of aggregation we used. To also rule out that the endogenous effect found in the
previous section is driven by other unobserved geographic characteristics we randomly
allocate individuals on different streets within the same parish. Results are presented
in column (5), it reassures that our estimates of the endogenous effect are mainly driven
by network–interactions as opposed to other neighbourhood unobservables.
In columns (6) and (7) we modify the sample. In column (6) we restrict the sample
to only individuals that are living within the same county where they were born, in
column (7) we restrict our analysis to the younger cohort (i.e. ages within 15 and
30 years). We notice that results change significantly. For non–movers, there are
now no significant effect of endogenous effects on unemployment, however the ones on
commercial and industrial occupations remain. This suggest that there is migration
responding to lack of job opportunities. The case of the younger cohort indicates that
the initial occupation of such population tend to be mainly on industrial and domestic
tasks. Taken together, these two results suggest an additional heterogeneity that our
empirical model is not addressing. Further research is needed to be able to incorporate
multiple types and thus, heterogeneous beliefs, into the estimation procedure while
accounting for consistent beliefs.
Table 2.6: Robustness checks estimation of endogenous effects Jy with asym-
metric influence
vars PML/FP
wδ=0p w
δ=100
p w
|nei|<10
p Placebo coords Non Ages
all city within
parish
movers 15-30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
unemployed 3.10∗∗∗ 3.577∗∗∗ 2.154∗∗∗ -2.420 0.476 1.228 1.724
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
( 0.73 ) ( 0.854 ) ( 0.608 ) (19.49) (2.058) ( 1.13 ) (1.795)
professional -0.796 0.077 0.135 -3.927 2.144 -1.429 -0.255
( 0.624 ) ( 0.718 ) ( 0.563 ) (12.957) (2.004) ( 0.938 ) (1.251)
domestic -1.545 2.476∗∗ -2.943∗∗ -12.754 0.306 -0.925 2.449∗∗
( 1.075 ) ( 0.936 ) ( 0.953 ) (11.74) (1.425) ( 1.55 ) (0.773)
commercial -3.356∗∗ -3.129∗ -2.229∗∗ 4.436 -2.766 -3.323∗ -0.807
( 1.061 ) ( 1.472 ) ( 0.791 ) (3.62) (2.259) ( 1.346 ) (1.486)
industrial 3.519∗∗∗ 3.351∗∗∗ 2.903∗∗∗ -4.198 0.732 3.457∗∗∗ 2.843∗∗∗
( 0.257 ) ( 0.301 ) ( 0.243 ) (3.623) (1.059) ( 0.396 ) (0.435)
log-like -154060 -154070 -154340 -183220 -155000 -64636 -37864
obs 165114 165114 76643 42497
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. unemployed sp,0; professional sp,1; domestic
sp,2; commercial sp,3; industrial sp,4. (xi, wpXp, up,y) always included
2.4.2 Alternative relaxation method
As stated above, we also implemented the Kasahara & Shimotsu (2012) NPL–Λ algo-
rithm that converges to the true parameters whenever the fixed point constraint (2.7)
does not have local contraction properties in a neighbourhood of the true parameters.
Specifically, we replace the right hand side of the fixed point iteration by expression
Λt =
{
Ψ(Sˆt−1,X,W; θˆt)
}α
Sˆt−1
1−α
(2.9)
with α ∈ {0.1, 0.8} ≈ 0.
From the endogenous coefficients reported in Table 2.7 we notice that they do not
change much compared to those reported in column (4) of Table 2.5 which is reassuring
that our PML/FP a´ la Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007) estimates are consistent.
Table 2.7: Estimation of endogenous effects Jy with asymmetric influ-
ence by NPL–Λ algorithm
vars NPL–Λ
α = .1 α = .8
(1) (2)
unemployed 3.099∗∗∗ 3.057∗∗∗
(0.731 ) ( 0.267 )
professional -0.796 -0.976
( 0.624 ) ( 0.650 )
Continued on next page
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(1) (2)
domestic -1.545 -0.669
( 1.075 ) ( 1.220 )
commercial -3.359∗∗ -3.429∗∗
( 1.062) ( 1.143 )
industrial 3.519∗∗∗ 3.639∗∗∗
( 0.257 ) ( 0.265 )
log-like -154100 -154060
obs 165114
xi yes yes
wpXp yes yes
up,y yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Beliefs unemployed
sp,0; professional sp,1; domestic sp,2; commercial
sp,3; industrial sp,4.
2.4.3 Evidence for identifying assumptions
We now turn present evidence showing that our identifying assumptions are likely to
hold. Like most researchers, we are working under the assumption that we have a good
measure of social group. To justify our use of ecclesiastical parish boundaries, we have
already provided anecdotal evidence suggesting that social networks were “local” (i.e.
geography mattered) and ecclesiastical parishes played a major role in the community.
To motivate assumptions A.2.2.3 we first provide evidence corroborating that ec-
clesiastical parishes within a BW were similar. We show that the 1855 Metropolis
Management Act, that merged ecclesiastical parishes into BW, created visible differ-
ences between BW. For this purpose, we use information on parish receipts and rates.
Additionally, we test whether the characteristics of individuals living at the border
of two neighbouring parishes within the same BW were significantly similar, which
shouldn’t be the case if there is sorting at that lower geographic level. We finally use
preliminary rent information collected at the street level to show that it is reasonable
to think that individuals were “as if” randomly allocated within a parish.
Parish receipts and rates within BW
Given that parishes were allowed to tax their members while providing relief to the
paupers it naturally led to aﬄuent parishes being unwilling to accept anyone who could
become a charge on the local finances. Initially, mobility restrictions were established
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dictating responsibility for the poor to their birth parish or to the parish where they had
lived for the past three years. A series of acts were later enacted so that the financial
burden of paupers was shared on a union-wide basis rather than a parish-wide basis.33
Therefore there was free mobility within a BW.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the total receipts per inhabitant and the accessible value
per inhabitant by BW. There appears to be substantial differences between neighbour-
ing BW while none for parishes within the same BW. Given the fact that this infor-
mation was public (we found it in a published article of the Economist in 1883), it is
reasonable to assume BW boundaries were intimately known by its residents, especially
the poor.(Snell 2009) From the local tax receipts in 188134 we see wide variation in the
wealth of administrative areas. Taken together these evidences suggest that there was
a lot of variation in terms of wealth across BW which would have been noticeable to
residents when choosing their location. With BW-wide rates, location decisions should
have primarily been based on this geographical unit.
LL_PA receipts_pop__ 0.385194 - 0.560071 __ 0.560072 - 0.766558 ___0.766559 - 1.257484___ 1.257485 - 2.012992___ 2.012993 - 7.441861
Figure 2.5: Total receipts (in £)
per inhabitant by administrative area
(BW/Vestries)
LL_PA value_pop _ 2.817812 - 5.110137 ___5.110138 - 8.568450___ 8.568451 - 13.400880 __ 13.400881 - 21.453950 ___ 21.453951 - 64.752860
Figure 2.6: Assessable value (in £)
per inhabitant by administrative area
(BW/Vestries)
Figure 2.7: Total receipts
Source: The Economist Newspaper Ltd, London (1883)
33”First, there was the law which made the poor ”irremoveable” poor on the common fund of the
union, instead of on the parochial rates. Then there was the Union Assessment Act, which equalised
the principle of assessment to the common fund throughout the several parishes of the same union,
making them contribute to the common fund in proportion to the rateable value for the property in
the parish, instead of in proportion to their own previous parochial contributions. Then there was
the great reform of last year (1865), the Union Chargeability Act, which changed all the poor on the
common fund, so abolishing the temptation offered to close parishes to keep out the poor, unless they
could also keep them out of the union itself, - and this is rarely practically possible, - which rendered
the poor irremoveable after a single year’s residence, instead of three years, and which gave the power
of removal to the more intelligent union guardians instead of the less intelligent parish overseers”. [The
Economist, 1866]
34see also figure 2.12 in appendix 2.6.1.
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Sorting or not sorting at the parish level
Simple models of residential choice suggest that if parishes boundaries are impor-
tant determinants of labour market outcomes and individuals know and care about
this, there should be substantial sorting along these ecclesiastical boundaries. House-
holds should thus be willing to pay more to live in a “better” parish even if houses and
neighbourhoods are very similar on either side of a parish border. Sorting at the eccle-
siastical parish level will bias estimates toward finding a positive association between
parish quality and employment rate, unless one fully controls for these other differences
across boundaries.
However, as explained by the epigraph taken from the Economist in 1857, there
was an increasing tendency, during the years succeeding the 1855 Management Act,
of residents to sort themselves into locations not based any more on the division of
labour but rather a “disposition to associate with equals” based on wealth.35 Given
that parishes within the same BW were facing the same tax burden and were subject
to similar redistribution policies we may argue such BW boundaries were the relevant
units at which “class–colonies” were emerging.
Additionally, we construct a test to see whether there is any “at-the-border” cor-
relation in unobservables among residents (i.e. at the common border level between
two neighbouring parishes, τβ level), after taking into account the selection based on
the BW level (i.e. controlling for τb). Given the impossibility to use unobservables
to construct such a test we use instead some observables characteristics obtained from
the census data (i.e. sex composition, number of children in the household, and of
servants as a proxy for wealth, percentage of married couples and share of individuals
that have migrated). Conceptually, this methodology is equivalent to testing whether
differences in means of exogenous characteristics on opposite sides of social boundaries
are statistically zero.
Consider the set of all BW borders as B. Let us define β(p, p′) ∈ B as a border
between an ecclesiastical parish p and p′ belonging to the same BW. Define a buffer h
to this border β and call βh = {i ∈ I | d(li, β) ≤ h} as the set of all individuals i that
live in location li within distance h to a point in the shared border β.
Define Zp as the random variable Z for individuals residing in ecclesiastical parish
p once we have controlled for the BW to which ecclesiastical parish p belongs to using
a fixed effect linear regression. Similarly, define Zp′ as the random variable Z for
individuals belonging to “control” parish of p (i.e. adjacent ecclesiastical parish of p).
Now, for a given distance r denote βr = {i ∈ I \ βh | d(li, βh) ≤ r} as those observations
35“If we secretly regard wealth as the measure of importance, we are awkward in different ways with
those richer or poorer than ourselves” The Economist, June 20, 1857 (p. 670).
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in location li that are no more that r-meters apart from any individual belonging to
buffer h-meters from border β. Our identifying assumption A.2.2.3 translates in this
setting to
lim
r→0
Corrβ(E·|βh [Zp],E·|βr [Zp]) = limr→0
Corrβ(E·|βh [Zp],E·|βr [Zp′ ]) (2.10)
If Z behaves as a random variable at the border β then condition (2.10) should hold.
In contrast, if Z responds differently at either side of the border then condition (2.10)
is no longer required to hold. In fact, if there is sorting patterns along parishes. exoge-
nous variables for individuals sharing the same social group should be more strongly
correlated than for individuals belonging to different social groups. We would expect
the correlation in the characteristics between individuals residing within the buffer zone
and those living outside it, while still belonging to the same social group, to be larger
than the correlation with those equally close but belonging to a different social group.
In brief, we should see no discontinuous jump in those observables characteristics that
are potentially exogenous (such as age and sex composition).
The following figure 2.8 depict evidence for a buffer h = 40 mts and bins (r) of
75 mts. The horizontal axis varies the distance to buffer observations with positive
values reserved to those individuals belonging to the same parish while negative values
depict individuals belonging to “control” parishes. On the vertical axis we plot the
corresponding correlation. Our identifying assumption imply that there should not be
a discontinuity at the origin if one compares the correlation among neighbours of the
same social parish and the correlation among neighbours of the control social parish.36
In figure 2.8 we see that none of the exogenous variables, apart from the share
of married head of households, exhibit any discontinuities in their correlations while
distinguishing by actual parish and neighbouring ones. Social interactions could be
an important determinant for the marriage market, similarly to the labour market.
Therefore, the discontinuity found in the share of married head of households should
not be surprising. We conclude that there is evidence of no selection at the ecclesiastical
parish boundaries (i.e social group borders) once BW fixed effects are accounted for.
We have also compiled some tentative evidence on rents at the building level (Stew-
art 1900). Our preliminary data (see appendix 2.6.1) shows that within–BW variation
is lower than between–BW which suggests that differences in house rents for parishes
within the same BW were lower than differences for parishes across different BW.
However more work on this is needed.
36We show the results for a buffer of = 40 mts and a degree third polynomial, but the results are
robust to different buffers and polynomial degrees (see Appendix 2.6).
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the identification and estimation of a multinomial
choice model with social interactions and asymmetric influence. The model allows for
correlated effects at the group level and includes a spatial weighting matrix to capture
potential interactions and/or strength of ties. We establish the identification of the en-
dogenous and exogenous interactions when there is enough variation on the behavioural
influences within a group. This extends prior work on social interactions focusing on
binary outcomes with asymmetric influence (Lee et al. 2014) and multinomial choice
model with symmetric influence (Brock & Durlauf 2006). It also depicts how variation
across and within groups may be exploited for identification with non–network data
(Bramoulle´ 2013, Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens 2013). We use a recursive pseudo max-
imum likelihood estimation with equilibrium fixed point subroutine (Aguirregabiria &
Mira 2007) to provide consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of our struc-
tural parameters. The empirical framework developed in this chapter may be applied
to other areas involving local interactions and categorical outcomes such as criminal
activities, modes of transport, or technology adoption.
As an empirical application, we examine how social groups affect occupational
choices in Victorian London. We construct a new dataset which allows the geograph-
ical localisation of the 1881 full census data. We define social groups using the eccle-
siastical parish boundaries and exploit a two–tier administrative system to deal with
self–selection into groups. We argue that ecclesiastical parishes were a defining feature
of social networks and individuals’ location decisions were based on BW, providers of
public good services. Our results indicate that social parishes play a role in determin-
ing labour market outcomes among Londoners in 1881. Once multiple equilibria in the
consistent beliefs constraint and group unobservables are accounted for, an increase in
the share of a industrial occupation in one’s parish peers increases one’s own proba-
bility of being employed at that same occupation, while for commercial occupations
peer’s competition is predominant. We also report that a higher expected incidence of
unemployed peers leads to a larger likelihood of being unemployed. Social interactions
do not seem to matter for occupational choice at both ends of skills’ distribution (i.e.
for domestic and professional occupations).
While our specific data allows us to investigate a historical period, our results might
be relevant for social network effects in contemporary studies. In the modern world of
easy mobility and technological information, we content that geography–related mea-
sures could capture the most relevant features of social networks. In the 19th century
such measure had more relevant content than nowadays. Moreover, the religious dimen-
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sion of our measure offers a plausible additional dimension given that church attendance
remained mandatory as a legacy of the Tudor era.
Relying on our historical period also enables us to circumvent the self–selection
into social group problems thanks to the curious form of local federalism based on a
two-tier administrative system present at that time. We exploit the fact that public
goods were provided at a higher tier and consequently determined location decision
while community identity were still largely determined at a more local level.
Our chapter helps us understand how social networks play a role in labour market
outcomes above and beyond neighbourhood (Topa & Zenou 2014). While most studies
have looked employment status, our study documents spatial clustering in occupation
within a city and can shed light on how otherwise homogeneous societies may differ
substantially due to the composition of their social reference group. A strong endoge-
nous effect suggests that any program that targets employment in particular sectors,
will have a spillover effect: increasing the employment likelihood of someone else in
the network. We show that failing to account for asymmetric influence and ignoring
possible correlated effects may bias the endogenous effect on occupational choices.
Studying social interactions and labour market outcomes can also help us to under-
stand social trends and transformations such as social mobility and industrialisation.
Inter-generational occupational and spatial mobility may remain low because workers
seek to use their inherited social connections to find jobs more easily as documented for
instance by Borjas (1994) and Munshi & Wilson (2008). This is a interesting question
for future work.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Further descriptives
London 1881 number of social parishes per civil
under 2
2 - 3
3 - 5
5 - 10
over 10
(a) | P |
London 1881 number of members per social
under 30
30 - 210
210 - 630
630 - 1120
over 1120
(b) np
London 1881 number of median street neighbours per social
under 10
10 - 17.4
17.4 - 30
30 - 51.8
over 51.8
(c) neip
London 1881 social parishes under analysis
included
not included
(d) Area under investigation
Figure 2.9: Social and civil parish: variation in | P (b) |, np, nei(i)
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London 1881 SEX
under 0.79
0.79 - 0.828
0.828 - 0.854
0.854 - 0.878
over 0.878
(a) Percentage of men per parish
London 1881 AGE
under 38.669
38.669 - 39.408
39.408 - 40.094
40.094 - 41.334
over 41.334
(b) Average age per parish
London 1881 married
under 0.889
0.889 - 0.93
0.93 - 0.951
0.951 - 0.966
over 0.966
(c) Percentage of married individual per
parish
London 1881 nchild
under 1.696
1.696 - 2.012
2.012 - 2.226
2.226 - 2.41
over 2.41
(d) Average number of children per
parish
2.6.2 CML estimation
The following is the generalization to the multinomial logit case for the CML to differ-
ence out fixed effect at the group level (Chamberlain 1980, Gabrielsen 1978).
One will need to restrict the sample N to reference groups where there is variation
in terms of occupational choices (which we denote N ′). Define µp,iy = 1 if yp,i = y,
µp,iy = 0 otherwise. The probability distribution of the restricted sample conditioning
on tp,y =
∑
i∈p µp,iy for every y, which is a sufficient statistic for every up,y, leads to
the following Conditional Maximum Likelihood function for the sub–sample N ′
LN ′ = 1
N ′
∑
p∈P
∑
i∈p
log
exp
(
β′
∑
i,y zp,iyµp,iy
)
∑
λ∈Λp exp
(
β′
∑
i,y zp,iyλiy
) . (2.11)
Where Λp =
{
λ = (λ1,0, · · · , λnp,L−1) | λiy = 0 or 1,
∑
y λiy = 1,
∑
i∈p λiy = tpy, y = 1, · · · ,
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London 1881 nservant
under 0.05
0.05 - 0.091
0.091 - 0.213
0.213 - 0.574
over 0.574
(e) Number of servants
London 1881 stayerp
under 0.022
0.022 - 0.072
0.072 - 0.138
0.138 - 0.198
over 0.198
(f) Percentage of residents in parish of
birth
London 1881 stayerc
under 0.348
0.348 - 0.418
0.418 - 0.488
0.488 - 0.595
over 0.595
(g) Percentage of resident in county of
birth
Figure 2.10: Descriptives by ecclesiastical parish
L− 1}
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Figure 2.11: Empirical distribution of parish members against statistics on street neigh-
bours, London 1881
£10 or over
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£5 to £6 9s. 11d.
£4 to £4 19s. 11d.
Under £4
Figure 2.12: Local Areas: Rateable Value per Head, 1881. Davis (1988)
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Table 2.8: Balanced Sample across merged observations in non institutional dwellings
Not merged Merged H0 : 1− 2 = 0
N Mean (1) SE N Mean (2) SE t-stat pval
All individuals
Male 802,735 0.450 0.001 895,712 0.473 0.001 30.430 0.000
Age 802,746 32.521 0.014 895,718 32.767 0.013 13.104 0.000
Pop Age 25-34 802,746 0.279 0.000 895,718 0.276 0.000 -4.087 0.000
Pop Age 35-44 802,746 0.207 0.000 895,718 0.205 0.000 -3.282 0.001
Pop Age 45-60 802,746 0.194 0.000 895,718 0.203 0.000 14.673 0.000
Native 802,746 0.934 0.000 895,718 0.920 0.000 -32.871 0.000
Labour Force 802,202 0.665 0.001 894,880 0.694 0.000 40.229 0.000
Married 799,622 0.590 0.001 892,655 0.608 0.001 24.750 0.000
Individuals in non extreme border parishes†
Male 150,171 0.473 0.001 491,167 0.467 0.001 -3.737 0.000
Age 150,171 32.822 0.032 491,170 32.731 0.018 -2.499 0.012
Pop Age 15-24 150,171 0.319 0.001 491,170 0.320 0.001 0.574 0.566
Pop Age 25-34 150,171 0.266 0.001 491,170 0.273 0.001 5.446 0.000
Pop Age 35-44 150,171 0.208 0.001 491,170 0.202 0.001 -4.605 0.000
Pop Age 45-60 150,171 0.207 0.001 491,170 0.205 0.001 -2.065 0.039
Native 150,171 0.904 0.001 491,170 0.901 0.000 -2.316 0.021
Labour Force 150,017 0.700 0.001 490,731 0.708 0.001 6.204 0.000
Married 149,572 0.600 0.001 489,443 0.590 0.001 -6.532 0.000
Individuals in non border parishes‡
Male 97,259 0.489 0.002 293,892 0.488 0.001 -0.523 0.601
Age 97,259 32.835 0.040 293,894 32.761 0.023 -1.602 0.109
Pop Age 15-24 97,259 0.318 0.001 293,894 0.322 0.001 1.968 0.049
Pop Age 25-34 97,259 0.264 0.001 293,894 0.267 0.001 1.532 0.126
Pop Age 35-44 97,259 0.210 0.001 293,894 0.204 0.001 -3.895 0.000
Pop Age 45-60 97,259 0.207 0.001 293,894 0.207 0.001 -0.052 0.959
Native 97,259 0.896 0.001 293,894 0.891 0.001 -3.615 0.000
Labour Force 97,160 0.701 0.001 293,560 0.703 0.001 1.211 0.226
Married 96,866 0.615 0.002 292,865 0.616 0.001 0.863 0.388
‡ border parishes are: Battersea, Bow, Bromley St Leonard, Brompton, Camberwell, St Dunstan Stepney/Mile End, Mile
End New Town, Poplar, St George Hanover Square, St James Clerkenwell, St Leonard Shoreditch, St Luke Chelsea, St
Luke Old Street, St Margaret Westminster, St Mary Abbots Kensington, St Mary Lambeth, St Mary Paddington, St Mary
Rotherhithe, St Marylebone, St Matthew Bethnal Green, St Nicholas Deptford, St Pancras, St Paul Deptford, Greenwich,
St Anne Kensington, Brompton, Islington. † extreme border parishes are: border parishes minus St George Hanover Square,
St Luke Old Street, St Dunstan Stepney/Mile End, Mile End New Town, St Marylebone.
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_csv_avg_rent_min 2.500 - 5.250 5.251 - 6.666 __ 6.667 - 9.042 9.043 - 11.166 11.167 - 16.025
Figure 2.13: Avg. rent per room (in £, lower bound) by ecclesiastical parish
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2.6.5 Marginal effects
Starting from equations 2.2 and 2.3 if we consider the change in the endogenous effect
we have
dPy,i
dwisy0
=
 JyPy,i(1−Py,i) if y0 = y,−Jy0Py0,iPy,i if y0 6= y.
However, for the contextual individual characteristics we know a change in any of
the covariates will have a direct effect on 2.2 but also an equilibrium effect through 2.3.
Therefore,
dPy,i
dxk,i
=
∂Py,i
∂xk,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
∂Py,i
∂wisy
∂wisy
∂xk,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect on beliefs of j ∈ neii taking y
+
∑
y0 6=y
∂Py,i
∂wisy0
∂wisy0
∂xk,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
effect on beliefs of j ∈ neii taking any other y0 6= y
Doing the calculation we get
dPy,i
dxk,i
= ck,yPy,i
(
1−∑y′∈Ω ck,y′ck,y Py′,i)+
JyPy,i(1−Py,i)
[∑
j∈neii wij
(
wjidk,yPy,j
(
1−∑y′∈Ω dk,y′dk,y Py′,j))]−∑
y0 6=y Jy0Py,i(Py0,i)
[∑
j∈neii wij
(
wjidk,y0Py0,j
(
1−∑y′∈Ω dk,y′dk,y0Py′,j))] .
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Table 2.15: Average Marginal Effects, endogenous and exogenous vari-
ables
vars PML/FP
unemployed professional domestic commercial industrial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Endogenous
Estimated wisˆy,i 5.37E-03 -2.41E-03 -1.83E-03 -2.46E-02 8.04E-02
sd (wisˆy,i) [ 0.039] [0.048] [0.049] [0.054] [0.106]
Exogenous sd var
direct -3.48E-03 1.72E-04 -2.11E-03 2.55E-03 3.71E-03
Age ind y -2.16E-06 2.65E-06 -2.05E-06 -3.04E-05 1.06E-04 [10.688]
ind y0 6= y -1.09E-05 -7.30E-06 -1.54E-05 -6.70E-05 2.63E-05
direct 1.57E-03 1.41E-03 2.19E-03 3.93E-03 1.36E-02
n child ind y 1.52E-05 -9.48E-06 3.87E-06 2.24E-05 -4.12E-05 [1.992]
ind y0 6= y 2.76E-06 -1.33E-05 4.17E-06 3.83E-05 -2.26E-05
direct 1.45E-03 1.68E-03 2.71E-03 6.50E-03 2.09E-02
n servant ind y -1.39E-05 6.28E-06 6.01E-06 7.91E-06 -8.94E-05 [0.876]
ind y0 6= y 8.22E-06 2.25E-05 2.07E-05 3.55E-05 -3.75E-06
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets.
2.6.6 Discontinuities in correlations
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Figure 2.16: Correlation in endogenous variables for h = 40 mts varying neighbours at
75 mts bins, polynomial degree 2
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Figure 2.17: Correlation in exogenous variables for h = 50 mts varying neighbours at
75 mts bins, polynomial degree3
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2.6.7 Administrative Areas
Table 2.16: Table of Administrative Areas
Present Borough Metropolitan
Borough
Board of Works Civil Parishes Ancient Parish
(1965) (1900) (1855)
Camden St Pancras Vestry St Pancras St Pancras
Hampstead Vestry Hampstead (St John) Hampstead (St John)
Holborn St Andrew above the
Bars (Holborn)
St Andrew (Holborn)
St George the Martyr
Holborn District St Andrew Holborn
above the Bars with
St George the Martyr
St Giles District St Giles in the Fields
& St George
Bloomsbury (1774)
Staple Inn Staple Inn Extra
Parochial Place
Furnivals Inn Furnivals Inn Extra
Parochial Place
Grays Inn Grays Inn Extra
Parochial Place
Holborn District Liberty of Saffron
Hill, Hatton Garden,
Ely Rents & Ely
Place
Liberty of Saffron
Hill, Hatton Garden,
Ely Rents & Ely
Place & Liberty of
Saffron Hill, Hatton
Garden, Ely Rents &
Ely place. Saffron
Hill is within St
Andrew Holborn
Lincolns Inn Lincolns Inn Extra
Parochial Place
Greenwich Greenwich Greenwich District Greenwich (St Alfege)
Deptford St Nicholas
Greenwich Deptford
(St Paul)
Lee District (orig
Plumstead)
Kidbrooke Kidbrooke Ancient
parish being regarded
as liberty following
loss of church and
re-established in 1866
Charlton (next
Woolwich)
Charlton
Woolwich (south
of River)
Lee District (orig
Plumstead)
Eltham (St John the
Baptist)
Eltham
Vestry (orig
Plumstead District)
Plumstead (St
Margaret)
Plumstead (originally
including chapelry of
East Wickham)
Vestry Woolwich (St Mary)
Hackney Hackney Hackney Board Hackney (St John) Hackney
Stoke Newington Hackney Board Stoke Newington (St
Mary)
Stoke Newington
Part of South
Hornsey forming
detached areas in
Stoke Newington
(parish and UD
created 1896 and
transferred to London
in 1900)
Hornsey
Continued on next page...
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Present Borough Metropolitan
Borough
Board of Works Civil Parishes Ancient Parish
Shoreditch Vestry St Leonard
(Shoreditch)
St Leonard (by 1558)
Whitechapel District Liberty of Norton
Folgate.
Hammersmith &
Fulham
Hammersmith Vestry Hammersmith (St
Paul)
Fulham
Fulham Vestry Fulham (All Saints) Fulham
Islington Finsbury Vestry Clerkenwell St James Clerkenwell
St John
Vestry St Luke St Giles Without
Cripplegate
Holborn District
Board
Glasshouse Yard
(Liberty)
St Botolph Without
Aldersgate
Holborn District
Board
St Sepulchre St Sepulchre
Charterhouse Charterhouse
Islington Vestry St Mary Islington St Mary Islington
Kensington &
Chelsea
Kensington Vestry St Mary Abbots,
Kensington
St Mary Abbots,
Kensington
Chelsea Vestry St Luke Chelsea St Luke Chelsea
Lambeth Lambeth Vestry Lambeth (St Mary ) Lambeth
Wandsworth
Lewisham Deptford Deptford (St Pauls) Deptford
Lewisham Plumstead Lee (St Margaret) Lee
Vestry Lewisham (St Mary) Lewisham
Part of Camberwell
on western slopes of
Forest Hill
Southwark Southwark St Saviours District
Board of Works
Christchurch
(Southwark)
Created parish in
1670, was originally a
liberty (Paris
Garden)
St Saviours District
Board of Works
St Saviour
(Southwark)
Created in 1541 from
the ancient parishes
of St Margaret and St
Mary Magdalen
which were combined
Vestry St Mary Newington St Mary Newington
Vestry St George the Martyr St George the Martyr
Camberwell Vestry St Giles Camberwell St Giles Camberwell
Bermondsey Vestry St Mary Magdalen,
Bermondsey
St Mary Magdalen,
Bermondsey
Vestry voting with St
Olave District
St Mary, Rotherhithe St Mary, Rotherhithe
St Olave District St John Horsleydown
(Southwark)
St Olave, Southwark
St Olave District St Olave & St
Thomas (Southwark)
St Olave (Southwark)
St Thomas
(Southwark); created
form area of St Olave
(above) in c.1550
from area comprising
Archbishop of
Canterbury’s hospital
Tower Hamlets Bethnal Green Vestry Bethnal Green (St
Matthew)
Stepney
Poplar Poplar District Bow, formed 1719
from Stepney
Stepney
Continued on next page...
86
2.6. Appendix 2. Occupational choice and social interactions
Present Borough Metropolitan
Borough
Board of Works Civil Parishes Ancient Parish
Poplar Poplar District Bromley Bromley
Poplar (All Saints),
formed 1817 from
Stepney, though had
been chapelry from
1654
Stepney
Stepney Limehouse District Limehouse (St Anne),
formed 1725 from
Stepney
Stepney
Whitechapel District Mile End New Town,
formed 1866 from
Stepney
Stepney
Mile End Old Town,
formed 1866 from
Stepney
Stepney
Whitechapel District Norton Folgate,
formed 1858
Prior to 1858 was
liberty and extra
parochial area
Whitechapel Distrct Old Artillery Ground,
formed 1866
Prior to 1866 was
liberty
Old Tower Without,
formed 1858 and
abolished 1895 (to St
Botolph without)
Previously extra
parochial place
Limehouse District Ratcliffe, formed 1866
from part of Stepney
and part of
Limehouse
Stepney
Whitechapel District St Botolph without
Aldgate (being that
part of St Botolph
that lays outside City
of London). In 1895
included Old Tower
Without.
St Botolph
Whitechapel District St Katherine,
transferred to St
Botolph Without in
1895
St Katherine
St George in the
East, formed 1729
from Stepney
Stepney
Limehouse District Shadwell, formed
1670 from Stepney
Stepney
Whitechapel District Spitalfields (Christ
Church), formed 1729
from Stepney
Stepney
Stepney (St Dunstan) Stepney
Whitechapel District Tower of London,
created parish in 1858
Prior to 1858 was
liberty and extra
parochial area
Limehouse District Wapping, formed
1729 from part of
Stepney
Stepney
Whitechapel District
(incl Holy Trinity
Minories, Pr St
Katherine)
Whitechapel (St
Mary), formed in
early 17th century
from part of Stepney
Stepney
Whitechapel District Holy Trinity
Minories, Transferred
to Whitechapel in
1895
Holy Trinity Minories
Continued on next page...
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Present Borough Metropolitan
Borough
Board of Works Civil Parishes Ancient Parish
Wandsworth Battersea Wandworth Board Battersea (St Mary) Battersea
Wandsworth
(western part)
Wandsworth Board Clapham (Holy
Trinity)
Clapham
Putney (St Mary) Originally chapelry of
Wimbledon
Streatham (St
Leonard)
Steatham
Tooting Graveney Tooting Gravey
Wandsworth (All
Saints)
Wandsworth
Westminster Westminster Vestry St Martin in the fields St Martin in the fields
Vestry St George Hanover
Square 1725
Vestry St James Westminster
(Piccadilly) 1685
Strand District St Anne Soho 1678
Strand District St Paul Covent
Garden 1645
Westminster
(1855-1885 only)
St Margaret
Westminster
St Margaret
Westminster
Westminster
(1855-1885 only)
St John the
Evangelist
Westminster 1727
Strand District St Clement Danes St Clement Danes
Strand District St Mary le Strand St Mary le Strand
Strand District Board
of Works
Liberty of the Rolls Liberty of the Rolls
(a Liberty, being that
part of St Dunstan’s
in the West situated
in Middlesex)
Strand District Board
of Works
Precinct of the Savoy Precinct of the Savoy
Paddington Vestry Paddington Paddington
Vestry Chelsea (det part) Chelsea (det part)
St Marylebone Vestry St Marylebone St Marylebone
Source: http://www.jimella.nildram.co.uk/counties.htm\#bounds
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Table 2.17: Balanced Sample across merged observations in non institutional dwellings
Not merged Merged H0 : 1− 2 = 0
N Mean (1) SE N Mean (2) SE t-stat pval
All individuals
Male 802,735 0.450 0.001 895,712 0.473 0.001 30.430 0.000
Age 802,746 32.521 0.014 895,718 32.767 0.013 13.104 0.000
Pop Age 25-34 802,746 0.279 0.000 895,718 0.276 0.000 -4.087 0.000
Pop Age 35-44 802,746 0.207 0.000 895,718 0.205 0.000 -3.282 0.001
Pop Age 45-60 802,746 0.194 0.000 895,718 0.203 0.000 14.673 0.000
Native 802,746 0.934 0.000 895,718 0.920 0.000 -32.871 0.000
Labour Force 802,202 0.665 0.001 894,880 0.694 0.000 40.229 0.000
Married 799,622 0.590 0.001 892,655 0.608 0.001 24.750 0.000
Individuals in non extreme border parishes†
Male 150,171 0.473 0.001 491,167 0.467 0.001 -3.737 0.000
Age 150,171 32.822 0.032 491,170 32.731 0.018 -2.499 0.012
Pop Age 15-24 150,171 0.319 0.001 491,170 0.320 0.001 0.574 0.566
Pop Age 25-34 150,171 0.266 0.001 491,170 0.273 0.001 5.446 0.000
Pop Age 35-44 150,171 0.208 0.001 491,170 0.202 0.001 -4.605 0.000
Pop Age 45-60 150,171 0.207 0.001 491,170 0.205 0.001 -2.065 0.039
Native 150,171 0.904 0.001 491,170 0.901 0.000 -2.316 0.021
Labour Force 150,017 0.700 0.001 490,731 0.708 0.001 6.204 0.000
Married 149,572 0.600 0.001 489,443 0.590 0.001 -6.532 0.000
Individuals in non border parishes‡
Male 97,259 0.489 0.002 293,892 0.488 0.001 -0.523 0.601
Age 97,259 32.835 0.040 293,894 32.761 0.023 -1.602 0.109
Pop Age 15-24 97,259 0.318 0.001 293,894 0.322 0.001 1.968 0.049
Pop Age 25-34 97,259 0.264 0.001 293,894 0.267 0.001 1.532 0.126
Pop Age 35-44 97,259 0.210 0.001 293,894 0.204 0.001 -3.895 0.000
Pop Age 45-60 97,259 0.207 0.001 293,894 0.207 0.001 -0.052 0.959
Native 97,259 0.896 0.001 293,894 0.891 0.001 -3.615 0.000
Labour Force 97,160 0.701 0.001 293,560 0.703 0.001 1.211 0.226
Married 96,866 0.615 0.002 292,865 0.616 0.001 0.863 0.388
‡ border parishes are: Battersea, Bow, Bromley St Leonard, Brompton, Camberwell, St Dunstan Stepney/Mile End, Mile
End New Town, Poplar, St George Hanover Square, St James Clerkenwell, St Leonard Shoreditch, St Luke Chelsea, St
Luke Old Street, St Margaret Westminster, St Mary Abbots Kensington, St Mary Lambeth, St Mary Paddington, St Mary
Rotherhithe, St Marylebone, St Matthew Bethnal Green, St Nicholas Deptford, St Pancras, St Paul Deptford, Greenwich,
St Anne Kensington, Brompton, Islington. † extreme border parishes are: border parishes minus St George Hanover Square,
St Luke Old Street, St Dunstan Stepney/Mile End, Mile End New Town, St Marylebone.
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Chapter 3
Reference points formation and
investment decisions
3.1 Introduction
The ideas delivered under the prospect theory framework by Kahneman & Tversky
(1979) have gain increasing relevance in the economic literature. Many experimental
results have showed that a loss, with respect to a reference point, is more painful to
individuals than a commensurable gain. Also there is evidence that marginal sensitivity
of further deviations is decreasing both below and above the reference point. This
translates into risk–loving behaviour in losses while being risk averse in gains. However,
what determines the reference point remains an open question.
Early suggestions on what a decision maker reference point is were mainly focused on
backward looking introspection and unique reference points (standard Prospect Theory,
PT Kahneman & Tversky (1979)). In that sense, any form of current status–quo, or
of habits formation were suggested as a determinant of the reference point. In all
such cases, actual experiences feed the benchmark against which individuals weight
the outcome from their decisions. More recently, some authors have suggested that
expectations that a person held when start focusing on the decision and shortly before
the outcome occurs (Expectation Based Prospect Theory, EBPT (Ko¨szegi & Rabin
0We acknowledge the comments from Syngjoo Choi, Erik Eyster, Matthew Rabin, Charles Sprenger,
Georg Weisza¨cker, Francesco Cerigioni and Lukas Wenner. The present version benefit from audiences
at the EEA-ESEM Gothenburg Meeting 2013, the BEElab Florence 2013, THEEM Konstanz 2013,
UCL work in progress seminar, and ULB Jamboree Meeting 2013. Without the contribution from
Ricardo Argu¨ello, Bernardo Atuesta, Mariana Blanco, Juan–Camilo Cardenas, Diana Contreras, Jenny
Espinosa, Carolina Lopera, Manuel Ramı´rez, Mauricio Rodr´ıguez, Oscar Salazar, Renata Samaca´ and
Hernando Zuleta this chapter would not have been written. Financial support from the Colombian
Central Bank and Colciencias grant 1222-405-20240, CT 144-2007 is appreciated.
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2006)) may affect reference point formation. In these later cases reference points are
generally multiple and forward looking.
In the present chapter we recognize that recently held expectations on both: possible
consumption levels (i.e. counterfactuals) and actual experienced consumption level
affect individual decision making. Therefore, foregone opportunities as well as actual
experiences serve as benchmarks against which individuals may compare prospective
outcomes from current actions. We thus allow for multiple reference points that take
as inputs lagged beliefs and lagged status quo. We apply such set up on an investment
decision framework.
Specifically, in this chapter we provide a model on investment decisions with multi-
ple reference points combining stochastically expectations on forgone outcomes together
with actual outcomes. The model delivers some behavioural results to be tested ex-
perimentally against competing theories of reference points formation. We draw our
motivation from the fact that it is not the same deciding how much to invest on a risky
alternative from a certain available income which one has earned after a winning event,
than starting with the same amount after losing the chance of starting with a higher
one.
None of the previous papers on investment decisions allow for beliefs to play a role
in determining the reference point, and therefore they are usually deterministic with
an adjustment based on starting conditions and recent outcomes. Our approach fills
this gap.
An important theoretical result we find is that willingness to invest in risky options
differs non–monotonically across income levels, specifically, the low income individuals
are willing to bear more risk than high–initial income individuals when stochastic
reference points are introduced. In this chapter we also provide an experiment to test
some of the implied behavioural results on a sample of informal small entrepreneur.
In the following section we provide a short overview of related work and then in-
troduce the experimental set–up we use to test the theoretical framework presented in
section 3.4. The model incorporates stochastic reference–dependent preferences into an
investment decision problem. In section 3.5 we present the econometric results from
the experiment and test the theoretical implications of the proposed model against
sensible competing theories on reference point formation.
3.2 Related Literature
The EBPT perspective seems to be consistent with some results found in the exper-
imental literature when individual’s status quo is not held constant. Abeler, Falk,
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Goette & Huffman (2011) experimental set-up suggest that an expectation-based ap-
proach is sensible in determining effort provision. Also, Ericson & Fuster (2011) provide
evidence that expectation–based reference points affect exchange behaviour. Ko¨szegi
& Rabin (2007) also show that endogenous reference points driven by beliefs can affect
risk attitudes, they state that a person is less risk averse in eliminating a risk she ex-
pected to face than in taking on the same risk if it was unexpected. Sprenger (2010)
tests specifically whether reference points can be determined by expectations. He is
interested in contrasting competing theories of reference point determination: EBPT,
Disappointment Aversion (DA, Loomes & Sugden (1986)) and EUT. His experimental
test suggest the existence of an endowment for risk which is uniquely predicted by
EBPT.
Evidence on path–dependence risk attitudes is given by Post, Van den Assem,
Baltussen & Thaler (2008). Their findings suggest that individual decisions cannot be
fully reconciled with Expected Utility Theory (EUT) preferences. In particular they
find that risk aversion is affected by previous outcomes experienced during the game.
Those experiencing large paper losses earlier exhibit a “break–even” effect reducing
their risk aversion in later rounds, which suggests that their reference point adapts
somewhat slowly to previous losses; those experiencing paper gains, as well, reduce
their risk aversion in later rounds.
There have been several papers that built upon reference points framework to inves-
tigate individual decisions. Bowman, Minehart & Rabin (1999) propose an axiomatic
approach to study how the inclusion of references points and loss aversion affects deci-
sions over savings and consumption in a two-period framework with habit formation.
They assume no borrowing constraints, no discount rate and savings earn no interest;
the uncertainty in their model is on income earned in the second period. They find
empirical and theoretical evidence that, given an expected income above (below) the
reference point, an increase in uncertainty leads the consumer to increase (decrease)
savings. Siegmann (2002) takes an especial case of the value function without habit
formation nor discount rate, but with uncertainty over interest rates. She finds that
the saving function is non-decreasing in income and differs across poor and rich.
Berkelaar et al. (2004) provide a model on investment decisions and portfolio alloca-
tion with reference dependent preferences. They assume a complete market framework
and find that loss averse investor will follow a partial portfolio insurance strategy, giv-
ing up wealth in good states in order to keep wealth above the reference point at the
planning horizon. This strategy reduces the initial portfolio weight of stocks. Gomes
(2005) studies instead the implication for trading volumes with reference dependent
preferences, he finds that demand function for risky assets is discontinuous and non–
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monotonic: once wealth reaches to a certain threshold individuals will insure themselves
against possible losses with respect to a deterministic reference point subject to habit
formation, this happens mainly because their utility is defined only on the gain–loss
domain.
On the other hand, Yogo (2008) investigates the effect of reference-dependent pref-
erences on asset prices which allows explaining the high equity premium found in the
data and its countercyclical behaviour. This is done by assuming that reference points
are based on slow changing habits.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment was implemented during October and November 2008. Overall we
ran 13 sessions within seven days which amounts to two sessions per day, one from 7
am to 9 am, and the other one from 5pm to 7 pm and an average of 15 subjects per
session. Our subject sample is composed by informal small entrepreneurs and amounts
to 216 members of the Institute for Social Economy, Colombia (IPES in spanish).These
entrepreneurs are mostly artisans and street vendors who are very vulnerable to shocks
and are constantly taking decisions under uncertainty that affect their future income.
From our sample of entrepreneurs, 64.8% are female within 20 and 50 years. Nearly
25.9% of our whole sample have less than high school degree, 30% have completed
secondary education, 25.9% have technical education and less than 6% have completed
a higher education degree. The monthly income of almost 50% of this population is
less than 5 minimum wages (i.e. approximately USD 200 by 2008) and 80% do not
save for retirement.
Experimental sessions were implemented in the IPES facilities so subjects did not
need to commute to the university lab and therefore were in a more familiar working
environment. These allowed subjects to approach experiment’s decisions more natu-
rally than had it been in an experimental laboratory within university premises. All
the instructions where read aloud with the help of a video–beam to guarantee each par-
ticipant got the same understanding of the instruction and experimental procedures.
Given subjects did not have much familiarity with computers and decisions at stake
were cumbersome, the implementation of each session was in charge of 15 undergrad-
uate students hired and trained specifically for the project, we called them Monitors.
The Monitors knew the purpose of the whole experiment and where given detailed
instructions on the wording they should use across the experiment in order not to
influence any behaviour.1 One Monitor was allocated to each subject, they were in
1See appendix 3.7.3 for the instructions handed in to the Monitors.
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charge of entering the decisions from the subjects into the computer and implementing
any randomized draw so participants were certain of it being transparent.
In addition, as the experiment was long and aimed at vulnerable population we
gave them, at the beginning, some refreshments so they could endure the whole proce-
dure. This prevented them from rushing through the final stage of the procedure. We
provided them with a folder, labelled with the university logo, which contained the pre-
liminary instructions, a socio–demographic survey and the instructions from the first
stage. As soon as the first stage was completed, they were told they would proceed to
the second stage without knowing the pay–off from the previous stage and that they
would receive the total experimental pay–off at the end of the session.
3.3.1 Procedure
In the overall experiment there were two stages. In the first stage we rationalize the
individual choices over a paired sequence of price–list lotteries following the experi-
mental design of Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen (2010) to determine parametrically each
individual Prospect Theory parameters: overweighting of small probabilities (which we
denote α), loss aversion (λ) and risk aversion (γ). In the appendix we include a detailed
description of it.
It is important to note that none of the decisions taken in the first stage affected the
decisions of the next stage. Experimental pay–offs were paid only after finishing both
stages. Subjects were clearly informed that none of the decisions made at that point
affected outcomes from the next stage and that answers were not considered either
correct or incorrect. We also collected a standard socio economic characterization
survey.
At the beginning of the second stage individuals completed a socio economic survey,
once they have done this we gave them an income, depending on the treatment they
were included in (more details below). The subjects were told that the assigned income
was of their own already because they had reached to this point of the experiment. This
is important for our implementation because we managed to make subjects feel that
the assigned income belonged to them already. Given an initial income, subjects are
face with investment alternatives and must decide what to invest on a risky alternative
and a risk–free one. All the instructions are to be found in the appendix 3.7.3.
Treatments
We split the population into four treatments that were characterised by an Income
Variation (IV) and a Reference point Variation (IV). The RV splits the population in
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half according to how the initial income would be generated while; the IV determines
how high that initial income would be.
In particular, the initial income level (ω) could take two values: High w = COP40, 000
(i.e. USD 20)2 or low w = COP20, 000 (i.e. USD 10).
ω =
 w Low initial income, ' USD 10,w High initial income, ' USD 20.
The RV vary how that initial income would be generated. We split the sample
into a first group of individuals (L0) that started the experiment with a predetermined
income. Importantly, they were not informed about the possibility of getting a different
income level than the one assigned to them. A second group of individuals (L1) were
informed there were two possible income levels one of which would be assigned to them
depending on a coin toss. They were then given a coin for them to choose which side
they wanted to associate with the high (low) level and to toss it afterwards to determine
their own income.
L =
 L0 predetermined ω,L1 coin toss lottery over feasible ω′s.
For all treatments, after the income level was assigned, we show the subjects the
physical note and remind them that it was already theirs, then leave it on the table in
front of them.
We were very careful on making the allocation and randomization of treatments
very transparent to avoid confounding effects on subjects’ decisions. The Table 3.1
summarize the four treatments together with the distribution of observations in our
sample. Subjects starting with a predetermined income of USD10 represent 35.65%,
those that started with a high income level USD20 are 33.80% of the overall sample.
The rest of the population face the coin toss to determine their initial income level and
they were evenly distributed between high and low income levels.
Once individuals receive the initial income they will then take a series of investment
decisions across several rounds t and states of the wolrd s. In particular, at moment
t individuals decide how much, of an available income wt, to invest in a single risky
alternative if state of the world is s. We give more details in the following section
2Equivalently to 10% of the 2008’s Monthly Minimum Wage in Colombia.
95
3.3. Experimental Design 3. Reference points formation and investment decisions
Table 3.1: Experimental treatments (L, ω)
L\ω w w freq.
L0 Fixed Low income Fixed High income 150
L1 Random Low income Random High income 66
TOTAL 50.0% 50.0% 216∗
∗ Total decisions are 5400. Each individual takes 5 investment decisions across
5 rounds .
Decisions
After individuals receive a starting income ω = w0 (round t = 0) they were asked to
take two set of decisions across T = 5 different rounds which are linked to each other
in the sense that final income in round t is the starting income at t+ 1. The number of
rounds are not known, ex–ante, to the individuals. Instead of trying to capture some
effects of infinite horizon dynamic problem we gave this instruction in order to remove
any specific concern from what to expect from future rounds and therefore, round by
round, the only relevant ex–ante difference is the available income at the beginning of
each round.
First decision: Investment θt,s
Given initial income, they have to decide what part of it (i.e. θt,s ∈ [0, 1]) they
are willing to invest in a Risky Alternative when the rate of return depend on equally
likely random states of the world s ∈ {1, · · · , 5}. Each state is associated to a rate
of return r1 = 0, 05; r2 = 0, 10; r3 = 0, 15; r4 = 0, 20 or r5 = 0, 30 if the outcome of
the Alternative is successful, and rs = −0.90 for all s if unsuccessful. They were told
that each rate of return rs, s ∈ {1, · · · , 5} was supposed to be considered as totally
independent from each other because only one state of the world would be chosen at
the end of a given round. So that, within each round, they had the same total income
to be invested in each state.
Any amount not invested is left for next decision round, which is equivalent to al-
locate that amount on a Safe Investment with a rate of return equal to 1. Individuals
were reminded that the assigned income was their own already, therefore a perfectly
viable decisions was to keep all of it in the Safe Investment round after round.
Second decision: Insurance Dt,s
After they have revealed The second decision individuals make at each round t is
whether they want to keep the Option for the Risky Investment (that we called Option
A) or change it for a Fair Insurance at each of the states of nature s = {1, · · · , 5} that
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we labeled Option B. We denote this decision as Dt,s ∈ {A,B}
Round by round
As the Risky Investment has two possible outcomes: success or failure, we allow
the likelihood of an event to change across rounds. Success probability ρt is set to be
decreasing across rounds: ρ1 = 0.1, ρ2 = 0.3, ρ3 = 0.5, ρ4 = 0.7, ρ5 = 0.9, a pattern not
ex–ante known by subjects. This, instead of bringing uncertainty or ambiguity about
subjects’ expectation regarding success probabilities in the future, help us to be sure
that individuals were revealing their willingness to invest at each probability of success
rather than thinking strategically on whether to wait for a round until the deterministic
rate of return is maximum.3
In each round t, after individuals had revealed their two decisions in each state s,
we throw a five–sides die to determine the state of nature to be taken into account. If
individual’s decision was to keep Option A the subject was ask to randomly draw a ball
from a bag in which 10 balls, a combination of green and red colored balls, had been
included already representing the corresponding probability of success of the business,
where the green color was associated to the business being successful. Otherwise, if
Option B had been chosen we updated automatically individual’s income.
Notice that at the end of each round t, an individual have a final income, wt+1
computed by taking into account the random state of the world, the amount invested
in the risky alternative, the decision between staying with the investment or accepting
a fair insurance and the amount left in the safe option.
3.3.2 Summary
Figure 3.1 summarizes the experimental procedure
At each round t an individual starts her decisions with an income wt, in each round
(t) she is informed about the probability of success (ρt) associated with the risky alter-
native. First, individuals must decide what part of their income to invest in the risky
alternative given state s (θt,s) and what part they wish to invest in the safe alternative
(1 − θt,s), where s represents a particular state of the nature that draws a particular
rate of return rs if successful. If the risky investment is unsuccessful the investor would
3However, a cleaner treatment would have been to allow for the rate of return to be randomly
chosen, with given support, round by round. In the analysis section we asses whether some of the
subjects were able to identify a deterministic pattern on the probability of success across consecutive
rounds by studying their decisions round by round by interacting indicator treatment variables with
round dummies, we did not find any evidence of a statistical significant effect,
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Figure 3.1: Decision timing for a given round t, with probability of success ρt
lose 90% of the invested amount, no matter the state of nature. Individuals know each
state s is independent of each other, therefore at a given round t the available income
wt is the same for each investment decision. Then individuals are given the option to
decide (Dt,s) whether they want to go through with the stated investment (Option A)
or change it for a fair insurance given her invested amount (Option B). After these
decisions, we randomly choose the relevant state s and compute final income wt+1 for
that round according to the prerecorded decision from the individual. This final income
will be the initial income at the following round. At the end of all rounds we calcu-
late accumulated payments. All individuals face a practice round before the actual
experiment starts.
This experimental implementation would allow us to contrast the theoretical predic-
tions included in the next section and their derivations in the appendix. Our approach
on the reference point formation assumes that it is determined by the expectations held
once individual focus on the decision at stake. In this case, an individual that got an
income level without knowing the existence of an alternative one, will associate the very
income level with her reference point. On the contrary, an individual who knew about
the existence of two income levels and the probability of getting them, will form her
reference point as either an intermediate point, consistent with the equal probability
of getting them, or will weight outcomes with mixed feelings against the two levels.
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3.4 Theoretical framework
Our baseline framework is built on the prospect theory elaborated by Kahneman &
Tversky (1979). The implemented treatments give us some power of discriminating
several competing theories of decision making under uncertainty: EUT, non–stochastic
reference–dependent model (i.e. standard Prospect Theory, PT), Prospect Theory with
Stochastic reference points (SPT) and Sampling–Based Prospect Theory (SBPT). SPT
follows closely the appraisal of Ko¨szegi & Rabin (2006) for surprise decisions where the
stochastic reference points are given exogenously.
Our modelling framework assumes that an agent has an initial income ω and must
decide what proportion θ to invest in a risky asset and how much to invest on a safe
asset with return Rf . The outcome of the investment is either Success (S) or Failure
(F). The rate of return if successful is R with probability ρ and unsuccessful with
complimentary probability. The problem here considered is static. This is reasonably
given that in the experimental treatments subjects did not know the number of decision
round they were going to face and therefore every round was regarded as the last one.
The final wealth y = (1 − θ)ωRf + θωR, which implicitly depends on
(
ω,R,
R,Rf , θ)
4, is consumed c. The utility is captured by u (c|b) ≡ m (c) + µ (c|b) where
m (c) is the usual outcome-based utility, which is strictly increasing and concave. b is
her reference point or benchmark. The more general form for the second term is one
in which both consumption and reference point are translated into values attached to
the goods, in this sense µ (c|b) ≡ v (m (c)−m (b)).
For the purpose of the current exposition we assume the simple piece-wise version
for the gain–loss utility µ (c | b), that is
µ (c | b) =
 m(c)−m(b) if c ≥ b−λ (m(b)−m(c)) if c < b. (3.1)
Our gain–loss utility is well behaved as is standard in the literature. It satisfies
desirability of the consumption no matter which is the reference point and the marginal
utility of a loss is strictly greater to the marginal utility of a commensurable gain. The
parameter λ can be interpreted as the weight attached to a gain-loss utility. If λ = 1
every gain has exactly the same decisional weight attached than a commensurable loss,
the higher is λ the more pain or distaste an individual suffers from a loss with respect
to a comparable gain.
From now on our interpretation when referring to b is that it represents a thresh-
4Notice then that y is a random variable with conditional distribution function F (· | θ) which with
probability ρ gives (1− θ)ωRf + θωR and with complimentary probability (1− θ)ωRf + θωR.
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old against which an individual compares her consumption associated to a recently
held belief on the income she could have attain. Therefore, we introduce exogenous
stochastic reference points in our model that keep close relation to the experimental
setup. Later on we evaluate the implication of different income levels in the optimal
investment decision.
For easiness of exposition let us denote with θω,LM the predicted invested amount
on the risky asset for those individuals under Income Variation ω ∈ {w,w}, Refer-
ence Variation L ∈ {L0, L1} and approach M ∈ {EUT, PT, SBPT, SPT} regarding
formation of b.5 That is
θω,LM ∈ arg max{θ:θ∈[0,1],c≤y}UM (c | ω,L). (3.2)
3.4.1 Expected Utility Theory.
Under EUT we assume that individual preferences are based solely in the out-come–
based utility m(c), which amounts to assuming λ = 0, and therefore individuals decide
what to invest based on the following function, were we have incorporated the random-
ness of consumption c = y captured by F (y | θ)
θω,LEUT ∈ arg maxθ
∫
m (y) dF (y | θ) . (3.3)
it is ready noticeable that experimental variation L won’t have any effect on de-
cisions under this framework, and variation ω will have an effect driven solely by the
assumption imposed by the function m(·).
Specifically, the first order condition is characterized by
ρ(R−Rf )ωm′(ω(Rf+(R−Rf )θ))−(1−ρ)(Rf−R)ωrm′(ω(Rf−(Rf−R)θ))
 ≤ 0≥ 0 if θ
< 1
> 0
(3.4)
and a necessary condition for there to be an interior optimum, given m′′ ≤ 0, is
that
ρ(R−Rf )
(1−ρ)(Rf−R) ≥ 1.
Denote θω,LEUT the optimal solution to the previous FOC whenever initial income is
ω ∈ {w,w} and it was determined by lottery L ∈ {L0, L1}. We know that θω,LEUT = 0 if
(R−R)
(Rf−R) <
1
ρ and θ
it,rt
EUT implied by equality in 3.4 otherwise.
Notice first that
Proposition 3.4.1. For any m(x) such that m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then θω,L0EUT =
θω,L1EUT for all ω.
5It implicitly depends on
(
R, R,Rf , ρ)
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The previous claim follows easily from the fact that treatments do not impose any
difference between any of the investment decision lotteries. By the time the individuals
are facing investment decisions the coin toss of the initial income has already passed,
and therefore any of the two reference variations L are equivalent decision problems.
Additionally we have the following proposition, where r′R(x | m) is the relative
risk aversion associated to utility m and income x , we provide the proof of this and
subsequent claims in appendix 3.7.1
Proposition 3.4.2. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then θw,L0EUT ≥ θw,L0EUT .
which is the well known result of increases on invested amounts for larger income
levels when there is decreasing relative risk aversion
Proposition 3.4.3. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then ∂θ
ω,L
EUT
∂ρ ≥ 0 and
∂θω,LEUT
∂R
≥ 0.
The proof of the previous result uses the implicit theorem as in proposition 3.4.2.
Summary EUT Under EUT we should not see any difference across Reference Point
variations for individuals with same income levels, no matter the values of ρ or
R, R.
3.4.2 Prospect Theory.
In the standard PT framework we allow for λ 6= 0 and define the reference point b as
the income received, ω, multiplied by the risk free return Rf , meaning that the initial
income becomes individual’s status quo. The optimal decision is given by
θω,LPT ∈ arg maxθ
∫
u (y | ωRf ) dF (y | θ) . (3.5)
However, as it was the case with EUT, variation in L does not change the prediction
for different ω–variations. More precisely, individuals under treatment (ω,L0) should
behave as if they were under (ω,L1), for status quo for both individuals is the same
value equal to ωRf . If there is any difference among income variation ω = w and ω = w
it is entirely driven by m(·).
The first order condition to decision problem 3.5 is given by
ρ2ωrm′(ω(1 + θr))− (1− ρ)(1 + λ)ωrm′(ω(1− θr))
 ≤ 0≥ 0 if
< 1
> 0
(3.6)
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Which we know θω,L0PT = 0 if
(R−R)
(Rf−R) <
1
2ρ(λ + 1 − (λ − 1)ρ) and θω,L0EUT implied
equality in expression 3.6 otherwise, for all ω.
Notice however that those starting with the lottery to determine their initial income
(variation L = L1) will solve the same decision problem 3.7
Max
0≤θ≤1
ρ
[
m(ω(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)) +
(
m(ω(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))−m(b)
)]
+
(1− ρ) [m(ω(Rf − (Rf −R)θ))− λ (m(b)−m(ω(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)))]
(3.7)
and therefore we have
Proposition 3.4.4. For any m(x) such that m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then θω,L0PT =
θω,L1PT for all ω.
And also the results encompassed in proposition 3.4.3 will hold. In summary, Stan-
dard Prospect Theory and EUT do not predict any difference across Reference Point
Variation, and differences across Income Variation are determined by the consumption
utility (m(.)). In particular,
Proposition 3.4.5. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then θw,L0PT = θw,L0PT
The proof follows the same procedure as Proposition 3.4.2 The only relevant differ-
ence between PT and EUT decision makers is that former individuals are less willing
to invest than later ones with same starting incomes. This is so because of first–order
risk aversion around reference point from PT decision makers.
Summary PT (i) For PT we should not expect any difference across Reference Point
variations, and differences across Income variations are determined by the outcome–
based utility and therefore, follow the same direction as EUT. (ii) The only rele-
vant difference between PT and EUT decision makers is that former individuals
are less willing to invest than latter ones with same starting incomes.
As we depict below, taking a stochastic reference point or sampling–based reference–
dependent preferences approach we get results that distinguish between reference vari-
ations. In particular, no matter the starting income level, individuals who face the
initial lottery are at least equally willing to invest in the risky alternative than those
who did not face the lottery. Individuals generally compensate losses, from investing
in the risky asset, with respect to the high reference point, with gains when weighing
that decision against the low reference point.
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3.4.3 Stochastic reference point
In a more general framework, where we take into account how recently held beliefs
play a role in determining reference points, we have that utility is given by the average
of u (c|b) generated by all feasible b’s under a distribution GL (·). This distribution
represents the beliefs an individual had about possible reference points she might have
faced. Therefore
θω,LSPT ∈ arg maxθ
∫ ∫
u (y|b) dGL (b) dF (y | θ) . (3.8)
Under SPT we assume that GL (b) captures the recently held beliefs about reference
points. Relating to the experimental implementation we will have that GL1 (b) is a
binary distribution, therefore b = wRf or b = wRf with probability
1
2 given the fair–
coin toss. While GL0 is a degenerated distribution such that b = ωRf with probability
1.
For an individual under treatment (w,L1) then b ≡ wRf > w(1 +θr) > b ≡ wRf >
w(1− θr) and therefore, he seeks to maximize
Max
0≤θ≤1
(1− pi){ρ [m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))− λ (m(b)−m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)))]+
(1− ρ) [m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ))− λ (m(b)−m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)))]}+
pi
{
ρ
[
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)) +
(
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))
)−m(b)]+
(1− ρ) [m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ))− λ (m(b)−m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)))]}
(3.9)
Assuming pi = 1/2, the FOC and SOC of equation 3.9 imply θ
w,L1
SPT = 0 if
ρ(R−Rf )
(1−ρ)(Rf−R) <
2(1+λ)
3+λ , otherwise θ
w,L1
SPT is implied by the following equation
3 + λ
2
ρ(R−Rf )m′(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))− (1 + λ)(1− ρ)(Rf −R)m′(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)) = 0 (3.10)
For individuals facing treatment (w,L0) we know their decision problem is just
given by equation 3.7 because b = wRf θ
w,L0
SPT = θ
w,L0
PT . We can claim then that
Proposition 3.4.6. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0 then θw,L1SPT > θw,L0SPT for any (R−R)(Rf−R) >
2(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
(3+λ)ρ
and θ
w,L1
SPT = θ
w,L0
SPT otherwise.
Now, for subject under treatment (w,L1) we have w(1 + θr) ≥ b ≥ w(1 − θr) > b
if θ ∈ [0, Rf2(Rf−R) ] and w(1 + θr) ≥ b > b ≥ w(1 − θr) if θ ∈ (
Rf
2(Rf−R) , 1]. We know
a global maximum is found whenever the argument is within [0,
Rf
2(Rf−R) ]
6 therefore
individuals under such treatment solve
6The proof follows the same procedure as Berkelaar et al. (2004). First we compute the conditions
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Max
0≤θ≤ Rf
2(Rf−R)
pi
{
ρ
[
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)) +
(
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))−m(b)
)]
+
(1− ρ) [m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ))− λ (m(b)−m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)))]}+
(1− pi){ρ [m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)) + (m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)))−m(b)]+
(1− ρ) [m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)) + (m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ))−m(b))]}
(3.11)
A necessary, and sufficient, condition for an interior optimum to exists is that (R−R)(Rf−R) >
(3+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
4ρ and is characterized by θ
w,L1
SPT = Min
{
θ∗, Rf2(Rf−R)
}
where θ∗ is character-
ized by
2ρ(R−Rf )m′(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ∗))− 3 + λ
2
(1− ρ)(Rf −R)m′(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ∗)) = 0 (3.12)
then we can proof that
Proposition 3.4.7. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then there is an
k ∈ R, k < ∞ such that θw,L1SPT = θw,L0SPT if (R−R)(Rf−R) ∈ [0,
(3+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
4ρ ), θ
w,L1
SPT > θ
w,L0
SPT for
any (R−R)(Rf−R) ∈ (
(3+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
4ρ , k), and θ
w,L1
SPT ≤ θw,L0SPT otherwise.
However more interestingly is that we have that,
Proposition 3.4.8. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0 then θw,L1SPT > θw,L1SPT for any (R−R)(Rf−R) >
2(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
(λ+3)ρ
and θ
w,L1
SPT = θ
w,L1
SPT otherwise.
Which implies that among individuals facing the initial lottery for determining
initial income, those who start with low income are more willing to undertake risk
than those who got the high income. Intuitively, this is the case because a low income
individual is in the loss domain, no matter what her invested amount is, with respect
to the highest reference point. Therefore, such an individual will have incentives to
increase her invested amount in order to reduce such loss feelings.
Summary SPT (i) SPT predicts that those starting with low income, having lost the
chance of getting the higher one, are more willing to invest in the risky alternative
than those who “won” the chance to start with the high income level. (ii) In
addition, SPT suggests that for those facing the lottery who got a high income,
there are some values of R for which the average invested amount, over the support
of ρ, is equal to the investment of high predetermined income individuals,
that must hold for the arguments that maximize each functions, then we evaluate the value function
in each region and the compare the level of both value functions to determine which one is greater.
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3.4.4 Sampling–based reference points
Another possibility is that preferences are given by the average of u
(
c|bGL
)
where bGL
captures, in a single dimension, reference point beliefs an individual had when first
focusing in the problem determined by GL (·). Therefore, utility is given by
θω,LSBPT ∈ arg maxθ
∫
u
(
y|bGL) dF (y | θ) . (3.13)
Under this Sampling–based prospect theory (SBPT, Spiegler (2012)) framework we
assume that bGL =
∫
b dGL(b) which captures somehow the recently held beliefs about
reference points.
As in the previous SPT framework we know θω,L0SBPT = θ
ω,L0
PT for any ω ∈ {w,w}.
However for those facing treatment (w,L1) face the following problem
Max
0≤θ≤1
ρ
[
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))− λ
(
m(bG)−m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))
)]
+
(1− ρ) [m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ))− λ (m(bG)−m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)))] (3.14)
A necessary, and sufficient, condition for an interior optimum to exists is that
(R−R)
(Rf−R) >
1
ρ and characterized by
(1+λ)ρ(R−Rf )m′(w(Rf +(R−Rf )θw,L1SBPT ))−(1+λ)(1−ρ)(Rf −R)m′(w(Rf −(Rf −R)θ
w,L1
SBPT )) = 0 (3.15)
On the other hand those facing treatment (w,L1) face the problem
Max
0≤θ≤ Rf
4(Rf−R)
ρ
[
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ)) +
(
m(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ))−m(bG)
)]
+
(1− ρ) [m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)) + (m(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ)) +m(bG))] (3.16)
A necessary, and sufficient, condition for an interior optimum to exists is that (R−R)(Rf−R) >
1
ρ and is characterized by θ
w,L1
SBPT = Min
{
θ∗∗, Rf4(Rf−R)
}
where θ∗∗ is characterized by
2ρ(R−Rf )m′(w(Rf + (R−Rf )θ∗∗))− 2(1− ρ)(Rf −R)m′(w(Rf − (Rf −R)θ∗∗)) = 0 (3.17)
Henceforth we find that
Proposition 3.4.9. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then there is an
k
′ ∈ R, k′ < ∞ such that θw,L1SBPT = θw,L0SBPT if (R−R)(Rf−R) ∈ [0,
1
ρ), θ
w,L1
SBPT > θ
w,L0
SBPT for any
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(R−R)
(Rf−R) ∈ (
1
ρ , k), and θ
w,L1
SBPT ≤ θw,L0SBPT otherwise.
the proof follows the same analysis of FOC as for proposition 3.4.7 where k
′
is such
that θw,L0SBPT (k
′
) = 4(Rf −R). On the other hand, we find then that
Proposition 3.4.10. If r′R(x | m) ≤ 0, m′(x) > 0 and m′′(x) ≤ 0 then there is an
k ∈ R, k < ∞ such that θw,L1SBPT = θw,L1SPT for any (R−R)(Rf−R) ∈ [0, k), and θ
w,L1
SPT > θ
w,L1
SPT
otherwise.
The proof is similar proposition 3.7.1 where k
′′
is such that θ
w,L1
SBPT (k) = 4(Rf −R)
This happens mainly because they are not anymore subject to first–order risk aver-
sion given that their reference point is sufficiently far, in absolute term, from their
starting income and because we are assuming a piecewise linear gain–loss utility.
Summary SBPT (i) SBPT does not predict any difference across individuals fac-
ing initial lottery. (ii) SBPT suggests that individuals facing a lottery for initial
income who got high income invest strictly greater average amounts than prede-
termined high income individuals.
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Summary: Theoretical results
In Table 3.2 we summarize the predictions on the average invested amount on the
risky alternative with a specific CRRA function, m(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ , assuming that R is
a continuous random variable distributed uniformly between 1.05 and 1.3 and ρ also
uniformly distributed between 0.1 and 0.9. Results hold for values of λ > 1 and
γ ∈ (0, 1).
Table 3.2: Theoretical Results‡ on average invested levels θω,LM .
EUT∗ PT∗∗ SPT† SBPT††
RV effect
θ
w,L1 − θw,L0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0
θ
w,L1 − θw,L0 = 0 = 0 Q 0 > 0
IV effect
θ
w,L0 − θw,L0 = 0 = 0 = 0 = 0
θ
w,L1 − θw,L1 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 = 0
‡ Common assumptions: m′ > 0,m′′ ≤ 0 and r′R(·) = 0.
∗ Propositions 3.4.1-3.4.3, ∗∗ props. 3.4.4-3.4.5,
† props. 3.4.6-3.7.1, †† props. 3.4.9-3.4.10
Hence, if, across individuals with same income level ω, variation L1 has a positive
effect on the invested amount with respect to variation L0, we can favor the set of
theories where recently held expectations determine a reference point (i.e. SPT and
SBPT) as opposed to those where past expectations do not affect them (i.e. EUT and
PT). If that is indeed the case, we further can distinguish between SPT and SBPT:
SPT is the only theory, among those considered, predicting that under reference point
variation L1, those who start with low income (ω = w) are more willing to undertake
risk, investing larger amounts, than those who got a high income (ω = w). SPT also
suggests that for those with high income, the difference on the invested amount between
those who face the initial lottery and those who did not is somewhat small, rather than
a large difference as suggested by SBPT.
In general, all theories suggest that the higher the success probability is, the higher
the invested amount in the risky alternative should be. They also predict that larger
average rate of return make individuals more likely to invest strictly positive amounts
of their income. SPT and SBPT predict as well that individuals facing initial lottery
(L = L1) are more willing to invest than those starting with a predetermined income
(L = L0) as opposed to EUT and PT, which predict no difference. However, only SPT
suggests that those individuals with low income and initial lottery (w,L1) are more
willing to invest than those with high income and initial lottery (w,L1).
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Only the last two frameworks are able to produce differences across reference de-
pendent variations. Finally, notice that any forward looking type of expectation–based
reference points are held constant across treatments and therefore can’t affect the ob-
served decisions. In that sense an EBPT a` la Ko¨szegi & Rabin (2006) cannot have any
observational implication in differentiating among treatments.
In the following section we include some descriptive statistics of the sample.
3.5 Experimental Findings
Table 3.3 depicts how successful the randomization was across treatments. We see
that the randomization of the IV was balanced for female ratio, age, economic strata,
percentage of people with higher education, last month income (in 2008 USD dollars)
and household income (in number of minimum wages). The RV was also successful
in every category apart from the percentage of people with higher education degrees,
there is a significant difference but only at a 10% level. Given this, we control for
individual characteristics in our econometric specification.
Table 3.3: Balanced Sample across treatments
Control Treatment H0 : 1− 2 = 0
N Mean (1) SE N Mean (2) SE t-stat pval
Income Variation, IV
Female 108 0.64 0.05 108 0.66 0.05 0.28 0.78
Age 107 43.48 1.25 107 41.79 1.25 -0.96 0.34
Econ. strata† 107 2.64 0.07 108 2.56 0.07 -0.83 0.41
Higher educ 108 0.40 0.05 108 0.48 0.05 1.23 0.22
Last month income 105 362.24 27.20 107 300.91 26.94 -1.60 0.11
HH income 108 5.68 0.28 107 5.08 0.28 -1.47 0.14
Reference Variation, RV
Female 150 0.61 0.04 66 0.73 0.06 1.62 0.11
Age 149 42.78 1.06 65 42.29 1.60 -0.25 0.80
Econ. strata† 149 2.62 0.06 66 2.53 0.09 -0.90 0.37
Higher educ 150 0.48 0.04 66 0.35 0.06 -1.80 0.07∗
Last month income 146 322.27 23.18 66 351.23 34.48 0.70 0.49
HH income 149 5.31 0.24 66 5.55 0.36 0.54 0.59
† Official Colombian system of classification by economic status. It takes values between 1 and 6. Lower values
translate into more deprived physical households. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.5, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. notes: Differences in total
observations are due to information not properly reported
In the next section we provide some descriptive results from individual decisions.
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3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
First, consider the distribution of percentage of invested income found in the data
(i.e. θi,t,s). Figure 3.2 shows on Panel (a) the density of this variable distinguishing
across different rate of returns if successful (i.e, rs). One can easily notice that as the
probability of success increases the density becomes more negatively skewed implying
higher invested amounts as the likelihood of a successful outcome becomes larger. On
the other hand Panel (b) depicts the density of the same variable but varying the
success probabilities (i.e. ρt), again we notice that the bulk of the density moves right
as the rate of return increases.7
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(b) By success probability. ρ1 = .1 (solid), ρ3 = .5
(dashed), ρ5 = .9 (dotted)
Figure 3.2: Density of invested Income
It is worth noting that in both panels there is a considerable concentration of values
at θt,s = 0 and a bounded outcome between [0, 1] which contravenes the standard
7In the appendix 3.7.2 Figures 3.6 and 3.5 provide histograms varying both success probability and
rate of return.
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statistical assumptions of the linear model, suggesting the use of a mixed discrete-
continuous distribution to analyse the data. We will come back to this issue below in
the econometric specification.
A preliminary analysis of the data is depicted in Figure 3.3 which shows the fitted
mean from a fractional polynomial regression which takes the following variables as
dependent ones. In Panel (a) it takes the average percentage of income invested across
different investment alternatives at a given round, that is θi,t = (1/5)
∑5
s=1 θt,i,s, which
we can associate to changes in ρt across t ∈ {1, · · · , 5}; while in Panel (b) we take
the average percentage of invested income in an alternative across rounds, that is
θi,s = (1/5)
∑5
t=1 θi,t,s which can be associated with changes to rs for any investment
alternative s ∈ {1, · · · , 5}.8
We show solid line for individuals under treatments (w,L1), dotted line represents
individuals starting with (w,L1 ) treatment, dashed lines represent high starting income
individuals but which did not face initial lottery (w,L0) and finally the long dashed–
dotted line represents low income and no initial lottery (w,L0).
9
From both graphs in Figure 3.3 it is ready noticeable, though statistically signif-
icance is postponed until next session, that treatments (w,L) have an effect on indi-
viduals decisions. In particular, considering fixed reference point treatment, we notice
that those with higher starting income are investing slightly larger amounts than those
starting with lower income. This would be small evidence in favour of decreasing rel-
ative risk aversion if it happens to be statistically significant, or in favour of constant
relative risk aversion if it is not.
Importantly, notice that those who face the initial lottery and got a high income,
are generally less willing to invest larger amounts, at any success probability or rate
of return, than those who started with a fixed high income. This result, if statistically
significant, contradicts our theoretical approach for SPT.
On the other hand, individuals that got a low income after the initial lottery are
eager to invest larger amounts, than those individuals starting with a low income with-
out facing the initial lottery. A result clearly in line with the behavioural implications
from our SPT model.
Neither EUT nor PT predict these additional differences across treatments (ω,L).
On the other hand, SPT and SBPT do predict differences across treatments, as ex-
pressed in Table 3.2. In the following section we present the econometric analysis which
8See in appendix 3.7.2, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 which distinguishes θt,s among all success probabilities
and rate of returns without taking averages. The patterns are nonetheless equal to the figure presented
above.
9See figure 3.4 in the appendix for the average of those who chose to change investment with the
fair insurance (i.e. Di,t,s = 1). As we notice it is generally less than 30% of the population who follow
this decision. The study of such behaviour is left for future work.
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Figure 3.3: Average percentage of invested income
Source: solid (w,L1), dotted (w,L1), dashed (w,L0),dashed–dotted (w,L0)
elucidate which of the considered theories on formation of reference points is more likely
to explain the qualitative results.
3.5.2 Econometric Specification
Our specification takes as dependent variable the percentage invested by individual i in
state s given success probability in round t (i.e. θi,t,s). Our main econometric approx-
imation controls for experimental treatments 1i[w,L0],1i[w,L0], 1i[w,L1], 1i[w,L1].
We include fixed effects for investment alternative s (ds) and by success probability or
round t (dt).
In our analysis we first provide OLS and Tobit estimates as benchmarks. How-
ever, Cook, Kieschnick & McCullough (2008) identify three specification errors when
following the linear approach whenever dependent variable lies within the [0, 1] inter-
val: First, the conditional expectation of a continuous percentage is only defined on
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the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, it must be a non–linear function of the explanatory vari-
ables. Second, the conditional variance and the conditional mean must be collinear,
because as the later approaches either boundary the conditional variance must change
accordingly. And third, different decision processes determine whether and individual
is willing to invest or not (i.e. 1[θi,t,s = 0]) and how much she is willing to invest (i.e.
optimal level θi,t,s).
On the same token defining a Tobit on a percentage, to deal with the first two
problems, may not be an appropriate strategy if the observed data is not censored by
nature but, rather, values outside the [0, 1] interval are not feasible for such type of
data.10 If that is the case, a mixed discrete-continuous distribution, given there are
mass points at zero and one (see Figure 3.2) may be a better statistical approximation.
We therefore deal with the statistical problems posed above, estimating a Gen-
eralised Linear Model equivalent to the quasi–likelihood model developed by Papke
& Wooldridge (1996) (GLM) and a Zero–and–One Inflated Beta model (ZOIB) fol-
lowing Ospina & Ferrari (2010, 2011). This later econometric approach has two ad-
vantages over GLM: firstly, we do not need to use asymptotic properties raised by
quasi–likelihood approach to validate its results and secondly, it allows for decision
1[θi,t,s = 0] to be generated by a different process than percentage θi,t,s > 0.
11
Consider equation 3.18 providing the linear approximation of the estimated model.
θi,t,s = a11i[w,L0] + a21i[w,L1] + a31i[w,L1] + ηi,t,s, (3.18)
where ηi,t,s = a0 +
∑5
t=1 γtdt+
∑5
s=1 δsds+ ziδ+ i,t,s. Being i,t,s orthogonal to the
covariates zi, given the randomization of the treatments, and assumed to be correlated
at the individual level. Replacing back ηi,t,s in equation 3.18, let us define this data
generating model as
θi,t,s = a
′Xi,t,s + i,t,s,
where Xi,t,s is a column vector containing the regressors with a constant term as its
first argument.
Notice first that OLS specification 3.18 has a close relation with the average of the
10However, in our present set–up, θ are actually censored given that individuals in the experiment
do not have access to outside credit markets for an experimental session.
11Analytically this difference has a mathematical link with decision problems in section 3.4. The
equation behind 1[θi,t,s = 0] is related to necessary conditions for a corner solution, usually the sign
of the FOC and SOC. While the expression for percentage θi,t,s has to do with the FOC holding with
equality.
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invested percentages, θ
ω,L
(associated with predictions from section 3.4) in particular,12
Eˆ[θi,t,s | 1i[ω,L0] = 1, ·] = aˆ0 p→ θω,L0 ,
Eˆ[θi,t,s | 1i[ω,L1] = 1, ·] = aˆ0 + aˆ2 p→ θω,L1 ,
Eˆ[θi,t,s | 1i[ω,L0] = 1, ·] = aˆ0 + aˆ1, p→ θω,L0 ,
Eˆ[θi,t,s | 1i[ω,L1] = 1, ·] = aˆ0 + aˆ1 + aˆ2 + aˆ3 p→ θω,L1 .
For the OLS specification i,t,s is assumed to be normally distributed while for the
Tobit case is assumed to present a truncated distribution at 0 and 1. On the other
hand, for the ZOIB specification, we follow Ospina & Ferrari (2010), and define that
i,t,s is distributed with a mixed discrete–continuous density function h(·) such that,
h(θi,t,s;pi0, pi1, µ, φ) =

pi0 if θi,t,s = 0,
(1− pi0)(1− pi1)b(θi,t,s;µ, φ) if 0 < θi,t,s < 1,
pi1 if θi,t,s = 1.
(3.19)
Where pi0 =
exp(a′0X0i,t,s)
1+exp(a′0X0i,t,s)
, pi1 =
exp(a′1X1i,t,s)
1+exp(a′1X1i,t,s)
. And b(·) is the density function
of a beta distribution with mean equation 0 < µ =
exp(a′Xi,t,s)
1+exp(a′Xi,t,s) < 1 and precision
φ ≡ exp(β), denoted by B(µ, φ), such that
b(θi,t,s;µ, φ) =
Γ(φ)
Γ(µφ)Γ(φ(1− µ))θ
µφ−1
i,t,s θ
φ(1−µ)−1
i,t,s , (3.20)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function. The beta distribution has been shown suitable for
modelling dependent variables that belong to the (0, 1) interval. As we study different
processes governing the decisions to invest and how much to invest, we allow estimates
for a0 to differ from a1 and a. However, we specify covariates for the zero cases to be
the same as those for strictly positive values (i.e. X0i,t,s = Xi,t,s) and for the one cases
we include an additional constant X1i,t,s = (1, 0, · · · , 0).
Therefore, the log–likelihood function implied by the ZOIB model is given by
L(κ) =
1
N
n∑
i=1
5∑
t=1
5∑
s=1
ln
[
pi
1[θi,t,s=0]
0 pi
1[θi,t,s=1]
1 ((1− pi0)(1− pi1)b(θi,t,s))1[0<θi,t,s<1]
]
,
(3.21)
where κ = (a,a0, a1, β) is the parameter vector to be estimated.
12Where Eˆ is the empirical expectation once we discount the investment alternative and round fixed
effects.
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Even though the nature of sequential decisions by subjects suggests a dynamic
panel data model, where we explicitly need to account for the time dependence of the
error term, the following understanding allows us to consider a model in which we
only need to include rounds dummy and still get consistent estimators. The problem of
initial conditions arises in dynamic panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity or
serially correlated shocks, therefore we must account for the initial conditions whenever
they are endogenous. However, the random assignment of treatments imply that initial
conditions are indeed exogenous, meaning that initial income is fixed and it was not
generated by the process generating the sample of subsequent income levels. We do
however allow for robust clustered variance at the individual level.
On the same token, we consider that the experimental setup of not presenting for
how many rounds individuals were going to take decisions for, allows us to follow this
approach instead of following dynamic setting where future value functions are to be
solved first by backward induction.
3.5.3 Results
The estimated coefficients using OLS, TOBIT, GLM and ZOIB specifications are given
in Table 3.4. The last two columns include the prospect theory parameters, recovered
in the first stage, into the zi variables.
Results across specifications suggest that individuals with high income levels and
fixed reference points invest larger amounts than those with low incomes and fixed
reference points. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant suggesting a
constant relative risk aversion in income.
Nevertheless, coefficients from every specification, suggest that those with larger
initial income, and predetermined reference point, are more willing to invest a strictly
positive amount than those with lower income.
The way in which the initial income is allocated seems to have a strong and per-
sistent effect on individual decisions. In particular, low income individuals who faced
the coin flip are more willing to invest (they are less likely to invest zero in the risky
alternative, see zero inflate coefficients). They are also investing larger amounts, than
those who did not face the initial lottery (main coefficients). Finally, high income indi-
viduals facing initial lottery tend to shy away from risky investments more often than
low income individuals facing the same initial lottery.
On the other hand, coefficients recovered from the first stage have consistent signs:
the more risk loving an individual is (i.e. 1− γ larger) the larger the invested amount
would be while more loss averse individuals (i.e. larger λ) invest significantly lower
amounts.
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In the last column we also include an indicator variable that captures whenever an
individual has experienced a loss in the previous round. What we observed is that such
experience make individuals more cautious and less willing to invest. However, the
effect of our treatments remain. This is reassuring of our intuition that the treatment
effect is mediated through individual preferences, by affecting the reference point, and
not through beliefs in the shape of winning–losing streaks. The sign goes in the opposite
direction than the one predicted by Ko¨szegi & Rabin (2007) which claim that risk–
loving behaviour is expected after an agent have, unexpectedly, lost money. This
suggest then that subjects in our experiment are actually aware of the chances of
losing money.
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Table 3.4: Estimated Coefficients
main: a OLS TOBIT GLM ZOIB ZOIB+S1 ZOIB+S1+L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[w,L0] 0.021 0.058 0.111 -0.220 -0.190 -0.212
(0.040) (0.050) (0.207) (0.168) (0.176) (0.179)
1[w,L1] 0.128
∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.610∗∗ 0.417∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.424∗
(0.052) (0.065) (0.245) (0.245) (0.210) (0.229)
1[w,L1] -0.185
∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.919∗∗∗ -0.262 -0.253 -0.202
(0.069) (0.086) (0.345) (0.263) (0.278) (0.292)
Constant 0.141∗∗∗ 0.048 -1.708∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗ -0.778∗∗∗ -0.568∗
(0.026) (0.036) (0.154) (0.116) (0.338) (0.343)
1− γ 0.076 0.095
(0.252) (0.263)
λ -0.040∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.020) (0.021)
α -0.246 -0.285
(0.454) (0.455)
Losst−1 -0.194∗∗
one inflate:a1
Constant -2.471∗∗∗ -2.504∗∗∗ -2.388∗∗∗
zero inflate: a0 (0.190) (0.195) (0.189)
1[w,L0] -1.077
∗∗∗ -0.992∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.359) (0.381)
1[w,L1] -0.704
∗ -0.723 -0.911∗
(0.424) (0.457) (0.502)
1[w,L1] 1.635
∗∗∗ 1.578∗∗∗ 1.952∗∗∗
(0.595) (0.629) (0.685)
Constant -0.226 -0.358 -2.779∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.748) (0.900)
(γ, λ, pi) yes yes
Losst−1 2.230∗∗∗
ln(φ) = β 0.843∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗
Obs: 5400 (before–last 4950, last 3960), Clustered s.e. round and investment fe. γ risk aversion,
λ loss aversion, α probability weight ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Even though coefficients are suggestive of the importance of the reference point
determination, in Table 3.5 we provide average marginal effects of the econometric
approximations of columns (2)-(4). We can compare those marginal effect with the
theoretical predictions in table 3.2 from the previous section. We stress that EUT and
PT do not predict any difference across RV .
Firstly, marginal effects also suggest a constant relative risk aversion: among indi-
viduals with predetermined initial income treatment, those with larger initial income
invest statistically the same percentage as their lower income counterparts. We cannot
reject the null hypothesis H0 : θ
w,L0−θw,L0 = 0. This renders validity to our theoretical
approach of CRRA preferences.
More importantly, focusing in the ZIB model, we find strong evidence of the rele-
vance of reference–points formation. First, individuals with low initial income facing
the stochastic determinacy of their reference point (in other words that had the chance
to start with a high income but lost it) are more prone to invest, as much as 10.3%
more, than individuals with a predetermined low income (H0 : θ
w,L1 − θw,L0 = 0 is
rejected). This is consistent with behavioural prediction from SPT and SBPT and
inconsistent with EUT and PT.
Table 3.5: Estimated Average Marginal Effects
TOBIT GLM ZIB
RV effect
(1) H0 : θ
w,L1 − θw,L0 = 0 0.163∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.065) (0.052) (0.044)
(2) H0 : θ
w,L1 − θw,L0 = 0 -0.095∗ -0.058 -0.002
(0.055) (0.045) (0.030)
IV effect
(3) H0 : θ
w,L0 − θw,L0 = 0 0.058 0.021 -0.002
(0.050) (0.040) (0.029)
(4) H0 : θ
w,L1 − θw,L1 = 0 -0.200∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗
(0.070) (0.056) (0.044)
Observations 5400 5400 5400
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Includes round and investment
alternative dummy ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
On the other hand, the negative sign in the second row (corresponding to H0 :
θw,L1 − θw,L0) suggests that initial lottery on reference points has an asymmetric effect
between those who started winning and those losing in a inconsistent manner with
stochastic reference points. This would suggest a sort of break–even and satisfaction
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effects: those who start losing feel that they have lost already and they are willing to
undertake more risk in order to reach the level they could have attained; on the other
hand, those that won the high initial income are already satisfied for not having lost
and thus, are less willing to undertake unnecessary risk. However, this difference is not
statistically significant different from zero.
The difference in signs of the RV effect on both income levels (rows (1) vs (2))
suggests that the statistically significant difference on the proportion of individuals
with a higher degree between samples L0 and L1, is not the driving force behind the
RV effect. If that would be the case, we do not see why the effect of RV over ω = w
and ω = w treatments should have different signs.
Finally, we find that willingness to invest positive amounts from low income indi-
viduals who faced the initial lottery is statistically larger than high income also facing
the initial lottery. We reject H0 : θ
w,L1 − θw,L1 = 0 even though individuals seem to
present constant relative risk aversion. Among the considered theories, SPT is the only
one which predicts such effect.
It is also noteworthy that Tobit specification gives upward biased estimates of the
real effect. Once we correct the specification problems explained above, we notice the
estimated average marginal effect with ZOIB are lower than previous Tobit estimates.
In particular, the effect of the initial lottery on high income individuals is not statisti-
cally significant.
Our results differ from the empirical ones of Gomes (2005). He finds that individ-
uals facing good news will demand more from risky assets than those who faced bad
news. If past expectations play a role in determining the reference point our results
suggest the effect should reversed. Our experimental results are also somehow different
from Post et al. (2008) because they find that a similar disposition effect, more will-
ingness to undertake risk, between individuals who experienced bad news and those
who experienced good news early in the game. The later difference could be explained
by the nature of their forward–looking definition of reference points as opposed to the
backward–looking one suggested here.
A final piece of evidence on multiple reference points is provided in figure 3.9. The
kernel bounded densities of invested percentage across rounds suggest that individuals
under L1, w are bunching together close to one additional reference point compared to
those under treatment L0, w.
13
13Where we use the Reflection estimator at the boundaries 0 and 1, such that fˆr(θ;h, 0, 1) =
1∑n
i wi
∑n
i
wi
h
Kr(θ; θi, h, 0, 1) where θ ∈ [0, 1] and Kr(θ; θi, h, 0, 1) = K( θ−θih ) +K( θ+θih ) +K( θ+θi−2h ).
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3.6 Conclusion
We provide artefactual field experiment evidence on reference–dependent preferences
and investment decisions on a sample of vulnerable small entrepreneurs. In particular
we find that having a high initial income increases individual’s likelihood to invest a
positive amount if and only if they did not face the lottery to determine their reference
points. Contrary to this, agents who started with a low income were more prone
to invest (even at lower rates of return) if they started with uncertainty about their
reference points. In this sense, having unfulfilled recent beliefs about a reference point
triggers risk–loving behaviour only on the low income individuals while promoting risk–
averse behaviours in high–income individuals, only the former effect is captured by the
simple theoretical model provided.
Several authors have provided arguments on how expectations on future events can
determine reference points. Our experimental evidence suggests that past expectations
could affect also reference points determination in close relatedness to multiple refer-
ence points suggested by Ko¨szegi & Rabin (2007). We provided a model of stochastic
reference points that replicates qualitatively most of the experimental results.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proofs
Proof of prop 3.4.2. If there exists an interior solution, the solution is characterized by
equation 3.4 with equality and negative sign on the SOC condition. By the Implicit
Function Theorem and replacing R−Rf = r and Rf −R = r, we get
∂θω,LEUT
∂ω
=
(1− ρ)rm′′(ω(1− θr))ω(1− θr)− ρrm′′(ω(1 + θr))ω(1 + θr)
ρr2m′′(ω(1 + θr)) + (1− ρ)r2m′′(ω(1− θr)) (3.22)
Knowing that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by rR(x | m) =
−m′′(x)m′(x) x then we can show that if it is non increasing r′R(x | m) ≤ 0 then both numer-
ator and denominator of equation 3.22 are negative. The equality is given whenever
there is a corner solution at zero.
Proof of 3.4.6. We already know that for any (R−R)(Rf−R) <
(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
2ρ we have θ
w,L0
SPT = 0.
It is easy to show that (1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ2ρ >
2(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
(3+λ)ρ whenever λ > 1. Therefore, if
(R−R)
(Rf−R) ≤
2(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
(3+λ)ρ then θ
w,L1
SPT = θ
w,L0
SPT = 0 but when
(R−R)
(Rf−R) >
2(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
(3+λ)ρ
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we have that θ
w,L1
SPT is defined implicitly by equation 3.10 which evaluated in LHS of
expression 3.6 gives us a negative value, implying then that θ
w,L1
SPT > θ
w,L0
SPT .
Proof of prop 3.4.7. Let us denote Denote k the value of R−RRf−R such that θ
w,L0
SPT (k) =
Rf
2(Rf−R) . The first equality follows because there is a corner solution equal to zero for
θw,L1SPT whenever
(R−R)
(Rf−R) ≤
(3+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
4ρ and for θ
w,L0
SPT whenever
(R−R)
(Rf−R) ≤
(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
2ρ ,
which is characterized by equation 3.7. Given λ > 1 we know that (3+λ)−(λ−1)ρ4ρ <
(1+λ)−(λ−1)ρ
2ρ . The second inequality follows because by replacing θ
∗ implied by equation
3.15 into equation 3.6 gives us a negative sign implying a lower optimal θw,LoSPT . Finally,
the last inequality is due to θw,L1SPT being bounded above by
Rf
2(Rf−R) given the incentive
to avoid losses, while θw,L0SPT is bounded above by 1.
Proof of prop . Combine proposition 3.4.6 and 3.4.7 to get the result.
3.7.2 Further descriptives
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Instructions for Monitors
1. In the Excel file, set Save As, and give the name of the file ID of the participant.
2. The sheet "ID" is only for information and can not be seen by the participant, ensure
you have this part ready before the participant arrives.
3. There are two different treatments and should be implemented accordingly with the
different instructions at the beginning of the game. The code used in the excel file will be
Income Treatment (IT): If (1) the wealth will be $ 20,000, if (2) is $ 40,000, if (3) is $
20,000 or $ 40,000 as the result issued by the coin toss (3). For (3) let the participant
choose which side of the coin will associated to each amount. However the coin should
fall to the floor (this is to ensure participants cannot influence the coin toss)
After the allocation of income, you need to put on the table the player's initial income and
tell him that that money is already of his own.
4. At the beginning of each round you must follow the following wording: "We are in the
XX round, the probability of business failure is XX%, which is the same as taking a red
ball from the bag that we will fill with 10 balls, among which XX/10 are red balls and
(100-XX)/10 are green, equivalently the probability of being successful is 1-XX%, which
is the same as taking a green ball from the bag".
5. In Round XX, in Step 1 of each alternative scenario start saying "How much would
you be willing to invest in the business in Scenario XX in which you could lost 90% of
your investment if it fails or get a return YY% if successful?"
6. Once the individual has responded continue saying, in the most neutral possible way to
avoid inducing an answer, "You just told me you would be willing to invest $ XX, equal
to XX% of your current income, this means you will lose XX (which is the same as
keeping just XX from the investment amount side) if the business fails or win XX (which
is the same as keeping XX from the invested amount) if the business is successful. Do
you want to keep or change the amount invested in this scenario?" If participant decides
to change the amount invested, repeat 5 and 6.
7. Once step 1 is completed for that scenario you move on to step 2. You should tell the
participant "Now we give you the offer of an insurance against your investment. It gives
you back the expected value of your investment minus a fixed value $X. What do you
prefer between: Option A, to stay with you investment or Option B, the insurance that
would return you a total amount of $ Y." Once the participant has answered then ask him,
again in a neutral mood, "Do you want to keep or change your choice between Option A
and Option B in this scenario?". Repeat 5, 6 and 7 to complete the five scenarios. Always
remember to code Step 1 (amount to be invested in the business) and then Step 2
(investment vs fair insurance) for all the five scenarios.
IMPORTANT: If at any time the player asks you to return to review any of the five
decisions within a same round, you can do so only if it is in the same round, however
there is no option to change previous decisions.
8. upon completion of the five alternative scenarios, go to Table 5 which summarizes the
scenarios and show it to the participant.
9. Now give the participant 5-side die. Describe to the participant the randomly chosen
scenario. That is, if you get from rolling the die the stage 5, show him that stage and
summarise to him his decision: “you decided to invest $ x dollars in business and chose
the option (A / B).
3.7.3 Experimental instructions
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10. If in the relevant scenario the participant chose Option A, take the black bag and
include green and red balls accordingly with the stated probability of success. Do it
transparent to the participant. Stir it, and let the player draw a ball, make sure it does not
look inside the bag.
11. Summarize to the participant the result.
12. Finish the round t reminding him/her that his income at the end of this round will be
his/her initial wealth for round t+1.
13. Save the file at the end of each round to protect against data loss.
To bear in mind:
• Remember to stay as neutral as possible. Do not induce responses. Call the experiment,
activity or game.
• If you are asked about the activity or research project aim, tell them that we want to
characterize the decisions of a group of people. But tell them that at the end of the
activity they will be invited to express their comments and that one member of the
research group will be happy to answer their questions.
• After they have confirmed a decision it CANNOT be changed afterwards. If they say no
longer maintain it may change at any time. Not when they are taking another decision and
want to see that or when playing step 2.
• Avoid telling the business "uncertain business" or "lottery". Just call it "business" or
“alternative”.
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Instruction for participants Stage 2. (I)
This activity will be implemented in a computer with the assistance of a monitor. You begin the
activity with an initial income in real money that will be assigned by the monitor. You receive
this wealth only after the whole the activity has finished, after we have add your gains and
subtract your losses. However, the initial income is already yours since the beginning
because you have reached to this point of the activity.
The activity consists of several rounds; in each round you must take five (5) decisions. At the
end of each round you would obtain gain or losses and those will depend on your choices,
the outcome at the end of the round will be add or subtracted from the income you had at
the beginning of that round. The number of rounds will be determined by the computer, and
neither the monitor nor you will know this information in advance.
Let's see how you can make choices at each round
After the monitor reports your initial income, you must carry out five (5) decisions, one
for each of five Alternatives (Alternative 1, Alternative 2... until Alternative 5). To determine
the outcome at the end of the round, only one of those decisions will be taken into account.
However, before taking decisions YOU WILL NOT KNOW which Alternative, form the
five Alternatives, is the one to be taken into account.
The alternative taken into account will be chosen at random throwing a 10-sided die ranging
from 0 to 9. If you get a value into 1 or 2 will be taken into account the Alternative 1, if you
get a value into 3 or 4 will be taken into account the Alternative 2 and so on, thus if the
die throws in the value 9 or 0 will be taken into account is Alternative 5 (face to 0 is the
value 10).
Each of the five (5) decisions consists of two (2) steps. Let's see:
Step 1.
You must determine how much of the starting income you want to invest if given each business
alternative. You are free to choose not to invest, to invest all your wealth or invest only part of
it the business. Observe that the maximum amount that you can invest in each alternative is the
starting income from that round. It is important to know that the money you choose not to
invest will be there for next round without any modification. In other words, you do not lose
the money you decided not to invest. Before we proceed further let us clarify what is a
business alternative.
Any business alternative has two possible outcomes: i) Success: If it is successful you will
get back the amount of money invested plus an additional return. The return will be between
5% and 30% depending on the alternative and you will know it in advance. Hence, if the
business is successful, for every 100 pesos invested, you will get back those 100 pesos plus
something between 5 and 30 pesos), or ii) Failure: in which case, you will lose 90% of the
amount of money you decided to invest. So if you invested 100 pesos then you will lose 90
pesos and will keep 10 pesos.
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Step 2
You must choose between two options: A to keep the investment on the business Alternative
as an investment you took in step 1, or B change the business by acquiring insurance, which give
your invested money back minus a the price of the insurance.
The five business alternatives in which you must make the decision differ on the rate of return
you would get if the business is successful. However, the amount you would lose, if the
business fails, will always be the same, equivalent to losing 90% of the amount invested. Thus:
 If Alternative 1 is chosen, after the die is thrown, the business will have a return of 5%
(for every 100 pesos spent you get additional 5 pesos)
 If Alternative 2 is chosen, after the die is thrown, the business will have a return of 10% for
every 100 pesos spent you gets additional 10 pesos)
 If Alternative 3 is chosen, after the die is thrown, the business will have a return of 15% for
every 100 pesos spent you gets additional 15 pesos)
 If Alternative 4 is chosen, after the die is thrown, the business will have a return of 120%
for every 100 pesos spent you gets additional 20 pesos)
 If Alternative 5 is chosen, after the die is thrown, the business will have a return of 30% for
every 100 pesos spent you gets additional 30 pesos)
It is important to note that in the same round, investing in an alternative does not affect the
income you for investing in the other alternatives within the same round. They are independent
alternatives.
Likewise, at the beginning of each round you will be informed of the chance or
probability that the business is successful (represented by the green balls •) or failure
(represented by red balls •). These chances will be different between rounds.
Now let us show you an example of the decision making process for the first
round
Example 1
i. The monitor will give you an initial income. Suppose it is $ 2,000 pesos.
ii. Since we are in Round 1, you will see on the computer the Characteristics of Business. At
the top of the screen you will find the following:
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You will see the staring income for this round, the chance, for this round, of the business
failing (in this case equal to nine red balls) and the chance of it succeeding (in
this case a green ball).
Knowing this information, you are know ask to determine how much of $ 2,000 you want to
invest in each of the five alternatives, and for each of them you have decided whether you
prefer staying with the investment or you want to change for the insurance and pay the price.
iii. Once you have taken the five (5) decisions for each alternative, we will throw the 10-sides
die to determine which of the alternatives will be taken into account to determine the
outcome. Suppose that the die get on 9, thus the considered alternative is the fifth one.
iv. We go to alternative 5 an check your decision made. Suppose that in this scenario
you decided to invest $ 1,200pesos (and therefore left without investing $ 800 pesos) in
step 1. So you would have the following
Accordingly, this investment would get $ 360 pesos if the business is successful
equivalent to keeping $ 1,560 ($ 1,200 invested plus $ 360 profit), and would lose $
1,080 (equivalent to keep $120 of that $ 1,200 invested). The probability of each outcome
is given by the number of green and red balls respectively.
Suppose further that in step 2 you chose to keep the investment (Option A) rather than
swift to the insurance (Option B), thus you will see the following
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Therefore, it is necessary to determine what would happen with the business in that
round
v. Ins ide a b l ack bag we put n ine red ba l l s and one green ball (because that
is equivalent to the probability of failure and success respectively). You will draw one of
the balls.
v i . Suppose that the ball was green•. Then we can get compute your income at the end of
Round 1. Your initial wealth was $ 2,000 pesos. The die determined that the Alternative 5
would be taken into account. Your decision in Step 1 was to invest $1,200 pesos, and in
the step 2 you decided to choose the investment rather than the insurance. The ball you
picked determined that the investment was successful. Then, your investment of $
1,200 pesos became $1,560 pesos. Thus, your wealth at the end of Round 1 is $ 2,360.
This represents the sum of $ 800 not invested in the business plus $ 1,560 you won with
this business.
Suppose now the ball drawn is red instead. Then, the result of the investment is
failure. Like we have already explained, , you lose 90% of the amount invested equivalent
to $1,080. Therefore, will stay with the $ 800 (which is not invested) plus $ 120 representing
10% of which are kept its investment. Consequently, your wealth at the end of the
round 1 is $ 920.
Suppose finally a third possibility. Everything remains the same but in step 2 instead
you chose option B (insurance). In this case, the Step 2 will look like
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In this case, it is not necessary to run the business according to the probabilities (no need to
darw one ball form the black bag). This is so because you decided to go for the insurance
(Option B). In this case, your final income in Round 1 will be the sum of the amount
investment $ 1,200 pesos minus the price of the insurance $936 equivalent to $ 264 ($ 1,200 -
$ 936 = $ 264) plus $800 pesos not invested in the business, leaving a total amount of $ 1.064.
One Round 1 has ended you will be informed of your new income. The following rounds
remain exactly as round 1, but with one difference: the initial income of each of these rounds
will not be assigned by the monitor, instead it will be equal to the final income from the
previous round.
Therefore, Initial income at round 1 will be allocated by the monitor, Initial income at round
2 will be the initial income of round 1 plus gains or minus losses form the investment
decision at round 1, which is the same as the final income at round 1. Initial income at round
3 is the final income of round 2, and so on and so forth. Additionally, you will be informed
about the probability of success and failure at each round.
You need to know that all rounds will be played consecutively and immediately, that is, once
you finish Round 1, Round 2 will start and you will make decisions corresponding to the
alternatives of that round, after Round 2 finishes then you will move to Round 3, and so on
and so forth until the end of the rounds. The income you earned at the end of the last round
will be the gain in this activity. Remember that payments will be made in cash (Colombian
pesos). We guarantee that we are in full capacity to pay what you earn in the activity. We
must say that during the rounds there will be no delivery of money but only at the end of all
the rounds.
If you have any questions this is the time to make.
Now you will be accompanied with one monitor that will lead you across the rounds. You
will play one practice round with a hypothetical income. After you have completed that
round you will begin playing with real income that the monitor will assign to you.
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Instruction for participants Stage 2. (II, Reference point treatment fixed)
Reference Point Treatment = Fixed
(Once subjects have completed the practice round)
You will start this stage with an income equal to $ 40,000 (20,000). This amount of money is
already yours given you have reached to this point in the activity. Your decisions must be taken
with reference to this income. Depending on your decisions and the outcomes you get, we will
add gains or losses to determine the final income.
Reference Point Treatment = Random
(Once subjects have completed the practice round)
You could start this stage with an income equal to $ 40,000 or $ 20,000. The actual amount will
depend on a coin toss. You must decide which side of the coin is associated with each income
level, once assigned you will toss the coin.
Please assign an income level to each side of the coin
(Once subjects have assigned income levels to sides of the coin)
Please, toss the coin
(Once subjects have tossed the coin)
According to the coin flip you have loss the chance of starting with an income equal to $ 40,000
(20,000) instead you will start this stage with an income equal to $ 40,000 (20,000). This amount
of money is already yours given you have reached to this point in the activity. Your decisions
must be taken with reference to this income. Depending on your decisions and the outcomes
you get, we will add gains or losses to determine the final income. is amount of money is already
yours given you have reached to this point in the activity. Your decisions must be taken with
reference to this income. Depending on the outcomes, we will add gains or losses obtained
across rounds.
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Instructions for participants Stage 1
In this activity, your earnings depend on your decisions. There is no wrong or correct
answer. There will be three (3) set of situations. The first set (denoted as Set 1) consists of
14 situations; the second set (Set 2) consists of 14 situations and the Set 3 of 7 situations.
Consequently, there are a total of 35 situations (please see the record sheet). In every
Situation we offer two choices: Option A and Option B. In each Situation we ask that you
choose either Option A or Option B according to what you prefer.
After you have completed your decisions, we will put into a bag 35 black chips numbered and
you will select one at random to select a Situation from the 35 situations which you
answered. The Situation selected will be played for real money.
For example, if the number selected is 15, we will apply the Situation 15 with real money.
Once the Situation is drawn we take into account your Option (A or B) chosen. Then we will
include in a black bag 10 ping-pongs between green () and red (). Where the number
of green balls () represents the chance that you obtain the greatest amount, and the red
balls ( ) that you of the lower amount. Once you draw a ball we will give you the
amount of money.
Now, let us provide an example of the Set 1.
Example 1
This example is for the Set 1, please look at your record sheet. (Situations from 1 to 14)
Note that there are two Options, A and B for each Situation. In a black bag there are 10 balls
between green and red. You must choose between A or B in each Situation.
Suppose that the number drawn at random is number 1, thus we take your decision made at
Situation 1.
Situation Option A Option B
1 $ 30.000 if 
$ 7.500 if 
$ 47.000 if 
$ 3.750 if 
If you chose Option A, the bag will contain three (3) green balls  and seven (7) red
balls  •. On the other hand, if elected Option B the bag containing one (1) green ball 
and nine (9) red balls  •. Afterwards, you will draw a ball from the bag at random.
If the green ball is drawn, those who chose Option A would receive $ 30,000 and those
who chose Option B will receive $ 47,000.
If the red ball is drawn, those who chose Option A will receive $ 7,500 and those who
chose Option B will receive $ 3,750
Example 2
Suppose now a situation where you choose Option A from Situation 1 to 6 and Option B
from Situation 7 to 14. Then, you must complete your record sheet as follows:
Sets 1
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Situation Option A Option B
1 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 47.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
2 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 52.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
3 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 59.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
4 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 67.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
5 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 78.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
6 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 91.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
7 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 109.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
8 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 125.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
9 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 149.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
10 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 184.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
11 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 238.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
12 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 330.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
13 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 509.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
14 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 923.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
Answer to Set 1
I chose Option A from situation 1 to 6
I chose Option B from situation 7 till 14
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Example 3
Now le tus suppose that you choos Option A for all 14 situations, then you must fill out
your record sheet as follows:
Situación Option A Option B
1 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 47.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
2 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 52.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
3 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 59.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
4 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 67.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
5 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 78.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
6 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 91.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
7 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 109.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
8 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 125.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
9 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 149.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
10 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 184.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
11 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 238.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
12 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 330.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
13 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 509.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
14 $ 30.000 si 
$ 7.500 si 
$ 923.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
Answer to Set 1
I chose Option A from situation 1 to 14
I chose Option B from situation till 14
136
Now lets see an experiment with Set 2. Please refer to the record sheet. (Situations 15
until 28)
Example 4
Lets assume that you chose Option B for all situations, therefore you must fill out the
record sheet as follows:
Set 2
Situación Option A Option B
15 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 26.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
16 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 27.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
17 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 28.100 si 
$ 3.750 si 
18 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 29.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
19 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 30.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
20 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 31.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
21 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 33.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
22 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 34.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
23 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 39.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
24 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 45.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
25 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 51.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
26 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 57.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
27 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 62.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
28 $ 20.000 si 
$ 15.000 si 
$ 67.000 si 
$ 3.750 si 
Answer to Set 2
I chose Option A from situation 1 to
I chose Option B from situation 1 till 14
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Now let us consider Set 3. Note Set 3 situations include losses. Please refer to the
record sheet. (Situations 29 until 35)
Set 3
Situación Option A Option B
29 Gana $ 25.000 si 
Pierde $ 4.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 21.000 si 
30 Gana $ 4.000 si 
Pierde $ 4.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 21.000 si 
31 Gana $ 1.000 si 
Pierde $ 4.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 21.000 si 
32 Gana $ 1.000 si 
Pierde $ 4.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 16.000 si 
33 Gana $ 1.000 si 
Pierde $ 8.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 16.000 si 
34 Gana $ 1.000 si 
Pierde $ 8.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 14.000 si 
35 Gana $ 1.000 si 
Pierde $ 8.000 si 
Gana $ 30.000 si 
Pierde $ 11.000 si 
If you get losses then they will be substracted from the final amount of money you get
from both Stages in the overall Activity (Stage 1 and Stage 2).
If you have any question this is the moment to raise it.
It is important to bear in mind that you must first fill out the record sheet according
to your preferences from Stage 1. Afterwards, you will come back to the main room
where we will deliver the instructions for the Stage 2. Once we finish Reading them
each of you will be assigned a Monitor to help you out in the implementation of your
decisión from that Stage 2. After you have finished Stage 2 each Monitor will have
all your record sheets from Stage 1 and he will implement the corresponding
payments. We guarantee that we are able to pay any amount that you have earned
during the experiment.
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3.7. Appendix 3. Reference points formation and investment decisions
With Set 1 and Set 2 we recover: Measure of decreasing sensitivity (γ) and weighting
of probabilities (pi)
To do so we follow the same procedure described in Tanaka et al. (2010). We find
the associated αi, λi, γi parameters that rationalises the Vi(LA,a)− Vi(LB,a) = 0 where
Lx,a is the lottery associated to Option X in row a, and Vi(LX) = (pii(ρ)µi(x | b)) |LX
were
µi(x | b) =

x1−γi
1−γi if x ≥ 0,
−λi(−x)1−γi
1−γi if x < 0
weighted by pii(ρ) = exp
[−(− log(ρ))αi ]. Notice that set 1 and set 2 gives us an interval
of values for which, at a given switching point, individual is consistent with a duple
(γ, α). Set 3 is used to recover parameter λi.
Set 1 switching points in Table 3.6
Set 2 switching points in Table 3.7
With Set 3 we recover loss aversion (λ).
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(a) Gain–loss utility µ(·) (b) Probability weight-
ing: pi(ρ)
Table 3.6: Set 1. switching points α y γ
σ\α 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2 9 10 11 12 13 14 NC*
0.3 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0.4 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
0.5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.7 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.8 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.9 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
*never changes
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Table 3.7: Set 2. Switching point for α y γ
σ\α 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2 NC* 14 13 12 11 10 9
0.3 14 13 12 11 10 9 8
0.4 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
0.5 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
0.6 11 10 9 8 7 6 5
0.7 10 9 8 7 6 5 4
0.8 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
0.9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
*Never changes
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Chapter 4
Interdependent Value Auctions
with Insider Information
4.1 Introduction
Much of the auction literature assumes that bidders hold rather equally informative
information about the value of the auctioned object, though they are assumed to know
about it privately.1 However, there are real-world auctions in which bidders are better
viewed as asymmetrically informed in terms of how precisely they know about different
aspects of the object’s value. For instance, in art auctions, buyers with professional
knowledge tend to appraise more accurately the potential value of an object than non-
professional buyers (Ashenfelter & Graddy 2003). In takeover auctions, buyers with the
existing shares of a target firm may have an access to inside information unavailable to
competitors.2 In auctions for gas and oil leases (so-called OCS auctions), firms owning
neighboring tracts are better informed about the value of a lease, such as oil reserves,
than non-neighboring firms (Hendricks, Porter & Wilson 1994). In these examples,
some bidders have far better access to value information than others, which suggests
the asymmetry of information access among bidders. This motivates us to explore the
implications of this asymmetry on auction outcomes.
Further elaborating on Kim (2003) we develop a model of interdependent value
0The chapter has benefited from comments by seminar participants at UCL Theory Seminar and
2013 ESA Zurich Meeting. We thank Brian Wallace for writing the experimental program and helping
us run the experiment.
1See, for instance, Myerson (1981) and Riley & Samuelson (1981) for the environment of private
value auctions, and Milgrom & Weber (1982a) for auctions with affiliated values.
2Sometimes, a current management team of the target firm participates in the bidding competition,
which is a practice known as management buyouts or MBO. Shleifer & Vishny (1987) argue that the
managers’ special information about their company is one reason for MBO.
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auctions with asymmetric information structure in two standard auction formats – the
second-price (sealed-bid) auction and the English auction. The model assumes a flexible
structure of valuation, encompassing both private component specific to individual
bidder and common component applied to all bidders. We depart from the standard
structure by assuming two types of bidders: insiders who are perfectly informed of
their value, and outsiders who are only informed of the private value component and
thus imperfectly informed about their value. Our theoretical analysis is general in that
we allow for any arbitrary number of insiders and outsiders in the equilibrium analysis.
This feature enables us to understand the revenue implication of the insiders’ presence
by examining how the seller’s revenue changes as the number of insiders varies.
When only one insider and one outsider exists, the second-price auction and the
English auction, which are equivalent, achieve the efficient allocation. With more than
two bidders and at least one insider, however, the equilibrium of the second-price
auction is inefficient. Efficiency loss is unavoidable in the second-price auction because
a sealed-bid format offers no way of eliminating the mismatch between insiders’ and
outsiders’ bidding strategies, which arises from the fact that the former depends on
both private and common components of the values while the latter depends only the
private component.
The English auction in contrast provides opportunities for outsiders to learn about
others’—both insiders and outsiders’—private information through the history of prices
at which they drop out. In an environment with symmetric information structure (that
is, there is no insider), each bidder’s private signal is precisely revealed in equilibrium
because his equilibrium drop-out price is monotonically related to his private signal.
Yet the inference problem can be more complicated in the presence of insiders, who
employ the (weakly) dominant strategy of dropping out at their values that reflect both
private and common components. We characterize an equilibrium in English auction
where outsiders overcome this inference problem to get the object allocated efficiently.
We do so by extending the equilibrium construction in Milgrom & Weber (1982b)
and Krishna (2003) to our setup, which involves finding a system of equations that
gives break-even signals at any given price in the presence of insiders. The outsider’s
equilibrium strategy is then characterized by the cutoff strategy in which he drops out
at such a price that the break-even signal becomes equal to his signal. The key to
the equilibrium construction is to guarantee that each outsider’s break-even signal as
a function of the price is strictly monotone, which holds true in our setup though it re-
quires a non-trivial analysis. The outsiders’ drop-out strategy, based on the monotonic
break-even signals, then implies that outsiders drop out before the price reach their
own value and drop out in order of their values. An immediate consequence of this
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strategy and insiders’ dominant strategy is that in the case an insider has the highest
value, he becomes a winner. In the case where an outsider has the highest value, the
allocation is also efficient because all other outsiders drop out earlier, revealing their
precise signals, and thus the informational gap between the highest-value outsider and
any remaining insider is reduced sufficiently to attain the efficient allocation. Our re-
sults highlight the efficiency-achieving role of the dynamic nature of the English auction
in an interdependent value setup with asymmetric structure of information.
We also explore the revenue implications of the asymmetric information structure
in the English auction. To investigate this, we consider two English auctions that differ
only by one bidder who switches from an outsider in one auction to an insider in the
other auction. With the equilibrium of the English auction we construct, we show that
for any signal profile, the latter auction with the switched insider yields a (weakly)
higher revenue than the former one. This result is based on two effects of turning an
outsider into an insider on bidders’ bidding behaviour. First, the switched insider drops
out at a higher price than when he is an insider. Second, the higher drop-out price
of the switched insider in turn causes active outsiders to drop out at higher prices.
This revenue prediction is reminiscent of the linkage principle of Milgrom & Weber
(1982b) in that the switch of an outsider into insider increases information available
to bidders. However, there are important differences between our revenue result and
Milgrom and Weber’s prediction. Unlike the case of Milgrom & Weber (1982b) where
the extra information available to bidders is made public, only one bidder entertains
better information in our setup. Also, our revenue prediction holds ex-post—that is,
for every realization of the signal profile— and thus does not depend on the assumption
that signals are affiliated.
While our theory offers a nice benchmark to compare the efficiency and revenues of
two standard auction formats in the environment with asymmetric information struc-
ture, its predictions are based on the nontrivial inference process in the English auction.
Whether individual bidders can rationally process the information revealed through the
auctions and the theoretical predictions are thus valid is ultimately an empirical ques-
tion. To test the validity of the theory, we design a simple experiment by varying the
auction format—between English and second-price—and the composition of insiders
and outsiders. Specifically, we employ three-bidder auctions of each format with either
three outsiders, or two outsiders and one insider, or one outsider and two insiders. Each
combination of an auction format and an insider-outsider composition serves as a single
treatment. In order to make outsiders’ inference problem as transparent as possible, we
let the computer play the role of insider who follows the dominant strategy of dropping
out at its own value This was public information to all human subjects.
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Our experiment presents several findings. First, the English auction achieves a
higher level of efficiency than the second-price auction when at least one insider is
present. And there is no significant difference of efficiency between the two auctions
when there is no insider. This finding on efficiency is consistent with our theory. Second,
average revenues tend to deviate upward from the equilibrium benchmark, in particular,
in both auction formats with no insider. Despite this, the increase in the number of
insiders has a positive impact on revenues in the English auction, as the theory predicts.
We also found a similar pattern of the increase of revenues in the second-price auction
with respect to the number of insiders. Third, there is evidence of naive bidding in
both auction formats, that is, winners’ curse behaviour. Quite intriguingly, the degree
of naive bidding in the data declines in the number of insiders in both auction formats.
In particular, this pattern is statistically significant and behaviourally large in the
English auction. We conjecture that the presence of insiders—who have informational
advantage—makes the outsider be more careful in bidding and creates a behavioural
incentive for the outsider to hedge against the informational disadvantage. This can
work toward the correction of naive bidding and thus of the winner’s curse in our setup.
Literature: This chapter contributes to the literature of auctions with asymmet-
ric information structure. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom & Weber (1983) study a
first-price common-value auction in which a single ‘insider’ has proprietary informa-
tion about the common value of the object, while other bidders have public infor-
mation. Hendricks et al. (1994) and Hendricks & Porter (1988) extend the analysis
of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) and study oil and gas drainage lease auctions.
Also, in first-price common-value auctions, Campbell & Levin (2000) and Kim (2008)
examine theoretically the effects of an insider on revenues and Kagel & Levin (1999)
study experimentally the effects of an insider on revenues and bidding behaviour. Our
chapter differs in the above papers in some important manners. We study the impli-
cations of insider information on efficiency as well as revenues in interdependent value
auctions, whereas the literature focuses on the revenue implications due to the pure
common-value assumption. We study the English auction and the second-price auction
rather than the first-price auction. And we provide a general equilibrium analysis for
any arbitrary number of insiders and generate the revenue ramifications of introducing
an extra insider, whereas the literature allows only a single insider.
Our model brings new insights to the literature concerning the allocative efficiency
in the interdependent value environment. Dasgupta & Maskin (2000), and Perry &
Reny (2002) design some original mechanisms that implement the efficient allocation
under a fairly weak condition (single crossing property). Krishna (2003) studies the
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English auction with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders in valuation and
adapts the equilibrium characterization of Milgrom & Weber (1982a). He provides
sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium. We extend Krishna
(2003)’s framework to accommodate the asymmetric information structure and study
how English auction can overcome the informational gap among bidders and achieve
the efficient allocation, as opposed to the inefficiency of the sealed bid auction. This
extension yields novel insights because we have a natural way of varying insider in-
formation by switching an outsider to an insider and establish the linkage principle
connecting insider information to the seller’s revenues.
Our experimental findings contribute to the experimental literature of auctions that
investigates the effects of auction formats on outcomes and bidding behaviour. Most
work in the experimental literature have focused on either private value auctions or pure
common value auctions. For excellent surveys, see Kagel & Levin (1995) and Kagel
& Levin (2011). There are a handful of experimental work on interdependent value
auctions. Goeree & Offerman (2002) report an experiment on a first-price auction with
interdependent values composed of private and common values and measure the degree
of inefficiency by varying the level of competition and the degree of uncertainty on
common value information. Kirchkamp & Moldovanu (2004) study experimentally an
interdependent value environment with asymmetric bidders in valuation in the English
auction and the second-price auction. They found that the English auction yields
higher efficiency than the second-price auction, consistent with equilibrium predictions.
Boone, Chen, Goeree & Polydoro (2009) study an auction environment with a restricted
structure of interdependent values and a single insider in which both English and
second-price auctions are inefficient, and report an experimental evidence that the
English auction performs better in both efficiency and revenues than the second-price
auction. We add novel evidence on the efficiency and revenue performances of the
two standard auctions in a general environment with interdependent values and insider
information.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we develop the model
of interdependent value auctions with asymmetric information structure and provide
the theoretical results for the second-price and English auctions. Section 4.3 describes
the experimental design and procedures. Section 4.4 summarizes experimental findings
and Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Theory
4.2.1 Setup
Following Kim (2003) a seller has a single, indivisible object to sell to n bidders. Let
N = {1, · · · , n} denote the set of bidders. The value of the object to each bidder is
determined by n-dimensional information s ∈ [0, 1]n, which we call a signal profile.
At this point, we do not specify who observes what signals, which is a central part
of our asymmetric information structure and will be discussed shortly. But we adopt
the convention of calling ith signal, si, bidder i’s signal. To denote signal profiles, let
s = (sj)j∈N , s−i = (sj)j 6=i, and sB = (sj)j∈B for any subset of bidders B ⊂ N . It is
assumed that the distribution of signal profile has a full support on [0, 1]n. Each bidder
i’s value, denoted vi(s), is assumed to be additively separable into two parts, a private
value component hi : R→ R and a common value component g : Rn → R, i.e.
vi(s) = hi(si) + g(s), (4.1)
where dhidsi > 0 and
∂g
∂sj
≥ 0 for all j ∈ N. According to this function, each bidder i’s
private value component only depends on his own signal si while the common value
component, which is the same across all bidders, depends on the entire signal profile s.
We adopt this functional form in part because it provides us with a natural model of the
asymmetric information structure in that some bidders often have superior information
about the common value aspect of the object than others.3 This functional form will
also be used later for our experimental study.4 We assume that hi and g are twice
continuously differentiable and hi(0) = g(0) = 0 for normalization. Assume also that
for each i, limsi→∞ vi(si, s−i) =∞ for any s−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1.5 Note that the value function
defined in (4.1) satisfies the single crossing property : for all s and i 6= j, ∂vi∂si >
∂vj
∂si
.
Note also that for any s, vi(s) > vj(s) if and only if hi(si) > hj(sj), i.e. a bidder with
a higher private component has a higher value. The allocation which gives the object
to a bidder with the highest value–or highest private component–for every realization
of signal profile in the support is called (ex-post) efficient.
The asymmetric information structure is modeled by partitioning N into I, a set of
insiders, and O, a set of outsiders: Each outsider i ∈ O only knows the private value
3There are some other studies which adopt this value function in the standard information setup.
For instance, see Wilson (1998) and Hong & Shum (2003)
4We note that our theoretical results are not restricted to the assumed functional form. Refer to
Kim (2004) for more general condition for the value function under which the efficiency and revenue
results of this chapter continue to hold.
5This can always be satisfied by, if necessary, redefining the function vi for signal profiles that are
not in the support [0, 1]n.
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component hi(si) while each insider i ∈ I knows both the private and common value
components, hi(si) and g(s). This assumption is tantamount to having each outsider
i be informed of his own signal si (due to the monotonicity of hi). So, if O = N
(i.e. there is no insider), then the model boils down to the standard information case
where every bidder i is only informed of his own signal si. Note that we are making a
parsimonious assumption on insiders’ information by only saying that they know the
values of hi(si) and g(s) for each s, while being silent on what signals precisely they
are informed of.6 We impose no restriction on the number of insiders or outsiders
except that there are at least one insider and one outsider, i.e. |I| ≥ 1 and |O| ≥ 1.
The information structure described so far is assumed to be common knowledge among
bidders In particular, outsiders know who insiders are. This assumption is reasonable
in the examples mentioned in the introduction since it is commonly known: who owns
the neighboring tract in an OCS auction; who are the existing shareholders or current
management trying to buy the target firm in an takeover auction; who are the expert
bidders in an auction of artworks.
For the auction format, we focus on the second-price (sealed-bid) auction and En-
glish auction.7 In the second-price auction, the highest bidder wins the object and pays
the second highest bid. For English auction, we consider the Japanese format, where
bidders drop out of the auction as the price rises continuously starting from zero until
only one bidder remains and is awarded the object at the last drop-out price. (Ties are
broken uniform randomly in both the second-price and English auctions.) Despite the
similarity in the pricing rules, the two auction formats are different in that in English
auction, bidders, especially outsiders, are given chances to observe others’ drop-out
prices and update their information while they are not in the second-price auction.
In both auction formats, we assume that each insider, who knows his value precisely,
employs the weakly dominant strategy of bidding (or dropping out at) his value.
4.2.2 Second-Price Auction
Let us start with the analysis of the second-price auction with two bidders, one insider
and one outsider. In this case, the analysis of the two auction formats is no different
since English auction ends as soon as one bidder drops out so bidders have no chance
to update their information as in the second-price auction. The following proposition
establishes the efficiency of both auction formats with two bidders.
6In the first-price auction, however, what insiders know beyond their values can be important since
it provides useful information about their opponents’ bids.
7We do not consider the first-price auction mainly due to its analytical intractability under the
asymmetric information structure. In the case of one insider and one outsider, however, an inefficiency
result can be established. Refer to Kim & Che (2004) for this result.
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Theorem 4.2.1 (Efficiency with Two Bidders). With n = 2, the object is efficiently
allocated in the unique undominated (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of the second-price
(or English) auction.
The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from the fact that the insider using the un-
dominated strategy pins down the optimal strategy for the outsider, which turns out
to be identical to the well-known equilibrium strategy in the standard information case
with two bidders (Maskin 1992). The uniqueness and efficiency of the equilibrium
stand in contrast with the standard information case where there exist a plethora of
inefficient (undominated) equilibria for the second-price auction.8
With more than two bidders, however, the second-price auction ceases to be efficient,
as the following result shows. The proofs of this theorem and all subsequent results are
contained in Appendix 4.6.1.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Inefficiency of Second-Price Auction). Suppose that n ≥ 3 and ∂g∂si >
0 for all i. Suppose also that the efficient allocation requires insiders to obtain the object
with a positive probability less than one. Then, there exists no efficient equilibrium for
the second-price auction.
To illustrate what causes this inefficiency, consider a symmetric case with 3 bidders
where hi = h for some h and all i, so a bidder which the highest signal has the highest
value. Suppose that bidder 3 is an insider while bidder 1 is an outsider. Fix bidder 1’s
signal at s¯1. In Figure 4.1 below, Ei denotes a set of signal profiles (s2, s3) for which
bidder i has to be a winner according to the efficient allocation.
Along the line CC ′, bidder 1’s bid remains the same. The same has to be true for
bidder 3’s bid in order that bidder 1 (resp. bidder 3) can be a winner below (resp.
above) the line, as the efficiency requires. This is not possible, however, since the value
bidding strategy of bidder 3 depends on s2 as well as s1 or s3 so it varies along CC ′.
Intuitively, the above inefficiency is caused by a mismatch between the bidding
strategies of outsider and insider in that the former’s bid depends only on his own
signal while the latter’s on the entire signal profile. One might ask why the same
intuition does not apply to the two bidder case where the efficiency always obtains
(as shown in Theorem 4.2.1). To explain, we need to consider what extra information
an insider’s bid reflects, compared to the standard case. In the two bidder case, the
extra information is a single outsider’s signal, which is also known to that outsider. In
case of three or more bidders, however, the extra information includes signals unknown
to outsiders. For instance, in the above example, bidder 3’s bid reflects s1 and s2 in
8To see this, refer to Bikhchandani & Riley (1991) for the common value case and Chung & Ely
(2000) for the interdependent value case.
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s3
s2
s¯1
s¯1
C C ′
E1 E2
E3
Figure 4.1: Example: Symmetric I = {3} , O = {1}
addition to s3, and s2 is not known to outsider bidder 1. The inability of bidder 1 to
adjust his bid depending on s2, in contrast to bidder 3’s ability to do so, is what leads
to an inefficient allocation in the second-price auction.
The equilibrium bidding strategy for outsiders in the second-price auction is difficult
to characterize due to the asymmetry between outsider’s and insider’s strategies. In
the following example, we provide partial characterizations of equilibrium strategies
with linear value function that will be used in our experimental study.
Example 1. Suppose that there are three bidders each of whom has a signal uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 1], and that for each i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}, vi(s) = asi +∑
j 6=i sj with a > 1. (For the experimental study, we will set a = 2.) Let us consider
three information structures, I = ∅, I = {3}, and I = {2, 3}. Assuming that insiders
use the dominant strategy of bidding their values, we aim to find symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for outsiders, denoted B : [0, 1]→ R+.
In the case of I = ∅, Milgrom & Weber (1982a) give us the symmetric equilibrium
bidding strategy as follow:
B(si) = Es−i [vi(si, s−i)|max
j 6=i
sj = si] = (a+
3
2
)si.
In the case of I = {2, 3}, the equilibrium bidding strategy for bidder 1, which is a
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best response to the value bidding by bidder 2 and 3, is given as
B(s1) =
2a
2+4a+1
2a+1 s1 if s1 ∈ [0, 2a+12a+2 ]
(2a+ 3)s1 − a− 1 otherwise.
(4.2)
The detailed analysis for this result is provided in the Supplementary Material. In
Figure 2 below, we reproduce Figure 1 with s¯1 = 0.7 and illustrate how the object
is allocated according to the equilibrium bidding strategy given in (4.2). The kinked,
dashed line corresponds to the signals (s2, s3) for which the equilibrium bid of bidder 1
with s¯1 = 0.7 is equal to the higher of value bids by bidder 2 and bidder 3. So, bidder
1 is a winning (losing) bidder below (above) that line. This implies that in the shaded
area Ai, the object is allocated to bidder i, even though his value is not the highest.
s3
s2
s¯1
s¯1
A1
A1
A3
A2
E1 E2
E3
Figure 4.2: Example: Inefficient allocations
In the case of I = {3}, we only have a partial characterization of monotonic equi-
librium bidding strategy that is symmetric for the two outsiders:9
Proposition 4.2.3. For the second-price auction with I = {3}, any symmetric, strictly
increasing equilibrium strategy for outsiders must satisfy the following properties: for
i = 1, 2, (i) B(si) ∈ [(a+ 1)si, (a+ 2)si],∀si ∈ [0, 1]; and (ii) B(1) = vi(1, 1, 1) = a+ 2.
The Supplementary Material provides the proof of this result along with a numerical
9We are not claiming here that any symmetric equilibrium must be monotonic. We note that
the presence of insider prevents us from establishing the necessity of monotonicity by using the usual
argument based on incentive compatibility.
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analysis of the equilibrium bidding strategy.
4.2.3 English Auction
In this section, we provide the equilibrium of English auction that achieves the effi-
cient allocation. Using this equilibrium construction, we also establish the comparative
statics for the revenue of English auction with respect to the number of insiders. As
mentioned earlier, English auction has an advantage over the second-price auction in
terms of the additional information bidders can acquire during the dynamic bidding
process. We show that this feature enables English auction to overcome the asymmetric
information between insiders and outsiders and achieve the efficient allocation. It is
also shown that more bidders being insider is beneficial for the seller’s revenue.
To this end, we construct the equilibrium of English auction following Milgrom
& Weber (1982a) and Krishna (2003). A key feature of our equilibrium construction
consists of describing how outsiders infer others’ signals from their drop-out prices and
then how to use this information to determine their own drop-out prices. Assume for
the moment that each outsider’s drop-out price at any moment of auction is strictly
increasing in his signal, so his signal is revealed as he drops out. Also, insiders’ drop-
out prices are equal to their values. Using this information, the active outsiders who
have yet to drop out calculate the break-even signals at each current price, which is
defined to be a signal profile that makes all active bidders break even if they acquire
the object at the current price. Then, each active outsider stays in (exits) the auction
if his break-even signal at the current price is smaller (greater) than his true signal.
Note that the assumed monotonicity of each outsider’s drop-out price with respect to
his signal is ensured if his break-even signal as a function of the current price is strictly
increasing.
To formalize this idea, let us introduce a few notations. Let A denote the set of
active bidders. So, N\A, O\A, and I\A denote the set of inactive bidders, inactive
outsiders, and inactive insiders, respectively. With pi denoting a drop-out price of
bidder i, let pB = (pi)i∈B for a subset of bidders B ∈ N . Note that a price profile,
pN\A, corresponds to a history of the game at a point where only bidders in A are active.
Suppose now that the current price is equal to p with a history pN\A. Suppose also that
the signals of inactive outsiders have been revealed to be sO\A. Given these revealed
signals, we define the break-even signal profile, denoted (sA(p; pN\A), sI\A(p; pN\A)),
to solve the following system of equations:
vi(sO\A, sA(p; pN\A), sI\A(p; pN\A)) =
{
pi for i ∈ I\A
p for i ∈ A
(4.3a)
(4.3b)
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The equations in (4.3a) says that with the signal profile (sO\A, sA(p; pN\A), sI\A(p; pN\A)),
the value of each inactive insider i is equal to his drop-out price pi, which is consis-
tent with the insiders’ value bidding strategy. The equations in (4.3b) says that if the
active bidders acquire the object at the current price p, then they would break even,
which is why the solution of (4.3) is called break-even signals. Then, the outsiders’
equilibrium strategy is simple: After any history pN\A, each outsider i drops out (stays
in) at price p if and only if si ≤ (>)si(p; pN\A). So, if si(p; pN\A) is strictly increasing
and continuous with p, then an outsider i with signal si drops out at price p at which
si = si(p; pN\A). It means that each outsider’s signal is revealed via his drop-out price,
as we assumed in order to set up the system of equations (4.3). The following theorem
proves that the value function in (4.1) admits a strictly monotonic solution for the
break-even signals, and thereby establishes the existence of efficient equilibrium:
Theorem 4.2.4 (Efficiency of English Auction). Consider English auction with n ≥ 3.
1. There exists an ex-post Nash equilibrium where each outsider i ∈ O\A drops out
at price p after history pN\A if and only if si < si(p; pN\A), where si(p; pN\A)
solves (4.3).
2. The equilibrium bidding strategy described in 1 leads to the efficient allocation.
An intuitive understanding of the efficiency of English auction can be gained from
comparison with the second-price auction. For this, we revisit the three bidder example.
Recall from Figure 1 (or Figure 2) that the source of the inefficiency result with the
second-price auction is that the insider bidder 3 adjusts his bid according to s2 (in
particular, along the threshold CC ′) while the outsider bidder 1 fails to do so. This
problem disappears in English auction. To see it, suppose that bidder 3 is the only
insider, and also that bidder 2 drops out first and reveals his true signal, which bidder
1 learns and subsequently reflects in his drop-out strategy. So there no longer is the
informational asymmetry between bidder 1 and bidder 3 regarding s2. Also, from this
point on, the bidding competition reduces to the two bidder case with one outsider
and one insider as in Theorem 4.2.1, where the efficiency easily obtains. In the current
example with three bidders and one insider, the argument for the efficiency result
based on the above intuition can be completed by observing that the outsiders’ drop-
out strategy implies: (i) they drop out before the price reaches their values; (ii) they
drop out in order of their values. Due to (i), an insider with the highest value always
becomes a winner. In the case an outsider has the highest value, the efficiency is
also achieved because, due to (ii), another outsider drops out and reveals his signal
before the highest-value outsider does so. The proof of Theorem 4.2.4 generalizes this
153
4.2. Theory 4. Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information
argument to the case in which there can be more insiders or outsiders. A difficult part
of the proof lies in proving the strict monotonicity of the break-even signals, which
follows from the fact that the value functions in (4.1) satisfy a sufficient condition
provided by Krishna (2003).
Turning to the revenue property, we ask how the presence of more insiders affects
the seller’s revenue. To do so, we consider two English auctions, E and E′, which only
differ by one bidder who switches from an outsider in E to an insider in E′. Given a
signal profile s, let P (s) and P ′(s) denote the seller’s revenue in E and E′, respectively,
under the equilibrium described earlier.
Theorem 4.2.5 (Linkage Principle). For any signal profile s ∈ [0, 1]n, P (s) ≤ P ′(s).
This result follows from establishing two facts: (i’) the switched insider drops out
at a higher price in E′ than in E; (ii’) the higher drop-out price of the switched insider
causes (active) outsiders to also drop out at higher prices in E′. To provide some
intuition behind (ii’), let us revisit the three bidder example. Suppose that bidder 1 is
a winner and pays the bidder 2’s drop-out price p2 after bidder 3, the only insider, has
first dropped out at p3. Then, the break-even signals s1(p2; p3) and s3(p2; p3) satisfy
v3(s1(p2; p3), s2, s3(p2; p3)) = p2 > p3 = v3(s1, s2, s3). (4.4)
Since bidder 1 is active at p2, we have s1 > s1(p2; p3), which implies by (4.4) that
s3 < s3(p2; p3). The fact that s1 > s1(p2; p3) means the break-even signal of the
active outsider underestimates his true signal, which has the effect of lowering the
selling price p2. However, this effect is mitigated by the fact that s3 < s3(p2; p3) or
the insider’s signal is overestimated. The underestimation of active outsiders’ signals
results from their attempt to avoid the winner’s curse by bidding as if the currently
unknown signals are just high enough to make them break even at the current price.
This is why an outsider drops out before the price reaches his value, as the fact (i’)
above suggests. Thus, one can say that an outsider getting better informed to become
an insider alleviates the detrimental effect of the winner’s curse on both his own and
other outsiders’ drop-out prices.
The revenue result in Theorem 4.2.5 is reminiscent of the linkage principle of Mil-
grom & Weber (1982a) (henceforth MW) in that the shift from E to E′ increases the
information available to the bidders, There are some crucial differences, however: Un-
like MW’s, the increased information here is not public since only the switched insider
gets better informed. Also, the revenue increase in Theorem 4.2.5 holds for every real-
ization of signal profile and thus does not rely on the assumption that the signals are
affiliated.
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Example 2. Let us consider the same linear example as in Example 1. In the case of
I = ∅ (i.e., no insider), the equilibrium strategy in Theorem 4.2.4 takes the same form
as in MW: if no one has dropped out, then the break-even signal for each bidder i is
given as p(a+1) , which means bidder i drops out at price equal to (a+ 2)si; if one bidder
j has already dropped out at pj and thereby revealed his signal sj , then the break-even
signal for each remaining bidder i is given as 1a+1(p− sj), which means bidder i drops
out at price equal to (a+ 1)si + sj .
Let us turn to the case I 6= ∅. If no one has dropped out or one outsider has
dropped out, an (active) outsider’s drop-out strategy remains the same as above. After
an insider j ∈ I has dropped out at price pj , the condition in (4.3) becomes
asi(p; pj) +
∑
k 6=i
sk(p; pj) = p for each i 6= j
asj(p; pj) +
∑
k 6=j
sj(p; pj) = pj ,
which yields the break-even signal si(p; pj) for each i 6= j that solves
(a+ 1)si(p; pj) +
1
a
(pj − 2si(p; pj)) = p.
Given the equilibrium strategy that calls for each outsider i to drop out at price p
where si(p; pj) = si, the above equation implies that an outsider i drops out at price
equal to (a+ 1)si +
1
a(vj(s)− 2si).
Table 4.1 and 4.2 below summarize the drop-out prices that result from the equilib-
rium strategy described above in the case of I = {3} and I = {2, 3}, respectively. Note
that we restricted attention to the cases of s1 > s2 in Table 1 and s2 > s3 in Table
2, so the value ranking within outsiders/insiders, and thus the order of their drop-out
prices, is fixed. The drop-out prices are for the bidders who do not have the highest
value, meaning that a bidder with the highest value is winning. The rightmost columns
of the two tables show what would be the sale prices (or the second drop-out prices) if
there were one less insider, which are lower than the prices in the second column from
the right, as one can check easily. Thus, the seller’s revenue gets (weakly) higher for
each realized signals as an outsider switches to an insider.
4.3 Experimental Design
The experiment was run at the Experimental Laboratory of the Centre for Economic
Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) at University College London (UCL) between
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Table 4.1: Drop-out prices for English auction in case of I = {3} and s1 > s2
1st drop-out price
2nd drop-out price
(= the sale price)
the sale price with
I = ∅
(1-i) s3 > s1 > s2 p2 = (a+ 2)s2 p1 = (a+ 1)s1 + s2 (a+ 1)s1 + s2
(1-ii) s1 > s3 > s2 p2 = (a+ 2)s2 p3 = v3(s) (a+ 1)s3 + s2
(1-iii) s1 > s2 > s3 and
(a+ 2)s2 > v3(s)
p3 = v3(s)
p2 = (a+ 1)s2 +
1
a
(v3(s)− 2s2) (a+ 1)s2 + s3
(1-iv) s1 > s2 > s3 and
(a+ 2)s2 < v3(s)
p2 = (a+ 2)s2 p3 = v3(s) (a+ 1)s2 + s3
Table 4.2: Drop-out prices for English auction in case of I = {2, 3} and s2 > s3
1st drop-out price
2nd drop-out price
(= the sale price)
the sale price with
I = {3}
(2-i) s1 > s2 > s3 p3 = v3(s) p2 = v2(s)
max{v3(s), (a+ 1)s2
+ 1
a
(v3(s)− 2s2)}
(2-ii) s2 > s1 > s3 and
(a+ 2)s1 > v3(s)
p3 = v3(s)
p1 = (a+ 1)s1 +
1
a
(v3(s)− 2s1)
(a+ 1)s1 +
1
a
(v3(s)− 2s1)
(2-iii) s2 > s1 > s3 and
(a+ 2)s1 < v3(s)
p1 = (a+ 2)s1 p3 = v3(s) v3(s)
(2-iv) s2 > s3 > s1 p1 = (a+ 2)s1 p3 = v3(s) v3(s)
December 2011 and March 2012. The subjects in this experiment were recruited from
an ELSE pool of UCL undergraduate students across all disciplines. Each subject par-
ticipated in only one of the experimental sessions. After subjects read the instructions,
the instructions were read aloud by an experimental administrator. Each experimental
session lasted around two hours. The experiment was computerized and conducted
using the experimental software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007). Sample in-
structions are reported in Appendix 4.6.4.
In the design, we use a variety of auction games with three bidders, i = 1, 2, 3.
Each bidder i receives a private signal, si, which is randomly drawn from the uniform
distribution over the set of integer numbers, {0, 1, 2, ..., 100}. Given a realization of
signal profile s = (s1, s2, s3), the valuation of the object for each bidder i is
vi (s) = 2× si +
∑
j 6=i
sj .
We have two auction formats in the experiment—the second price (sealed-bid) auc-
tion and the English auction. In each auction format, we had three distinct games in
terms of the number of insiders from zero to two, k = 0, 1, 2. Thus, there are in total
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six treatments in terms of the auction format and the number of insiders. A single
treatment consisting of one auction format and a single value of k was used for each
session. We conducted 12 sessions in total by having two sessions for each treatment of
the auction games. Each session consisted of 17 independent rounds of auction games,
while the first two rounds were practice rounds in which auction outcomes were not
counted for actual payoffs. Throughout the chapter, we use the data only after the first
two rounds. The table 4.3 below summarizes the experimental design and the amount
of experimental data. The first number in each cell is the number of subjects and the
second is the number of group observations in each treatment. In total, 233 subjects
participated in the experiment.
Table 4.3: Experimental sessions
Session
Auction format # of insiders (k) 1 2 Total
0 21 / 105 21 / 105 42 / 210
English 1 18 / 135 20 / 150 38 / 285
2 23 / 345 19 / 285 42 / 630
0 21 / 105 21 / 105 42 / 210
Second-price 1 20 / 150 16 / 120 36 / 270
2 17 / 255 16 / 240 33 / 495
We use an irrevocable-exit, ascending clock version of the English and the second-
price auctions (Kagel, Harstad & Levin 1987, Kirchkamp & Moldovanu 2004). In
the English auction treatments, each subject sees three digital clocks representing the
bidding process on his or her computer screen, one for each bidder in the group, while
there is only one clock presented for each subject on the screen in the second-price
auction treatments. In the English auction, the computer screen clearly indicates which
clock belongs to each subject and, if any, belongs to an insider.
In the beginning of an auction round, the subjects were randomly formed into
three-bidder groups. In treatments with insider(s), each insider bidder was played
by the computer, while outside bidders were played by human subjects. The groups
formed in each round depend solely upon chance and were independent of the groups
formed in any of the other rounds. Once assigned into a three-bidder group, each
subject observed the realization of his or her own priviate signal and the formula of the
valuation computation. Other bidders’ signals in the formula were hidden to indicate
that subjects could not observe others’ signals.
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Clocks simultaneously start at -4 and synchronously move upwards by 1 unit per
half second. In the second-price auction, when the subject drops out by stopping his
or her clock, it turns red with the price at which it was stopped. If the other two
participants have not dropped out yet, their clocks continue to ascend by the same
speed. Once all three bidders have stopped their own clocks, the auction is then over.
The last bidder who chose the highest price becomes a winner of the auction and pays
the price at which the second bidder dropped out. On the other hand, in the English
auction, if one bidder stops his or her clock, the remaining two bidders observe, at the
next bid increment, that bidder’s clock having been stopped and turning red. There
will then be 3 seconds of time pause before the two remaining clocks will synchronously
increase by 1 unit per second. If one more participant drops out, the auction will then
be over. The last remaining bidder becomes a winner of the auction and pays the
price at which the second bidder dropped out. If all remaining bidders dropped out at
the same price level or if the price level reached 500 (the maximum bid allowed), the
winner is then selected at random from the set of those participants and pay the price
at which this event occurred.
Each subject simply needs to move the mouse over his or her own clock and click
on it, when the price on the clock reaches the level he or she wants to drop out. This
makes the subject drop out of the bidding, that is, his or her own clock stop. Once
subjects have dropped out, they were not allowed to re-enter the auction. Subjects
cannot stop their clocks before it reaches 0, which is the minimum bid allowed.
In treatments with at least one insider, an insider is played by the computer. This
(computer-generated) insider uses a simple rule of drop-out decision: it drops out at a
price equal to its own valuation. The computer participant always abides by this rule.
This information is common knowledge to subjects.
When an auction round ended, the computer informed each subject of the results
of that round, which include bids at which bidders dropped out, signals that bidders
received, values of the auction object, payments and earnings in that round. Once every
subject confirmed the results, the next round started with the computer randomly
forming new groups of three bidders and selecting signals for bidders. This process was
repeated until all 17 rounds were completed.
Earnings were calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged into pounds at the
rate where each 40 tokens was worth £1. The earnings in each round were determined
by the difference between winning revenue and winning cost. The winning revenue is
the valuation assigned to the subject if he or she won the auction and zero otherwise.
The winning cost is the price paid by the subject. If the subject did not win the
auction, the winning cost is simply equal to zero. In our experiment, subjects may
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accumulate losses, exhaust their balance, and go bankrupt during the experiment. If
this event happened, subjects were no longer allowed to participate in the experiment.
In order to avoid the potentially adverse impacts of the limited liability for losses on
bidding behaviour,10 we gave each subject a relatively large amount of money, £10,
as an initial balance that the subjects uses in the experiment. This initial balance
is only paid to subjects in the case they actually earn it in the auction games. For
instance, if their net earning in the auction games is zero, then they only receive the
participation fee, 5 pounds. None of the subjects experienced a bankruptcy during the
experiment. The total payment to a subject was the sum of his or her earnings over
the 15 rounds after the first two practice rounds, plus the initial balance £10 and an
extra £5 participation fee. The average payment was about £18.32. Subjects received
their payments privately at the end of the session.
4.4 Experimental Findings
4.4.1 Efficiency
We begin the analysis of experimental data by comparing the efficiency performance
across auction treatments. Table 4.4 reports the frequency of efficient allocation as
well as the average efficiency ratio measuring the economic magnitude of inefficient
outcomes. The efficiency ratio is defined as the actual surplus improvement over ran-
dom allocation as percentage of the first-best surplus improvement over random as-
signment.11 This ratio equals one if the allocation is efficient, that is, the highest-value
bidder wins the object, and less than one otherwise. For auction treatments with one
insider (resp. two insiders), we divide the data with respect to the ranking of the value
of the insider (resp. the outsider). The last two columns on the right side report, for
each treatment of the number of insiders, p-values from the one-sided t-test of the null
hypothesis that the efficiency outcome of the English auction is less than or equal to
that of the second-price auction.
The level of efficiency is high in all treatments. The frequencies of efficient allocation
range from 76% (in the second-price auction with k = 1) to almost 90% (in the English
10Hansen & Lott (1991) argued that the aggressive bidding behaviour in a common value auction
experiment done by Kagel & Levin (1986) may be a rational response to the limited liability rather than
a result of the winner’s curse. Lind & Plott (1991) designed an experiment eliminating the limited-
liability problem and found that this problem does not account for the aggressive bidding patterns in
the Kagel and Levin experiment.
11Our measure of efficiency ratio normalizes the realized surplus both by the best-case scenario
(efficiency) and by the worst-case scenario (random assignment). This double-normalization renders
the measure more robust against the rescaling of value support than an alternative measure like the
percentage of the first-best surplus realized.
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Table 4.4: Frequencies and ratios of efficient allocation
SPSB English
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H0 : (1) = (3) H0 : (2) = (4)
# of insiders Freq. Ratio Freq. Ratio
0 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.17 0.22
1 0.76 0.74 0.83 0.89 0.05 0.00
2 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.01 0.00
Notes: The efficiency ratio is defined as (realized surplus minus random surplus) divided
by (first-best surplus minus random surplus). The two columns on the right side report
the p-value from the t-test for the null hypothesis that outcomes between the SPSB and
the English auctions are equivalent.
auction with k = 2). The efficiency ratio shows similar patterns: the subjects achieved,
on average, between 74% (in the second-price auction with k = 1) and 93% (in the
English auction with k = 2) of the first-best surplus over random surplus. On the
other hand, we find that the English auction exhibits better performance in efficiency
than the second-price auction, when theory predicts so. In the symmetric information
structure with no insider (k = 0), there is no significant difference in efficiency between
the two auction formats. In the presence of insider, however, the efficiency outcomes
are significantly higher in the English auction than in the second-price auction. These
results are qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions that when at least
one insider is present in auction, an efficient equilibrium exists in the English auction
but not in the second-price auction. We further divide the data with respect to the
value ranking of bidders. In the auctions with one insider (k = 1), the efficiency ratio
of the English auction is significantly higher than that of the second-price auction,
regarding of the value ranking. In the auctions with two insiders (k = 2), the English
auction attains higher efficiency than the second-price auction in each case of value
ranking except for the case where the outsider has the second-highest value.
To examine further the higher efficiency performance of the English auction, we
divide the data of the English auction treatments into two subsamples with respect
to whether the second-price auction format, if it would have been used, had predicted
an efficient or inefficient allocation. That is, for each observed realization of signals
in each data point of the English auction treatments, we check if the second-price
auction format predicts an inefficient or efficient allocation. Due to the small sample
size of the second-price predicting an inefficient allocation, we allow a 5-token margin
for classifying the case of inefficiency in such a way that treats a single data point as
inefficient if the equilibrium of the second-price auction is either inefficient or efficient
but the difference of its two high bids is less than 5 tokens. We then check how often
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subjects were able to achieve an efficient allocation in each of these two cases. We
conduct the same analysis for the second-price auction treatments. Table 3 presents
the frequencies of efficient allocation in each case in the treatments with at least one
insider with the number of observations in parentheses.12 The last column reports
p-values from the one-sided t-test of the null hypothesis that the efficiency outcome of
the English auction is less than or equal to that of the second-price auction.
Table 4.5: The decomposition of efficient and inefficient allocations
Highest-value bidder
English auction SPSB auction
Outsider Insider Outsider Insider
Winner Efficient Inefficient Efficient Inefficient Efficient Inefficient Efficient Inefficient
4.5-A. (# of insiders) = 1
Outsider
0.83 0.11
–
0.19 0.78 0.06
–
0.30
(156) (21) (19) (147) (11) (25)
Insider –
0.05 0.81
– –
0.16 0.70
–
(10) (79) (30) (57)
Total 0.83 0.17 0.81 0.19 0.78 0.22 0.70 0.30
(156) (31) (79) (19) (147) (41) (57) (25)
4.5-B. (# of insiders) = 2
Outsider
0.87
– –
0.11 0.72
– –
0.12
(180) (46) (118) (39)
Insider –
0.13 0.89
– –
0.28 0.88
–
(26) (378) (46) (292)
Total 0.87 0.13 0.89 0.11 0.72 0.28 0.88 0.12
(180) (26) (378) (46) (118) (46) (292) (39)
Table 4.5 offers further insights on the efficiency performances across treatments
with insiders. In the case where the second-price auction format predicts an efficient
allocation, actual frequencies of efficiency are quite high, ranging from 81% (in the
second-price auction treatment with k = 1) to 92% (in the English auction treatment
with k = 2). In contrast, the level of efficiency becomes much lower in the case where
the equilibrium under the second-price auction format is treated as inefficient: the
frequencies of efficiency range between 33% (in the second-price auction with k = 1)
and 66% (in the English auction treatment with k = 2). In each given treatment, the
difference of efficiency outcomes between these two cases are statistically significant at
12The results of Table 4.5 remain basically the same either when we do not use any margin or larger
margin in classifying the case where the second-price auction format predicts an inefficient outcome.
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usual significance levels. Thus, where the bidding mismatch problem between outsiders
and insiders is prone to occur, subjects tend to more likely fail to attain an efficient
allocation. Furthermore, in the case where the second-price auction format predicts an
inefficient allocation, the English action performs significantly better than the second-
price auction when k = 1: 33% in the second-price auction versus 62% in the English
auction. In that case of the treatments with k = 2, we find no difference between the
two auction formats.
We summarize the efficiency outcomes as follows.
Finding 1 (efficiency) The English auction exhibits higher efficiency performance
than the second-price auction in the presence of insiders, as theory predicts. In
the symmetric information structure where there is no insider, there is no of
efficiency performance between the two auction formats.
4.4.2 Revenue
We move on to the comparison of revenue performances across auctions. Table 4.6
presents average percentage deviations of observed revenues from their theoretical pre-
dictions across treatments, along with their standard errors and p-value from t-tests
for the null hypothesis that the sample mean is equal to zero. For auction treatments
with one insider (resp. two insiders), we divide the data with respect to the ranking of
the value of the insider (resp. the outsider).
When all bidders are outsiders, we observe that observed revenues are significantly
higher than theoretically predicted revenues: 22% higher in the English auction and
26% higher in the SPSB auction. This tendency becomes weaker in auctions with at
least one insider: 3% (0%) higher in the English auction with k = 1 (k = 2) and 14%
(1%) higher in the SPSB auction with k = 1 (k = 2). It may not be unexpected because
insiders in the experiment are computer-generated and play the equilibrium strategy
of bidding their own values. Despite this consideration, observed revenues in the SPSB
auction with k = 1 are significantly above theoretical prediction. When we look closer
at the data by the ranking of values, in auctions with k = 1, the tendency of revenues
being above theoretical prediction becomes strong when both outsiders have lower or
higher values than the insider. This apparently results from the overbidding (relative
to the BNE equilibrium) by outsiders. We will investigate the bidding behaviour of
subjects more thoroughly in the next subsection. In auctions with k = 2, observed
revenues appear to concentrate around theoretical prediction. The magnitude of the
departures of observed revenues from theoretical ones is not large, although some of
the departures remain significant.
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Table 4.6: Average percentage deviations of observed revenues from theoretically pre-
dicted revenues
# of insiders Ranking of values (I or O) English auction SPSB auction
0 All
0.22 0.26
(0.096, 0.023) (0.045, 0.000)
1
All
0.03 0.14
(0.014, 0.047) (0.024, 0.000)
I = (highest-value)
0.06 0.28
(0.036, 0.101) (0.058, 0.000)
I = (second highest-value)
-0.02 0.03
(0.012, 0.112) (0.019, 0.165)
I = (lowest-value)
0.03 0.13
(0.012, 0.005) (0.036, 0.001)
2
All
0.00 0.01
(0.002, 0.453) (0.004, 0.063)
O = (highest-value)
-0.01 -0.03
(0.003, 0.000) (0.005, 0.000)
O = (second highest-value)
0.02 0.03
(0.006, 0.008) (0.010, 0.001)
O = (lowest-value)
0.00 0.02
(0.001, 0.024) (0.006, 0.005)
Notes: I stands for an insider and O represents an outsider. The first number in paren-
theses is a standard error of sample mean and the second number is p-value from t-test
for the null hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero.
Our theory establishes the linkage principle of the English auction that for any
signal profile, the switch of an outsider to an insider weakly increases the revenue. In
order to check out the linkage principle, we run regressions of observed revenues (resp.
theoretical revenues) on signal profiles and dummies for the number of insiders in each
auction format. The results are reported in Table 4.7.13
Controlling for the signal profile, switching an additional outsider to an insider
improves revenues significantly in the English auction. The observed revenues increase
on average by 10 from k = 0 to k = 1 and 8 from k = 1 to k = 2 in the English auction,
both of which are statistically significant at usual significant levels. The magnitudes
of revenue improving with extra insider in the data are also consistent with those
predicted by theory. In the regressions with theoretical revenues, we similarly observe
13As a robustness check of Table 4.7, we conduct regression analysis with more flexible functional
specifications of quadratic forms of signals or dummies for insider / outsider and their interactions with
signals. These results are reported in the Appendix tables 4.11-4.12. In essence, the empirical findings
about the linkage principle remain unchanged.
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Table 4.7: Regression analysis of revenues
Variables English SPSB
k = 1 10.466*** 10.491***
(1.983) (2.477)
k = 2 18.716*** 9.838***
(1.738) (2.218)
s(1) 0.889*** 0.766***
(.039) (.055)
s(2) 2.087*** 1.837***
(.038) (.051)
s(3) 0.796*** 0.761***
(.04) (.054)
constant -7.739*** 18.436***
(2.98) (3.883)
# of obs. 1125 975
R2 0.907 0.837
p-value
H0 : (k = 0) = (k = 1) 0.000 0.000
H0 : (k = 1) = (k = 2) 0.000 0.749
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** represent 10%,5%, and 1% significance level,
respectively. s(1) = min[s], s(3) = max[s], s(2) =
med[s]
the increase in revenues by 12 from k = 0 to k = 1 and 9 from k = 1 to k = 2 in the
English auction. Analogously, we observe the revenue-improving outcomes in the SPSB
auction data, despite that we are unable to prove it theoretically. Observed revenues
in the SPSB auction increase by 10 from k = 0 to k = 1, while they remain unchanged
from k = 1 to k = 2. At least in the current experimental setup, theory predicts the
linkage principle in that theoretical revenues increase by 14 from k = 0 to k = 1 and
by 8 from k = 1 to k = 2.
We summarize our findings about revenue as follows.
Finding 2 (revenue) Revenues in the data tend to deviate above from theoretical
prediction, in particular in auctions with no insider. Despite this tendency, the
increase in the number of insiders has a positive impact on revenues in the English
auction, consistent withe the linkage principle of the English auction. We find
similar patterns of revenue-improving with extra insiders in the SPSB auction.
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4.4.3 Bidding behaviour
We have found that the auction treatments, in terms of both auction formats and the
number of insiders, have significant impacts on efficiency and revenues. At the same
time, we have identified some quantitive departures from the predictions of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. In this section, we examine the subjects’ behaviour of bidding closely
to better understand the features of the data. We begin this analysis with the SPSB
auction.
SPSB auction We first overview the general patterns of bidding behaviour in the
SPSB auction by drawing scatter plots between subjects’ bids and their private signals
across insider treatments, and matching them with the BNE strategy. The scatter
plots are only based on human participants in the experiment who are outsiders. This
is presented in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Scatter plots of bids and signals: SPSB auction
This simple graphical representation of bidding behaviour already reveals some
useful information on the nature of bidding behaviour. There is notable departure
of bidding from the BNE strategy when the value of private signal is low: low-signal
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bidders bid substantially higher than the BNE strategy dictates. This overbidding
pattern in low values of signal appears present in all insider treatments, although this
pattern appears to be weaker in the treatment with two insiders. On the other hand,
subjects’ bids appear less responsive to their own private signals than the BNE predicts.
As a consequence, many observed bids tend to lie below the BNE strategy when the
value of private signal is high.
In order to examine the bidding behaviour of subjects more closely, we run the
linear regressions of subjects’ bids on their private signals. Our theory predicts that
the BNE strategy has a kink at the value of signal equal to 82.109 when k = 1 and
to 500/6 when k = 2. We thus use the regression specifications with and without
these kinks.14 Table 4.8 reports the results of the regressions with robust standard
erros clusted by individual subjects. We also present p-values of the F -test for the null
hypothesis that observed bids follow the equilibrium strategy.
Table 4.8: Regressions of bids on signals in the SPSB auctions
Variables (k = 0) (k = 1) (k = 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
si 2.754*** 2.423*** 2.309*** 2.912*** 2.756***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.22) (0.22)
1[si > 82.109] -90.933
(79.09)
1[si > 82.109]si 1.125
(0.89)
1[si > 500/6] -352.69
(226.80)
1[si > 500/6]si 4.006
(2.50)
Constant 48.797*** 72.214*** 75.876*** 34.475** 39.836***
(8.57) (8.12) (7.29) (12.78) (12.07)
R2 0.71 0.7 0.7 0.64 0.65
# of obs. 630 540 540 495 495
H0 : (β, c) = (b, 0) (s=3.5) n/a n/a n/a s = 175 , 1[.] = −300, s + 1[.]s = 7
F test 16.21 3.64
p value 0.00 0.02
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual subjects are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
14As shown in Proposition 1, we only have a partial characterization of the BNE strategy when
k = 1. Despite that, we are able to numerically derive the kink of the BNE strategy when k = 1.
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The regression analysis confirms the information extracted from the scatter plots
in Figure 4.3. The subjects respond less sensitively to their own private signals than
theory predicts. The estimated coefficients on signals are in the range between 2.4
and 2.9, and significantly lower than the theoretical prediction around 3.5 in each
insider treatment. The constant term in the regression is significantly positive in each
treatment. In sum, the regression results confirm that subjects tend to overbid relative
to the equilibrium when signals are low, and that this overbidding tendency reduces
when signals are high. The joint test based on F -statistic indicates that subjects’
behaviour differ significantly from the equilibrium strategy at usual significance levels.
Overall, the overbidding pattern in our data is consistent with the findings in the
experimental literature of auctions (Kagel & Levin 2011).
English auction We now turn to the subjects’ behaviour in the English auction.
We again overview the general patterns of bidding in this auction format by drawing
scatter plots with subjects’ bids. If the subject is the first drop-out bidder, we relate his
drop-out price to his own private signal. If the subject is the second drop-out bidder,
we associate his drop-out price with the BNE strategy we constructed in Theorem 3
and showed in Table 1. The second drop-out bidder’s equilibrium strategy contains
information on her private signal as well as the first drop-out price (and the identity of
the first drop-out bid when k ≥ 1). Thus, it is a convenient, visual way of summarizing
the behaviour of second drop-out prices and comparing them with the BNE strategy.
The scatter plots are presented in Figure 4.4.
Analogous to the overbidding pattern in the SPSB auction, we observe that the
first drop-out prices tend to depart significantly from the equilibrium strategy when
the value of private signal is low. However, this pattern appears strikingly less notable
in the treatment with two insiders, wherein there is a cluster of observed bids along
the line of the equilibrium strategy even when the signal value is quite low. It also
appears that the first drop-out subjects tend to respond less sensitively to their private
signals. Regarding the second drop-out subjects, they appear to bid less responsively
to the combination of their own signal and the first drop-out price than the Bayesian
equilibrium dictates.
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plots of bids and signals: English auction
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A useful comparisson between SPSB and English auction bidding behaviour is found
in Figure 4.5. We show the Kernel smoothing of the difference between observed
and theoretical bids for each treatment. If there were no departures from theory the
plotted lines would be horizontal at the 0 value. It makes evident the overbidding
(underbidding) at low (high) signals. Increasing the number of insiders has a larger
impact on English format, reducing overbidding at low signals.
Figure 4.5: Kernel Estimation of the difference between observed bids and theoretical
bids
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(b) English auction (first-drop bids)
It is not clear from the simple scatter plot or the non–parametric smoothing whether
this behavioural departure results from the insensitivity to their private signal or to
the first drop-out price or some other combination.
Therefore, we run the censored regressions of first drop-out and second drop-out
prices, with the sample of outsiders. We need to adopt the censored regression method
because we only observe the first drop-out price for the lowest bidder and the other
two remaining bids are right-censored, and because the second drop-out price is left-
censored by the first drop-out price. In the treatment with one insider (k = 1), as
the BNE strategy predicts, the regression specification for the second drop-out price
interacts the second drop-out bidder’s private signal and the first-drop price with the
dummy indicating if the first drop-out bidder is an insider. We further include an
alternative specification by adding this dummy in the regression equation to capture
any potential empirical impact of this dummy on the constant term. Table 4.9 reports
the regression results and p-values from the F -test for the joint null hypothesis that
observed bids follow the equilibrium strategy.15 Robust standard errors clustered by
individual subjects are reported in parentheses.
15The censored regression approach, using the maximum likelihood estimation method, is given in
detail in Appendix 4.6.3.
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The regression analysis of the first drop-out prices reveals that the subjects respond
to less sensitively to their private signal than the equilibrium strategy across insider
treatments. The estimated coefficients on private signal are 2.88 in the treatment with
no insider (k = 0), 3.26 in the treatment with one insider (k = 1), and 3.48 in the
treatment with two insiders (k = 2), whereas the equilibrium behaviour responds to
private signal by a factor of 4. We also found that the constant term is significantly
positive in all insider treatments, 77.89 when k = 0, 65.67 when k = 1, and 32.09 when
k = 2. Given these results, the null hypothesis that the first drop-out prices follow
the BNE strategy is rejected at usual significance levels in each insider treatment.
Intriguingly, the estimated coefficient on private signal increases and the constant term
declines as the number of insiders increases. Thus, the overbidding pattern and its
resulting winner’s curse get weaker when there are more insiders in the experiment.
The presence of an insider who knows the value of the object may make outsiders
be more wary of hedging against the informational asymmetry between insider and
outsider. This need to hedge against the informational asymmetry may operate in the
direction of correcting the winner’s curse.
We turn to the regression analysis of the second drop-out prices, which is quite
revealing. Similar to the first drop-out bidders, the second drop-out bidders respond less
sensitively to their own private signal than the equilibrium analysis predicts. However,
they respond excessively to the first drop-out prices. According to our theory, the
equilibrium bid would respond to the first drop-out price by a factor of 0.25 in the
treatment with no insider and in the treatment with one insider when an outsider
dropped out first, and by a factor of 0.5 in the treatment with one insider when the
first drop-out bidder is an insider as well as in the treatment with two insiders. In
the experiment, the subjects on average responded to the first drop-out price by about
0.40 when k = 0, 0.34 when k = 1 and the first drop-out bidder is an outsider, 0.65
when k = 1 and the insider dropped out first, and 0.70 in the treatment with two
insiders.16 Despite the excessive responsiveness to the first drop-out price, as suggested
in Figure 3, the combined behavioural response of own signal and first drop-out price
appears less sensitive that the equilibrium dictates. The joint null hypothesis that
experimental behaviour is equivalent to the equilibrium strategy is rejected at usual
significance levels in each treatment. Finally, we note that in the auction treatment
with one insider (k = 1), the subjects responded differentially to the identity of the first
drop-out bidder: they tend to put more weight on the first drop-out price and less on
their private signal when the insider dropped out first. This is qualitatively consistent
16The p-values of the t-test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of p/4 is equivalent to the
equilibrium prediction are 0.000 in each case of consideration.
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with the Bayesian equilibrium analysis.
Quantifying naive bidding The overbidding pattern in our interdependent
value environment with insider information is closely related to the findings of the
winner’s curse in the experimental literature of common value auctions (see Kagel and
Levin, 2002). Winning against other bidders implies that the outsider’s value estimate
happens to be the highest among outsiders as well as higher than each insider’s value.
Thus, the failure to account for this adverse selection problem results in overbidding
and can make the outsider fall prey to the winner’s curse.
We employ a simple strategy of quantifying the extent to which subjects in our
experiment fail to account properly for the adverse selection problem and thus bid
naively. We define naive bidding as bidding based on the unconditional expected value
(by ignoring completely the adverse selection problem). For the second-price auction
and the first drop-out bidder in the English auction, the naive bidding strategy takes
the form of bnaive (si) = 2si + 100. We also assume the same form of naive bidding
strategy after observing a first-drop price in the English auction, which means that
the naive bidder ignores any information from first drop-out price. We then consider a
convex combination of the naive bidding strategy and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategy. For all bidders in the second-price auction and the first drop-out bidders in
the English auction, this combined bidding strategy is represented by
b (si;α) = α× bnaive (si) + (1− α) bBNE (si) .
For the second drop-out bidders in the English auction with first drop-out price pj , it
can be written as
b (si, pj ;α) = α× bnaive (si) + (1− α) bBNE (si, pj) .
We estimate α by matching this form to the data for each treatment. α measures the
degree to which the subjects’ behaviour departs from the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and is close to the naive bidding strategy. In our setup, α is well identified. For
instance, for the first drop-out bidder in the English auction with each k, this convex
combination can be rewritten as b (si;α) = 100 × α + (2α+ 4 (1− α)) si and α is
identified by matching the constant term and the slope of this equation to the data.
Comparing α estimates across situations where the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
common is of particular interest. Because the equilibrium strategies are held constant
in such situations, comparing the magnitude of α estimates is meaningful. For this
purpose, we note that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies for the first drop-out
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bidder are the same in all insider treatments of the English auction. The equilibrium
strategies for the second drop-out bidder are common in the English auction with no
insider (k = 0) and in the English auction with one insider (k = 1) when the first
drop-out bidder is an outsider. Also, they are common in the English auction with one
insider (k = 1) when the first drop-out bidder is an insider and in the English auction
with two insiders (k = 2). We will focus on the comparisons of α in such situations.
Table 4.10 reports the regression results of α estimates across auction treatments.
Robust standard error clustered by individual subjects are reported in parentheses. We
also report t-test for the equivalence of α between two insider treatments in a given
auction format.
Table 4.10: Nonlinear least squares imposing BNE parameters
SPSB English
k=0 k=2 k=0 k=1 k=2
0.488 0.402 0.657 0.525 0.179
(.086)*** (.122)*** (.080)*** (.096)*** (0.060)***
R2 0.94 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 630 495 210 179 281
H0 : αk = αk′ α0 = α2 α0 = α2 α0 = α1 α1 = α2
F test: 0.34 23.38 1.14 9.48
p value 0.56 0.00 0.29 0.00
bk=0 = (2α+ 7
2
(1− α)) + α100 bk = (2α+ 4(1− α)) + α100
bk=2 = (2α+ 17
5
(1− α)) + α100−
(300 + 18
5
si)(1− α))1[si > 5006 ]
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by individual subjects are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
There is substantial evidence of naive bidding in all treatments: an estimated pa-
rameter α is statistically significant at an usual significance level in all treatments of
the English and second-price auctions. On the other hand, we observe the notable
variations of α̂ across insider treatments of the English auction. For the case of first
drop-out prices (where the equilibrium strategies are all common across insider treat-
ments), α̂ decreases in the number of insiders: α̂ = 0.66 when k = 0; α̂ = 0.53 when
k = 1; and α̂ = 0.18 when k = 2. The reduction of the degree of naive bidding is
statistically significant relative to the treatment with two insiders. A similar pattern is
established for the second drop-out prices. Comparing α̂’s between the treatment with
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k = 0 and that with k = 1 when the first drop-out bidder is an outsider, we again find
a significant drop in the degree of naive bidding: α̂ = 0.70 when k = 0 and α̂ = 0.32
when k = 1 and the first drop-out bidder is an outsider. We do not find any statistical
difference between two estimates in the treatment with k = 1 and 2 where the first
drop-out bidder is an insider. In the second-price auction treatments, we do not find
similar monotonic patterns of α̂: α̂ = 0.49 when k = 0; α̂ = 0.73 when k = 1; and
α̂ = 0.40 when k = 2.
The declining pattern of the degree of naive bidding in the English auction is
quite intriguing. We conjecture that the presence of insiders–who have informational
advantage–makes the outsider more wary about the information asymmetry and thus
creates a motivation for the outsider to hedge against the asymmetry. This may work
toward the correction of naive bidding and thus of the winner’s curse in our setup. We
summarize bidding behaviour in the experiment as follows.
Result 3 (bidding behaviour) (i) There is evidence of naive bidding in both the
second-price auction and the English auction, that is, overbidding relative to the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (ii) The degree of naive bidding declines significantly
in the increase of the number of insiders in the English auction.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have proposed a model of interdependent value auctions with ex ante
information asymmetry and examined key predictions of the model via a laboratory
experiment. We study two standard auction formats–the second-price (sealed-bid)
auction and the English auction. In each auction we allow any composition of insiders,
who are perfectly informed of their value, and outsiders, who are only informed about
the private component of their value. The information asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders gives rise to potential mismatch of bidding strategies between them.
Our model is distinct from the existing auction literature with insider information
in a couple of important respects (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 1983, Hendricks & Porter
1988, Hendricks et al. 1994). First, unlike the literature where common value is typ-
ically assumed, we study the effects of insider information in standard auctions with
interdependent value structure–the second-price (sealed-bid) auction and the English
auction. The structure of interdependent value enables us to investigate the ramifica-
tion of insider information on revenues as well as efficiency. We predict that the English
auction has an efficient equilibrium, while the second-price auction is unable to avoid
inefficiency caused by the presence of insider. Second, our theory is general in that we
provide an equilibrium characterization for any number of insiders, in contrast to the
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common practice of the literature where only one insider is introduced. This yields
novel insights to the literature. Most importantly, the increase in insider information
by turning an outsider to an insider has a positive impact on the seller’s revenues. This
is reminiscent of the celebrated Linkage principle of Milgrom & Weber (1982a).
The experimental evidence supports the theoretical predictions on efficiency and
revenues. We observe that subjects achieved an efficient allocation more frequently
in the English auction than in the second-price auction when insider information is
present. This is consistent with the theory that the English auction has an efficient
equilibrium, whereas the second-price auction not. Controlling for realized signals,
average revenues of the English auction increase in the number of insiders. Although
we do not have revenue predictions for the second-price auction, we find similar patterns
that revenues of the second-price auction increase in the number of insiders as well.
Despite the compliance of experimental data to theory, there is substantial evidence
of naive bidding as typical in the experimental auction literature (see Kagel & Levin
(2011, 1995). Intriguingly, we find that the degree of naive bidding declines in the
number of insiders in the English auction. We conjecture that the more insiders are
present, the more wary outsiders are in their bidding behaviour, which may operate
in the direction of reducing naive bidding and, as a result, the winner’s curse. This
is something to ponder over in developing an alternative, behavioural explanation of
subjects’ bidding behaviour.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1: Suppose that bidder 1 is an insider and employs the un-
dominated strategy of bidding v1(s) for each s. Given this, the optimal bid b2(s2) of
bidder 2 as an outsider must satisfy;
b2(s2) < v1(0, s2) if v1(0, s2) > v2(0, s2)
= v2(α, s2) if v1(α, s2) = v2(α, s2) for some α
> v1(1, s2) if v1(1, s2) < v2(1, s2).
(4.5)
Assume first that v1(0, s2) > v2(0, s2), which implies by the single crossing property
that v1(s1, s2) > v2(s1, s2) for every s1 ∈ [0, 1], so it is efficient for bidder 1 to obtain
the object regardless of s1. Since bidder 1 bids v1(s1, s2), bidder 2 would incur a loss
by winning. Bidder 2 could avoid this loss by bidding any b < v1(0, s2) ≤ v1(s1, s2) and
losing. A similar argument will establish that an optimal bid must be at least v2(1, s2)
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if v1(1, s2) < v2(1, s2), which will lead to the efficient allocation. Lastly, assume that
v1(α, s2) = v2(α, s2) for some α. Note that such α is unique due to the single crossing.
Bidder 2’s optimal bid b has to lie in the interval [v1(0, s2), v1(1, s2)] so that there
exists φ1(b, s2) ∈ [0, 1] such that v1(φ1(b, s2), s2) = b. Letting FS1|S2(·|s2) denote the
distribution of s1 conditional on s2, the expected payoff of bidder 2 with s2 is∫ φ1(b,s2)
0
(v2(s1, s2)− v1(s1, s2))dFS1|S2s1s2.
The integrand is positive if and only if s1 < α, and thus the expression is maximized
by setting b = v1(α, s2) = v2(α, s2). Hence, bidder 2 wins if and only if s1 < α or
v1(s1, s2) < v2(s1, s2) due to the single crossing, which means the resulting allocation
is efficient.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.2: Suppose to the contrary that there exists an efficient equi-
librium of the second-price auction. For a given bidder i, let us define Ei := {s ∈ [0, 1]n |
vi(s) ≥ vj(s) for all j 6= i}, that is the set of signals for which bidder i wins the ob-
ject at the efficient equilibrium. Due to the assumption that insiders obtain the good
with some positive probability less than one, there must exist an outsider i, an insider
j, and a signal profile s in the interior such that vi(s) = vj(s) > maxk 6=i,j vk(s) (or
hi(si) = hj(sj) > maxk 6=i,j hk(sk)). Fix any such profile s and let Eij(si) := {s′|s′i =
si and s
′ ∈ Ei ∩ Ej}. Then, we can find another profile s˜ ∈ Eij(si) such that s˜i = si,
s˜j = sj , and s˜k < sk,∀k 6= i, j.
Now, given the efficient allocation and value bidding of bidder j, the bid bi(si) of
bidder i with si has to satisfy
max
{s′∈Ei|s′i=si}
vj(s
′) ≤ bi(si) ≤ min{s′∈Ej |s′i=si}
vj(s
′). (4.6)
If the first inequality were violated, then bidder i with signal si would lose to bidder j
when the former has a higher value. If the second inequality were violated, then bidder
j would lose to bidder i with signal s′i when the former has a higher value. Now, from
(4.6)
max
s′∈Eij(si)
vj(s
′) ≤ max
{s′∈Ei|s′i=si}
vj(s
′) ≤ bi(si) ≤ min{s′∈Ej |s′i=si}
vj(s
′) ≤ min
s′∈Eij(si)
vj(s
′).
so vj(·) has to be constant on Eij(si). This implies that for some constant k, vj(s′) =
k, ∀s′ ∈ Eij(si), which in turn implies that vi(s′) = k, ∀s′ ∈ Eij(si) since vi(s′) = vj(s′)
for any s′ ∈ Eij(si). Thus, for any s′ ∈ Eij(si), we must have hi(si) = hi(s′i) = k−g(s′),
which cannot be true since, given our assumption, we have g(s) > g(s˜) even though
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s, s˜ ∈ Eij(si).
From now, we provide the proofs of Theorem 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 in Section 4.2.3. To
simplify notation, we will let s(p) := (sO\A, sA(p; pN\A), sI\A(p; pN\A)) and si(p) =
si(p; pN\A) for i ∈ I∪A, by omitting the price history pN\A. We first establish a couple
of preliminary results in Lemma 4.6.1 and 4.6.3. To do so, let v = maxi∈N maxs∈[0,1]n vi(s).
Given the assumption that limsi→∞ vi(si, s−i)→∞ for any s−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, we can find
some si for each i such that vi(si, s−i) ≥ v for any s−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1.
Lemma 4.6.1. For any sO\A and pN\A, there exists a solution (sA, sI\A) : [maxi∈N\A pi, v]→
×i∈I∪A[0, si] of (4.3) such that for each i ∈ A, si(·) is strictly increasing.
Proof. Let v′A·B(s) denote a |A| × |B| matrix with its ij element being ∂vi∂sj (s) for i ∈ A
and j ∈ B. From now, we write v′A·B for convenience. Let 0A and 1A denote column
vectors of 0’s and 1’s with dimension |A|, respectively. The following result from
Krishna (2003) will be useful for the subsequent proof:
Lemma 4.6.2. Suppose A = (aij) is an m × m matrix that satisfies the dominant
average condition:
1
m
m∑
k=1
akj > aij , ∀i 6= j and
m∑
k=1
akj > 0,∀j. (4.7)
Then, A is invertible. Also, there exists a unique x  0 such that Ax = 1, where 1 is
a column vector of m 1’s.
To obtain a solution to (4.3) recursively, suppose that the set of active bidders is
A and the unique solution of (4.3) exists up to price p = maxk∈N\A pk. Let (sA, sI\A)
denote this solution at p. We extend the solution beyond p to all p ∈ [p, v]. To do so,
differentiate both sides of (4.3) with p to get the following differential equation: v′A·A v′A·I\A
v′I\A·A v
′
I\A·I\A
 s′A(p)
s′I\A(p)
 =
 1A
0I\A
 (4.8)
(sA(p), sI\A(p)) = (sA, sI\A).
Note that the first matrix in the LHS can be written as v′I∪A·I∪A. Assume for the
moment that v′N ·N is invertible so its principal minors v
′
I∪A·I∪A and v
′
I\A·I\A are in-
vertible too. Then, by Peano’s theorem, a unique solution of (4.8) exists since the
value functions are twice continuously differentiable. We now show that v′N ·N is in-
vertible and also sA(p)
′  0. To do so, let us rewrite the last |I\A| lines of (4.8) as
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s′I\A = −(v′I\A·I\A)−1v′I\A·As′A. Substitute this into the first |A| lines of (4.8) to obtain
V s′A = 1A after rearrangement, where
V := v′A·A − v′A·I\A(v′I\A·I\A)−1v′I\A·A.
If V satisfies the dominant average condition for any A, then, with A = N , V = v′N ·N
is invertible by Lemma 4.6.2. Also, by Lemma 4.6.2, s′A(p) 0.
To prove that V satisfies the dominant average condition, let g′k =
∂g
∂sk
and g′A =
(g′k)k∈A, where g
′
A is considered as a column vector. Let DA denote the diagonal matrix
whose diagonal entry is h′k =
dhk
dsk
for k ∈ A. Then, for any A,B ⊂ N ,
v′A·B =
 DA + 1A(g′A)t if A = B1A(g′B)t if A ∩B = ∅,
where (·)t denotes the transpose of a matrix. Using this, we can rewrite V as
V = DA + 1A(g
′
A)
t − 1A(g′I\A)t
(
DI\A + 1I\A(g′I\A)
t
)−1
1I\A(g′A)
t
= DA + (1− x)1A(g′A)t, (4.9)
where x = (g′I\A)
t
(
DI\A + 1I\A(g′I\A)
t
)−1
1I\A. Since all the entries in any given
column of the matrix 1A(g
′
A)
t are identical and the diagonal entries of DA are positive,
the first inequality of (4.7) is easily verified. The proof will be complete if the second
inequality of (4.7) is shown to hold, for which it suffices to show x < 1:
x = (g′I\A)
t
(
DI\A + 1I\A(g′I\A)
t
)−1
1I\A
= (g′I\A)
t
(
D−1I\A −
(
1
1 + (g′I\A)
tD−1I\A1I\A
)
D−1I\A1I\A(g
′
I\A)
tD−1I\A
)
1I\A
= (g′I\A)
tD−1I\A1I\A −
(
(g′I\A)
tD−1I\A1I\A
)2
1 + (g′I\A)
tD−1I\A1I\A
=
(g′I\A)
tD−1I\A1I\A
1 + (g′I\A)
tD−1I\A1I\A
=
∑
k∈I\A g
′
k/h
′
k
1 +
∑
k∈I\A g
′
k/h
′
k
< 1,
where the second equality was derived using the formula for an inverse matrix,
(
A+ bct
)−1
= A−1 −
(
1
1 + ctA−1b
)
A−1bctA−1,
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with A = DI\A, b = 1I\A, and c = g′I\A.
Given the break-even signals obtained in Lemma 4.6.1, we consider each outsider
i’s strategy of dropping out (staying in) at p if and only if si < si(p) after any history
pN\A. Together with the insiders’ value bidding strategy, we refer to this strategy
profile as β∗.
Lemma 4.6.3. Given the strategy profile β∗, for any signal profile s ∈ [0, 1]n, (i)
outsiders drop out in order of their values; (ii) for each outsider i, pi ≤ vi(s); and (iii)
at any outsider i’s drop-out price pi, sj(pi) ≥ sj for each insider j who is inactive at
pi.
Proof. Consider two outsiders i and j with pi ≤ pj . Then, at the price pi at which
bidder i drops out, we have
hi(si) = hi(si(pi)) = pi − g(s(pi)) = hj(sj(pi)) ≤ hj(sj),
where the first equality and the inequality follow from the drop-out strategy of the
outsiders i and j, respectively, while the second and third equalities from the break-
even condition at pi. This proves (i) since hi(si) ≤ hj(sj) means vi(s) ≤ vj(s).
To prove (ii), suppose to the contrary that pi > vi(s). Since si(pi) = si, this means
hi(si) + g(s(pi)) = pi > hi(si) + g(s), so g(s(pi)) > g(s). Given this, for each insider
j ∈ I (whether active or not), we must have
hj(sj)− hj(sj(pi)) ≥ g(s(pi))− g(s) > 0, (4.10)
where the first inequality holds since the break-even condition implies that for an
inactive insider j, hj(sj) + g(s) = vj(s) = pj = vj(s(pi)) = hj(sj(pi)) + g(s(pi)) while
for an active insider j, hj(sj) + g(s) = vj(s) ≥ pi = vj(s(pi)) = hj(sj(pi)) + g(s(pi)).
The inequality (4.10) implies sj > sj(pi) for each insider j. Also, for each active
outsider j ∈ O ∩ A, we have sj ≥ sj(pi). Thus, s ≥ s(pi) so vi(s) ≥ vi(s(pi)) = pi, a
contradiction.
To prove (iii), note first that due to (ii), we have hi(si) + g(s) = vi(s) ≥ pi =
hi(si(pi)) + g(s(pi)) = hi(si) + g(s(pi)) since si(pi) = si. This inequality means g(s) ≥
g(s(pi)). If an insider j is inactive at pi, then we must have vj(s) = pj = vj(s(pi)) or
hj(sj(pi))− hj(sj) = g(s)− g(s(pi)) ≥ 0, which yields sj(pi) ≥ sj .
Proof of Theorem 4.2.4: We first prove that the strategy profile β∗, if followed by
all bidders, leads to the efficient allocation, and then show that it constitutes an ex-post
equilibrium.
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Given that outsiders drop out in order of their values (according to (i) of Lemma
4.6.3), the efficiency result will follow if an outsider i with the highest value among
outsiders drops out before (after) an insider j with the highest value among insiders
if and only if vi(s) < (>)vj(s). In case vi(s) < vj(s), the outsider i dropping out at
some pi ≤ vi(s) (from (ii) of Lemma 4.6.3) means that the insider j is a winner since
pi ≤ vi(s) < vj(s) is lower than the insider j’s drop-out price vj(s). Assume now
that vi(s) > vj(s) and suppose to the contrary that the outsider i drops out at some
price pi < vj(s) at which only insiders, including j, are active.
17 Then, the break-even
condition at pi implies hi(si) = pi − g(s(pi)) = hk(sk(pi)) for each k ∈ I ∩ A. Since
hi(si) > hk(sk) for all those k, this means hk(sk(pi)) > hk(sk) or sk(pi) > sk. Thus, due
to (iii) of Lemma 4.6.3, we have s(pi) = (sO, sI∩A(pi), sI\A(pi)) ≥ s with sk(pi) > sk,
which implies pi = vk(s(pi)) > vk(s) for all k ∈ I ∩A. This contradicts with the value
bidding strategy of insiders.
To show that the strategy profile β∗ constitutes an ex-post equilibrium, let us focus
on an arbitrary outsider i. If i has the highest value and follows the equilibrium strategy
to be a winner, then his payoff is vi(s) −maxk 6=i pk ≥ vi(s) −maxk 6=i vk(s) ≥ 0.18 So
any nontrivial deviation by i cannot be profitable since it will only result in losing and
earning zero payoff. Suppose now that there is some j with vj(s) > vi(s). If j is an
insider, then any nontrivial deviation by i to become a winner would make him pay
at least vj(s), i.e. more than his value. Let us thus focus on the case j is an outsider
with the highest value. Any nontrivial deviation by i would require him to wait beyond
some price p such that si(p) = si, and then becoming a winner after j drops out last at
some pj > p.
19 Then, we must have si(pj) > si and sj(pj) = sj . Combining this with
sI(pj) ≥ sI (from (iii) of Lemma 4.6.3), we have s(pj) = (sO\{i}, si(pj), sI(pj)) ≥ s
with si(pj) > si, so vi(s(pj)) = pj > vi(s), implying the deviation would incur a loss to
i.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.5: Throughout the proof, for any variable x in E, we let x′
denote its counterpart in E′. For instance, p′k denotes a drop-out price of bidder k in
E′. Let O = {1, 2, · · · , l} and thus I = {l+ 1, · · · , n}, and assume that v1(s) ≤ v2(s) ≤
· · · ≤ vl(s), without loss of generality. Then, O′ = O\{i} and I ′ = I ∪ {i}.
First, according to (ii) of Lemma 4.6.3, the switched insider i drops out at a (weakly)
higher price in E′ than in E. The proof will be complete if we show that all other
outsiders drop out at (weakly) higher prices in E′ as well. Now suppose for a con-
17This holds since bidder i is the last to drop out among outsiders, according to (i) of Lemma 4.6.3.
18The first inequality holds since each insider drops out at his value and each outsider drops out
below his value according to (ii) of Lemma 4.6.3.
19An argument similar to that in the proof of the efficiency can be used to show that since j has the
highest value, j is the one to drop out last (except for i) even under i’s deviation.
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tradiction that some outsider drops out at a lower price in E′ than in E. Note that
for all outsider k < i, we have p′k = pk since the history of drop-out prices is the
same across E and E′ until pi is reached. Using this and our assumption, let us define
j = min{k | p′k < pk, and i < k ≤ l}. Let us first make a few of observations: (i) a
signal sk for each k < j with k 6= i has been revealed in both E and E′ when the price
clock reaches p′j , since pk ≤ p′k ≤ p′j for all such k20; (ii) s′j(p′j) = sj = sj(pj) > sj(p′j)
since pj > p
′
j ; and (iii) s
′
i(p
′
j) ≥ si. To see (iii), it follows from (iii) of Lemma 4.6.3
if i is inactive at p′j in E
′. If i is active at p′j , then the monotonicity of s
′
i(·) implies
s′i(p
′
j) ≥ s′i(pi) = si(pi) = si since p′j ≥ pi.21 We next show that
s′k(p
′
j) ≥ sk(p′j) for all k ∈ {j + 1, · · · , n}, (4.11)
which, given (i), (ii), and (iii) above, will imply that s′(p′j) ≥ s(p′j)22 with s′j(p′j) >
sj(p
′
j), so p
′
j = vj(s
′(p′j)) > vj(s(p
′
j)) = p
′
j , yielding the desired contradiction. To prove
(4.11), observe first that the break-even conditions at price p′j in E and E
′ yield
g(s(p′j)) = p
′
j − hj(sj(p′j)) > p′j − hj(s′j(p′j)) = g(s′(p′j)),
where the inequality holds due to (ii) above. We then prove (4.11) by considering two
cases depending on whether or not k ∈ {j + 1, · · · , n} is active at p′j in E′. Since each
outsider k ∈ {j + 1, · · · , l} is active at p′j in E′, an inactive bidder k ∈ {j + 1, · · · , n}
must be an insider. For such k, we obtain (4.11) since the break-even conditions at
price p′j in E and E
′ yield
hk(s
′
k(p
′
j)) = pk − g(s′(p′j)) > pk − g(s(p′j)) = hk(sk(p′j)), (4.12)
where the inequality follows from (4.12). Turning to the case in which bidder k ∈
{j + 1, · · · , n} is active at p′j in E′, he must be active at p′j in E as well. The reason
is that if k is an outsider, then p′j < pj and he drops out no sooner than j in E (due
to (i) of Lemma 4.6.3) while if k is an insider, he drops out at the same price (i.e. his
value) in E and E′. Thus, we obtain (4.11) since the break-even conditions at p′j in E
and E′ yield
hk(s
′
k(p
′
j)) = p
′
j − g(s′(p′j)) > p′j − g(s(p′j)) = hk(sk(p′j)),
20The second inequality here holds since outsiders drop out in order of their values in E′.
21The equality s′i(pi) = si(pi) follows from the fact that the price history is the same across E and
E′ until pi is reached.
22Note that the i-th component of s(pj) is equal to si so the inequality follows from (iii).
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where the inequality follows again from (4.12).
4.6.2 Experimental analysis
Table 4.11: Regression analysis of revenues more flexible specifications
Variables English SBSP
k = 1 10.847*** 10.861***
(1.986) (2.468)
k = 2 18.853*** 10.435***
(1.74) (2.214)
s(1) 0.975*** 0.288
(.227) (.304)
s(2) 2.037*** 1.710***
(.153) (.197)
s(3) 0.466** 1.075***
(.226) (.301)
s(1)2 0.006*** 0.009***
(.002) (.003)
s(2)2 0.001 0.003
(.002) (.002)
s(3)2 0.002 -0.004
(.002) (.002)
s(1) x s(2) -0.007* -0.014***
(.003) (.004)
s(1) x s(3) 0 0.009**
(.003) (.004)
constant 2.36 15.850*
(6.665) (9.04)
# of obs. 1125 975
R2 0.908 0.839
p-value H0: (k=0) = (k=1) 0.000 0.000
p-value H0: (k=1) = (k=2) 0.000 0.834
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** represent 10%,5%, and 1% significance level, respec-
tively. s(1) = min[s], s(3) = max[s], s(2) = med[s]
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Table 4.12: Regression analysis of revenues more flexible specifications
Variables English SBSP
k = 1 15.665** 17.633*
(7.936) (9.763)
k = 2 29.069* 24.29
(15.381) (18.879)
s(1) 0.784*** 0.626***
(.048) (.066)
s(2) 2.053*** 1.716***
(.043) (.059)
s(3) 0.707*** 0.622***
(.051) (.066)
1[s(1)=s(Insider)] -10.971 -16.276*
(7.892) (9.833)
1[s(2)=s(Insider)] -5.224 -19.698*
(8.303) (10.228)
1[s(3)=s(Insider)] -23.238** -31.405***
(9.224) (11.549)
1[s(1)=s(Insider)] × s(1) 0.245*** 0.261***
(.067) (.092)
1[s(2)=s(Insider)] × s(2) 0.082 0.332***
(.058) (.075)
1[s(3)=s(Insider)] × s(3) 0.181*** 0.310***
(.066) (.09)
constant 3.565 38.074***
(4.217) (5.168)
# of obs. 1125 975
R2 0.91 0.844
p-value H0: (k=0) = (k=1) 0.049 0.071
p-value H0: (k=1) = (k=2) 0.084 0.484
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** represent 10%,5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.
s(1) = min[s], s(3) = max[s], s(2) = med[s]
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4.6.3 Maximum Likelihood approach
The ML approach deals with the censoring existing in the observed data. It distin-
guishes between the observed drop–out bid ds,ir and the reservation bid ps,ir. For
easiness of exposition denote, for all i ∈ N , g1(i, r) as the individual who first drops
out from i’s group in round r, and the corresponding group as g(i, r), let G1(r) be
the collection of all first bidders at round r. Therefore, for all i ∈ G1(r) we know
p1,ir = d1,ir but for the other two active bidders j ∈ g(i, r) \ g1(i, r) we only know that
p1,jr > p1,g1(j,r)r which means that we observe a right–censored variable of their true
drop–out price. For the second stage, we know that for bidder g2(i, r), who second
drops out, his/her reservation bid is p2,g2(i,r)r = d2,g2(i,r)r, but for the remaining bidder
j we only know d2,jr > d2,g2(i,r)r, which again implies a right–censored variable.
Consider ks,ir = p
k
s,ir − Γks,ir where Γks,ir follows from the right hand side of the
regression equation. We know that ds,g1(i,r)r = ps,ir if and only if i ∈ gs(i, r). If we
define eks,ir = d
k
s,g1(i,r)r
− Γks,ir then ds,g1(i,r)r = ps,ir if and only if eks,ir = ks,ir.
Denoting θks =
(
αs
k, βs
k, δs
k, {σs,i : i : 1→ Nk}
)
and Ds ≡
(
ds,gs(i,r)
)
∀i∈Nk,r∈R the
information on drop–out prices from the experiment, the density function associated
to the first bidding function p1,ir is given by
fp1,ir(b | ·) = f(p1,ir = d1,g1i,rr | ·)1[i∈g1(i,r)](1− F (p1,ir ≤ d1,g1i,rr | ·))1[i/∈g1(i,r)] ,
therefore the ML function is
Lk1
(
θk1 ;D1
)
=
∏
r∈R
∏
i∈Nk
[
1
σi
φ
(
ek1,ir
σi
)]1[i∈g1(i,r)] [
1− Φ
(
ek1,ir
σi
)]1[i/∈g1(i,r)]
(4.13)
On the other hand, the ML associated to second bidders is
Lk2
(
θk2 ;D2
)
=
∏
r∈R
∏
i∈Nk\G1(r)
[
1
σi
φ
(
ek2,ir
σi
)]1[i∈g2(i,r)] [
1− Φ
(
ek2,ir
σi
)]1[i/∈g2(i,r)]
(4.14)
Notice that the specification corresponds to a Partial ML estimator. From Wooldridge
(2003) we know that, once correcting the variance matrix for within–subjects depen-
dence, the pooled partial MLE analysis is consistent and asymptotically normal.
4.6.4 Supplementary Material
Equilibrium of Second-Price Auction with I = {2, 3}: We aim to find bidder
1’s bid that is a best response to the value bidding of the two insiders, bidder 2 and
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3. By symmetry, it suffices to focus on the case in which s2 ≥ s3 so v2(s) ≥ v3(s),
meaning bidder 2 bids higher than bidder 3. Then, by bidding b, bidder 1 wins the
object to obtain a payoff equal to v1(s)− v2(s) = (a− 1)(s1 − s2) when b ≥ v2(s) and
s2 ≥ s3, which can be rewritten as s3 ≤ min{b − as2 − s1, s2}. Given this and the
uniform distribution of signals, bidder 1’s payoff from biding b is given as
pi(b; s1) =
∫ min{1, b−s1
a
}
0
(a− 1)(s1 − s2) min{b− as2 − s1, s2}ds2.
As one can check, this expression is maximized by setting b = B1(s1) with B1(s1)
defined in (4.2).
Equilibrium of Second-Price Auction with I = {3}: Let B : [0, 1]→ R+ denote
a symmetric, non-decreasing bidding strategy for the two outsiders. We first prove
Proposition 4.2.3 to obtain a partial characterization of monotone equilibrium bidding
strategy for general value distribution:
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3. To first show that B(s) ≥ (a+1)s for all (0, 1], suppose
for a contradiction that bidder 1, for instance, with some signal sˆ ∈ (0, 1] is bidding
B(sˆ) < (a + 1)sˆ. We consider this bidder’s payoff at the margin, i.e. when his bid
is tied with that of either bidder 2 or bidder 3 as the highest bid. First, being tied
with bidder 2 means that s2 = sˆ, in which case bidder 1’s (ex-post) payoff is equal to
v1(s)− B(sˆ) > asˆ+ sˆ+ s3 − (a+ 1)sˆ = s3 ≥ 0. Next, being tied with bidder 3 means
that v3(s) = as3 + sˆ+s2 = B(sˆ) < (a+1)sˆ, which implies that as3 < asˆ−s2 so s3 < sˆ.
In this case, bidder 1’s ex-post payoff is equal to v1(s)− v3(s) = (a− 1)(sˆ− s3) > 0. In
sum, bidder 1 with sˆ obtains a positive marginal payoff whether he is tied with bidder
2 or bidder 3. So, it is profitable to slight increase his bid from B(sˆ).
To next show that B(s) ≤ (a+ 2)s for all s ∈ [0, 1], let now suppose to the contrary
that bidder 1, for instance, with some signal sˆ ∈ [0, 1] is bidding B(sˆ) > (a + 2)sˆ. As
above, we consider this bidder’s payoff at the margin. In the case of tying with bidder
2, we have s2 = sˆ and v3(s) = as3 + 2sˆ ≤ B(sˆ), which implies s3 ≤ B(sˆ)−2sˆa . So bidder
1’s (ex-post) payoff is
(a+ 1)sˆ+ s3 −B(sˆ) ≤ (a+ 1)sˆ+ B(sˆ)− 2sˆ
a
−B(sˆ) = a− 1
a
[B(sˆ)− (a+ 2)sˆ] < 0
since B(sˆ) > (a + 2)sˆ. In the case of the tying with bidder 3, we have s2 ≤ sˆ and
v3(s) = as3 + sˆ + s2 = B(sˆ) > (a + 2)sˆ, which implies s3 > sˆ. Then, the payoff of
bidder 1 with sˆ is v1(s)− v3(s) = (a− 1)(sˆ− s3) < 0. In sum, bidder 1 with sˆ obtains a
negative marginal payoff whether he is tied with bidder 2 or bidder 3. So, it is profitable
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to slightly reduce his bid from B(sˆ).
To show (ii), note that by (i), we must have B(1) ≤ (a + 2). Suppose now for a
contradiction that B(1) < a + 2. If an outsider i with signals si = 1 deviates to some
bid greater than B(1), then it will only increase his chance of winning against bidder
3, in which case his payoff increases by vi(1, s−i)− v3(1, s−i) = (a− 1)(1− s3) > 0. So
the deviation is profitable.
To go beyond the partial characterization in Proposition 4.2.3, let us consider the
problem faced by bidder 1 with any fixed signal s1 ∈ [0, 1]. By bidding b, he wins if s2 ≤
B−1(b) and v3(s) ≤ b. Then, his payment is equal to v3(s) if v3(s) ≥ B(s2) and equal
to B(s2) otherwise. In the former case (the darker gray area A3 in the graph below),
his (ex-post) payoff is v1(s)−v3(s) = (a−1)(s1−s3) while in the latter case (the lighter
gray area A2 in the graph below), his payoff is v1(s)−B(s2) = as1 + s2 + s3 −B(s2).
s3
s2
1
1
b−s1
a
B−1(b)
B(s2) = v3(s)
b = v3(s)
s1 : fixed
A3
A2
s2
b−s2−s1
a
B(s2)−s2−s1
a
Given this and the uniform distribution of signals, the expected payoff of bidder 1
186
4.6. Appendix 4. Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information
with s1 can be written as
pi(b; s1) =
∫ B−1(b)
0
[∫ min{ b−s2−s1
a
,1}
max{B(s2)−s2−s1
a
,0}
(a− 1)(s1 − s3)ds3
]
ds2
+
∫ B−1(b)
0
[∫ max{B(s2)−s2−s1
a
,0}
0
(as1 + s2 + s3 −B(s2))ds3
]
ds2.
The first (resp., second) integration corresponds to bidder 1’s payoff in the area A3
(resp,. A2). Then, the requirement that this payoff be maximized by setting b = B(s1)
gives rise to a differential equation with which we can solve for B. While we omit
the detailed expression for the differential equation, it yields a linear solution below a
threshold signal:
B(s1) =
(
−7 + 7a+ 4a2 +√1 + 14a− 23a2 − 8a3 + 16a4
2(−3 + 4a)
)
s1 for s1 ∈ [0, s],
where the threshold s is the signal s1 that solves
B(s1)−s1
a = 1.
23 Unfortunately, an
analytical form solution for B is unavailable beyond the range [0, s]. Instead, we have
used a numerical method to draw a graph of B that is given as follow:
23We note that for a = 2, B(s1) ' 3.44s1 and s ' 0.82
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1 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Research foundations have 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you 
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of 
the monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim 
your payments. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee simply for showing 
up on time. In addition, you will receive £10 as an initial balance you will use in this 
experiment. Any positive or negative earnings incurred during the experiment will be added 
into this balance. Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. During 
the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. Your 
payments will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
40 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 17 independent and identical (of the same 
form) auction rounds. In each round you will act as a bidder in an auction and compete for 
a single hypothetical object with other two participants in your group. Note that the first 
two rounds are practice rounds in which your earnings will not be counted for actual 
payoffs. The remaining 15 auction rounds are real and any positive or negative earnings 
will be counted for actual payoffs. If your balance during the experiment goes below zero, 
you will become inactive and be excluded for any remaining auction rounds and will 
receive only £5 participation fee at the end of the experiment.  
 
An auction round 
 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 17 rounds. Each 
round starts by having the computer randomly form three-person groups. The groups 
formed in each round depend solely upon chance and are independent of the groups formed 
in any of the other rounds. That is, in any group each active participant is equally likely to 
be chosen for that group. In a case where any other participant was excluded due to its 
negative balance, there is a chance that you may become inactive in a particular round 
when you are matched with that participant who was excluded.  
In the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned a signal that will be 
randomly drawn from the set of integer numbers of tokens between 0 and 100 (numbers not 
including decimals). That is, any number from the set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} will be equally 
likely to be drawn. A signal you will be assigned in each round is independent of signals 
other participants will be assigned and is independent of a signal assigned to you in any of 
the other rounds. This will be done by the computer. 
Experimental instructions
Instructions SPSB k = 0
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Figure 4.6: Attachments Instructions SPSB k = 0
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1 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Research foundations have 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you 
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of 
the monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim 
your payments. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee simply for showing 
up on time. In addition, you will receive £10 as an initial balance you will use in this 
experiment. Any positive or negative earnings incurred during the experiment will be added 
into this balance. Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. During 
the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. Your 
payments will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
40 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 17 independent and identical (of the same 
form) auction rounds. In each round you will act as a bidder in an auction and compete for 
a single hypothetical object with other two participants in your group. Note that the first 
two rounds are practice rounds in which your earnings will not be counted for actual 
payoffs. The remaining 15 auction rounds are real and any positive or negative earnings 
will be counted for actual payoffs. If your balance during the experiment goes below zero, 
you will become inactive and be excluded for any remaining auction rounds and will 
receive only £5 participation fee at the end of the experiment.  
 
An auction round 
 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 17 rounds. Each 
round starts by having the computer randomly form three-participant groups. In each group, 
one participant is played by the computer (called a computer participant), while the other 
two participants are played by persons. The groups formed in each round depend solely 
upon chance and are independent of the groups formed in any of the other rounds. That is, 
in any group each active person is equally likely to be chosen for that group. In a case 
where any other person was excluded due to its negative balance, there is a chance that you 
may become inactive in a particular round when you are matched with that person who was 
excluded.  
In the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned a signal that will be 
randomly drawn from the set of integer numbers of tokens between 0 and 100 (numbers not 
including decimals). That is, any number from the set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} will be equally 
likely to be drawn. A signal you will be assigned in each round is independent of signals 
other participants will be assigned and is independent of a signal assigned to you in any of 
the other rounds. This will be done by the computer. 
Instructions SPSB k = 1
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1 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Research foundations have 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you 
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of 
the monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim 
your payments. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee simply for showing 
up on time. In addition, you will receive £10 as an initial balance you will use in this 
experiment. Any positive or negative earnings incurred during the experiment will be added 
into this balance. Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. During 
the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. Your 
payments will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
40 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 17 independent and identical (of the same 
form) auction rounds. In each round you will act as a bidder in an auction and compete for 
a single hypothetical object with other two participants in your group. Note that the first 
two rounds are practice rounds in which your earnings will not be counted for actual 
payoffs. The remaining 15 auction rounds are real and any positive or negative earnings 
will be counted for actual payoffs. If your balance during the experiment goes below zero, 
you will become inactive and be excluded for any remaining auction rounds and will 
receive only £5 participation fee at the end of the experiment.  
 
An auction round 
 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 17 rounds. Each 
round starts by having the computer randomly form three-participant groups. In each group, 
two participants are played by the computer (called computer participants), while the other 
participant is played by you.  
In the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned a signal that will be 
randomly drawn from the set of integer numbers of tokens between 0 and 100 (numbers not 
including decimals). That is, any number from the set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} will be equally 
likely to be drawn. A signal you will be assigned in each round is independent of signals 
other participants will be assigned and is independent of a signal assigned to you in any of 
the other rounds. This will be done by the computer. 
You will only know your own signal but not signals of the other two computer 
participants. On the other hand, the computer participants will know not only their own 
signals but also the signals of other two participants.  
The value of the object for each participant is determined by signals received by that 
participant and the other participants in the same group. Specifically, each participant’s 
Instructions SPSB k = 2
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1 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Research foundations have 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you 
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of 
the monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim 
your payments. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee simply for showing 
up on time. In addition, you will receive £10 as an initial balance you will use in this 
experiment. Any positive or negative earnings incurred during the experiment will be added 
into this balance. Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. During 
the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. Your 
payments will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
40 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 17 independent and identical (of the same 
form) auction rounds. In each round you will act as a bidder in an auction and compete for 
a single hypothetical object with other two participants in your group. Note that the first 
two rounds are practice rounds in which your earnings will not be counted for actual 
payoffs. The remaining 15 auction rounds are real and any positive or negative earnings 
will be counted for actual payoffs. If your balance during the experiment goes below zero, 
you will become inactive and be excluded for any remaining auction rounds and will 
receive only £5 participation fee at the end of the experiment.  
 
An auction round 
 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 17 rounds. Each 
round starts by having the computer randomly form three-person groups. The groups 
formed in each round depend solely upon chance and are independent of the groups formed 
in any of the other rounds. That is, in any group each active participant is equally likely to 
be chosen for that group. In a case where any other participant was excluded due to its 
negative balance, there is a chance that you may become inactive in a particular round 
when you are matched with that participant who was excluded.  
In the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned a signal that will be 
randomly drawn from the set of integer numbers of tokens between 0 and 100 (numbers not 
including decimals). That is, any number from the set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} will be equally 
likely to be drawn. A signal you will be assigned in each round is independent of signals 
other participants will be assigned and is independent of a signal assigned to you in any of 
the other rounds. This will be done by the computer. 
Instructions English k = 0
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Figure 4.8: Attachments Instructions English k = 0
194
1 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Research foundations have 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you 
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of 
the monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim 
your payments. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee simply for showing 
up on time. In addition, you will receive £10 as an initial balance you will use in this 
experiment. Any positive or negative earnings incurred during the experiment will be added 
into this balance. Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. During 
the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. Your 
payments will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
40 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 17 independent and identical (of the same 
form) auction rounds. In each round you will act as a bidder in an auction and compete for 
a single hypothetical object with other two participants in your group. Note that the first 
two rounds are practice rounds in which your earnings will not be counted for actual 
payoffs. The remaining 15 auction rounds are real and any positive or negative earnings 
will be counted for actual payoffs. If your balance during the experiment goes below zero, 
you will become inactive and be excluded for any remaining auction rounds and will 
receive only £5 participation fee at the end of the experiment.  
 
An auction round 
 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 17 rounds. Each 
round starts by having the computer randomly form three-participant groups. In each group, 
one participant is played by the computer (called a computer participant), while the other 
two participants are played by persons. The groups formed in each round depend solely 
upon chance and are independent of the groups formed in any of the other rounds. That is, 
in any group each active person is equally likely to be chosen for that group. In a case 
where any other person was excluded due to its negative balance, there is a chance that you 
may become inactive in a particular round when you are matched with that person who was 
excluded.  
In the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned a signal that will be 
randomly drawn from the set of integer numbers of tokens between 0 and 100 (numbers not 
including decimals). That is, any number from the set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} will be equally 
likely to be drawn. A signal you will be assigned in each round is independent of signals 
other participants will be assigned and is independent of a signal assigned to you in any of 
the other rounds. This will be done by the computer. 
Instructions English k = 1
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Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Research foundations have 
provided funds for conducting this research. Your earnings will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of the other participants in the experiment. If you 
follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money.  
At this point, check the name of the computer you are using as it appears on the top of 
the monitor. At the end of the experiment, you should use your computer name to claim 
your payments. At this time, you will receive £5 as a participation fee simply for showing 
up on time. In addition, you will receive £10 as an initial balance you will use in this 
experiment. Any positive or negative earnings incurred during the experiment will be added 
into this balance. Details of how you will make decisions will be provided below. During 
the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of pounds. Your 
payments will be calculated in terms of tokens and then exchanged at the end of the 
experiment into pounds at the following rate: 
40 Tokens = 1 Pound 
In this experiment, you will participate in 17 independent and identical (of the same 
form) auction rounds. In each round you will act as a bidder in an auction and compete for 
a single hypothetical object with other two participants in your group. Note that the first 
two rounds are practice rounds in which your earnings will not be counted for actual 
payoffs. The remaining 15 auction rounds are real and any positive or negative earnings 
will be counted for actual payoffs. If your balance during the experiment goes below zero, 
you will become inactive and be excluded for any remaining auction rounds and will 
receive only £5 participation fee at the end of the experiment.  
 
An auction round 
 
Next, we will describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all 17 rounds. Each 
round starts by having the computer randomly form three-participant groups. In each group, 
two participants are played by the computer (called computer participants), while the other 
participant is played by you.  
In the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned a signal that will be 
randomly drawn from the set of integer numbers of tokens between 0 and 100 (numbers not 
including decimals). That is, any number from the set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} will be equally 
likely to be drawn. A signal you will be assigned in each round is independent of signals 
other participants will be assigned and is independent of a signal assigned to you in any of 
the other rounds. This will be done by the computer. 
You will only know your own signal but not signals of the other two computer 
participants. On the other hand, the computer participants will know not only their own 
signals but also the signals of other two participants.  
The value of the object for each participant is determined by signals received by that 
participant and the other participants in the same group. Specifically, each participant’s 
Instructions English k = 2
197
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
Regarding chapter 2 we provide an extension to discrete choice models with social
interactions when there are asymmetries on the degree of peer influences and group
unobservables. We find conditions under which a multinomial choice model presents
unique equilibrium and show that, even in the presence of correlated effects at the
group level, the endogenous and contextual effects are separately identified provided
sufficient variation in the weighting matrix. In our application, our specific data allows
us to investigate a particular historical period but our results might be relevant for
social network effects in contemporary studies. Using contemporary datasets together
with local networks based on geography not be the best measure of the relevant social
group. This may lead to complicated patterns of interdependences in errors across
individuals as well as make it difficult to assess counterfactuals (Manski 2000).
Relying on our historical period and the unique two-tier administrative system en-
ables us to deal with self–selection into social group. We exploit the fact that public
goods were provided at a higher tier and consequently affected location decision while
community identity were still largely determined at a more local level. We find that
social interactions are important in explaining industrial occupational choice and un-
employment. Failing to account for group unobservables overestimates these effects.
Studying social interactions may help understand Inter-generational occupational
(Borjas 1994, Munshi & Wilson 2008). This is a interesting question for future work.
On chapter 3 we provide an artefactual field experiment evidence on reference–
dependent preferences and investment decisions on a sample of vulnerable small en-
trepreneurs from the developing world. In particular we find that having unfulfilled
recent beliefs about a monetary outcome triggers risk–loving behaviour only on indi-
viduals who fell behind their more optimistic expectation, while promoting risk–averse
behaviours on individuals which surpass their most pessimistic one.
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Several authors have pointed out that expectations on future events can determine
reference points. Our experimental evidence suggests that past expectations could
affect also reference points determination in close relatedness to multiple reference
points suggested by Ko¨szegi & Rabin (2007), Sprenger (2010). We provide a model
of stochastic reference points that replicates qualitatively most of the experimental
results. Further experimental work is needed to fully understand the interactions be-
tween status quo, lagged beliefs and forward looking beliefs in determining reference
points formation.
Lastly, the interdependent value auction model in chapter 4 explicitly studies the
effects of insider information in standard auction formats. The structure of interde-
pendent value enables us to investigate the implications on efficiency and revenue. We
predict that the English auction has an efficient equilibrium, while the second-price
auction is unable to avoid inefficiency. It is also shown that turning an outsider to an
insider has a positive impact on the seller’s revenues (reminiscent of Milgrom & Weber
(1982a)’s linkage principle).
The experimental evidence supports the theoretical predictions on efficiency and
revenues. Efficient allocation is more frequent in the English auction than in the second-
price auction when insider information is present. Once realized signals are accounted
for, average revenues of the English auction increase in the number of insiders. Despite
the compliance of experimental data to theory, there is substantial evidence of naive
bidding in line with other literature (Kagel & Levin 2011, 1995). Intriguingly, we
find that the degree of naive bidding declines in the number of insiders in the English
auction. This is something to ponder over in developing a behavioural explanation of
subjects’ bidding behaviour where imperfectly informed bidders become more wary the
more insiders are present.
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